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Abstract
Regional organizations have developed into important global actors as they
negotiate inter-regional trade agreements, regulate economic policies, and develop
international security communities. States have much to gain from such regional
cooperation efforts particularly in emerging regions such as Latin America. Such gains
can include increased trade and economic relations, enhanced security, attracting external
investment, and increasing bargaining power at the international level. With such gains to
be had, one might expect states in these regions to regularly cooperate in order to achieve
their common interests. However, this is clearly not always the case. Latin America has
struggled for decades with an ebb and flow of regional cooperation schemes. Why do we
see variation in levels of regional cooperation in Latin America? More specifically, given
the potential gains from regional cooperation, why do we see periods of defection within
these organizations?
Historical cases within the Latin America suggest that regional cooperation
suffers under conditions of unequal gains. Asymmetrical distribution of economic gains
from cooperation efforts hinder further integration and increase the chance a state will
defect from the group’s arrangements. This study uses a mixed methods approach to
explore the impact of economic asymmetry on regional cooperation in Latin America.
Beginning with a large-N statistical analysis utilizing a cross-nested model to capture
variance within and between organizations, it finds evidence that asymmetric distribution
ii

of investment and trade hinders political indicators of cooperation. Additional in-depth
case analysis of the Andean Community and Mercosur further highlight these trends
through showing country-specific data and diplomatic statements during periods of major
defection within the groups. Based on these findings, this study demonstrates the
importance of the distribution of gains expected from regional cooperation efforts as it
concludes that increasing economic asymmetry within a region leads to lower overall
cooperation among an organization’s member-states.
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Chapter One: Introduction
Introduction
Since the end of the Cold War, regional agreements around the world have
become increasingly prevalent. Nearly every state in the world is a member of at least
one regional organization generated from such agreements. Many of these organizations
have developed into important global actors as they negotiate inter-regional trade
agreements, regulate travel and migration policies, and develop international security
communities. Despite this global trend of regionalization and the potential gains from
regional cooperation embodied in these organizations, there are varying levels of intraregional cooperation. While some organizations successfully negotiate and implement
regional agreements, others struggle to build relationships between their member-states
and appear to be only symbolic. Latin America in particular has witnessed an ebb and
flow of regional cooperation schemes for decades with organizations making progress in
building cooperation only to then experience member defection. Why do some regional
organizations exhibit periods of deep regional cooperation while others do not? Why do
we see variation in levels of cooperation within Latin American regional organizations
over time?
Individual states have much to gain through regional cooperation. Economic gains
include increased market size and efficiency as states deepen their relationships and drop
borders within the group. Such gains are less valuable to emerging regions such as Latin
1

America where many states share similar market profiles and a relatively low economic
reliance on their neighbors. However, even without a high level of interdependence,
cooperation efforts offer economic gains through increased bargaining power for the
group in multilateral institutions and increasing appeal for foreign (extra-regional)
investment. In addition, the potential benefits of regional cooperation are not only
economic but political and social as well. Deepening political and economic ties through
regional organizations can lead to increased peace within the region along with
cooperation on common issues such as poor infrastructure, development, and democratic
consolidation.
Even with the many potential benefits from regional cooperation, states struggle
to maintain their agreements and deepen connections with their neighbors. Rather than a
continual increase in cooperation levels over time, organizations throughout Latin
America continue to also experience periods of decline and stagnation. This vacillation is
demonstrated when regional organizations move from periods of active cooperation in
which they develop institutions and further regional policies to periods of defection with
member-states violating or exiting regional agreements and even engaging in inter-state
disputes. While stagnation and adherence to existing agreements once the organization is
formed can be expected as states enjoy the benefits of the status quo, what enables these
periods of active cooperation within the group or leads member-states to defect? This
research tests the impact of economic health and relationships among states on political
indicators of regional cooperation arguing that, while economic benefits may stem from
cooperation, asymmetric distribution of these benefits hinders further progress and can
lead to state defection.
2

Background
Beginning in the late 1950s, multiple regional cooperation efforts emerged in
Latin America. Of these, four prominent examples are the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM), the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Andean Community
(CAN), and the Southern Common Market (Mercosur). Since their formation, these
regional organizations have experienced varying levels of regional cooperation in terms
of dropping trade barriers between member-states, developing common regional policies
such as common external tariffs, and negotiating as a unit in multilateral organizations
(e.g. the World Trade Organization). This variation in levels of cooperation occurs both
when comparing Latin American organizations to one another as well as when observing
cooperation within individual organizations over time.
A brief historical overview of the four regional organizations listed above
highlights the variation in levels of regional cooperation between and within these
organizations since their founding. Created in 1973, CARICOM has been a relative
success story for promoting regional cooperation, experiencing a general increase in
overall cooperation overtime along with periods of stagnation. Shortly after CARICOM’s
formation, the region created a development bank designed to promote regional trade and
provide development assistance to member-states in need. These measures increased
intra-regional trade dramatically and led to further support for common economic
policies including a common social security agreement implemented in 1990s to help
with labor mobility. By 2006, the region had established a single market with all
members except the Bahamas and Haiti. In addition, the Caribbean Court of Justice was
created to settle regional trade disputes. Today, 12 of the 15 member-states have
3

implemented a common passport and intra-Latin American regional trade is over 20% of
total trade (CARICOM Secretariat, 2017) though progress within the group has stagnated
in recent years.
While CARICOM has experienced a steady increase of regional cooperation, the
member-states of CACM struggled initially to agree upon or implement any regional
measures. Founded in 1960, CACM appeared to be off to a promising start with lofty
economic and political cooperation goals. Within its first decade, the organization
liberalized approximately 95% of tariffs within the region, agreed on a common external
tariff for member-states, and progressed as a group in terms of industrialization (Ocampo
& Ros, 2011:345). However, the organization quickly encountered difficulties with states
defecting from the group as political and economic tensions rose. Unequal distribution of
wealth between member-states, the stress of financial crises, and poor economic diversity
preceded violations of CACM policies including increased protectionist measures by
members. In addition, a growing Honduran trade deficit with El Salvador increased
tensions between the two member-states and contributed to the 1969 war between them.
Economic and political instability in the region led to the suspension of CACM’s efforts
by the mid-1980s. However, the organization was revamped in the 1990s as memberstates increased regional cooperation through the creation of regional infrastructure
projects and the creation of a debt-settlement mechanism (Merrill, 1993).
In contrast to CACM, CAN started auspiciously. However, cooperation within the
group has struggled with strong periods of defection over its history as two members
defected from the community by exiting the organization altogether. CAN began as the
Andean Pact, which was founded in 1969. Originally, the regional grouping was driven
4

by import substitution based policies and a desire to sever extra-regional economic
dependency. The member-states developed an Andean court of justice and parliament to
coordinate regional policies. However, cooperation efforts stagnated during the debt
crises of the 1980s. The organization was revamped and restructured in the 1990s as the
Andean Community with more liberal outward-looking economic policies. Four of the
five member-states successfully implemented a regional free trade agreement and agreed
upon a common external tariff (Giordano & Devlin, 2011). However, this momentum did
not last and cooperation within CAN deteriorated for a period in the mid-2000s with the
exit of Venezuela as it sought stronger economic ties with the neighboring regional
grouping, Mercosur. Currently, two member-states (Ecuador and Bolivia) are following
suit and negotiating membership with Mercosur (“Bolivia Invited to Become,” 2012)
though neither have initiated an exit from CAN1. Though the organization has struggled
with membership, it does prove adept at adjusting to changes within the region and is
currently furthering its integration with Mercosur through the continued development of
UNASUR.
While much younger and larger, Mercosur has had a harder time than CAN
recovering from periods of defection within the group. Shortly after its founding in 1991,
Mercosur was viewed as the “golden child” of the new wave of regionalism in Latin
America. The region rapidly liberalized economic relations between member-states while
intra-regional trade, extra-regional FDI, and regional exports thrived under the newly
coordinated policies. In addition, Mercosur established itself as a legal international

1

Bolivia began accession to full Mercosur membership in 2015 while Ecuador remains
an associate member along with the rest of the CAN states.
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personality able to negotiate inter-regionally and in international forums. Unfortunately,
when financial crises hit the region (primarily Brazil and Argentina) in the late 1990s,
cooperation within the organization halted. Intra-regional trade dropped dramatically and
economic tensions led to a blockade between Argentina and Uruguay. A decade later,
relationships between member-states of Mercosur were strained further as the
organization debated membership for Venezuela. Paraguay adamantly opposed this
addition arguing that Venezuela did not meet the democratic standards set forth by the
grouping. However, when Paraguay was suspended due to undemocratic practices,
Venezuela was voted in. Paraguay’s suspension has since been lifted but the tension
between the two members remains (Farnsworth, 2013) and Venezuela’s continued
membership in the group is in doubt2. Despite such political tensions, Mercosur continues
to push for increased economic cooperation and improved diplomatic relations. In
addition, new and potential member-states including Bolivia and Ecuador allow for an
increased market size and cooperation that might prove beneficial to the region in the
near future. However, Mercosur appears to struggle under the weight of the new
members despite the potential advantages they bring.
Research Purpose
Each of these four Latin American regional organizations has experienced periods
of increased cooperation as member-states implemented regional policies and lowered
borders among themselves. In addition, each organization has suffered major setbacks for
cooperation as member-states violated regional agreements, engaged in disputes with

2

At the time of writing, Venezuela’s membership is suspended due to violation of
Mercosur’s democratic principles.
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each other, and/or exited the organization altogether. What explains this ebb and flow of
cooperation? A large body of existing research on regional organizations seeks to
understand the benefits and challenges of deepening regional ties. However, much of this
work is done in a European context with less focus on emerging regions such as Latin
America. In particular, few comparative studies of emerging regions exist to better
understand what factors help and hinder these organizations. Emerging regions offer
additional insight to the phenomenon of regional integration as they are less economically
interdependent yet still form and maintain regional agreements contrary to many
Eurocentric theories. Further research of these regional organizations in emerging regions
is needed to better understand the drivers and dynamics of regional cooperation.
Realist theory would suggest that these cooperation efforts disintegrate as soon as
they cease being in the best interest of individual states. But does this hold true? Even if it
does, at what point does a state determine regional cooperation is no longer in its best
interests, particularly when there is still the potential to gain in absolute terms if not
relatively? Since their inception, the four regional groupings in Latin America discussed
above have experienced a wide variance in levels of cooperation. Their collective
struggles with cooperation are representative of the many additional regional
organizations within Latin America. Why did some organizations take off and embody
cooperation while others did not? What explains the variation in levels of regional
cooperation throughout Latin America? More specifically, given the potential gains from
regional cooperation, why do we see periods of defection within these organizations?
International influence, in particular the state of the global economy, likely plays
a critical role in regional cooperation efforts, as times of crisis often correlate with
7

periods of low levels of cooperation. However, the ebb and flow seen throughout Latin
American organizations is not consistent enough to be explained exclusively by global
factors. There must be specific regional dynamics at play in these episodes of cooperation
and defection. For example, at the same time that the Andean Pact was thriving, CACM
experienced extremely high levels of defection. In a particularly notable instance of
defection from a regional agreement in Latin America, the 1969 “Soccer War” between
Honduras and El Salvador highlighted the damage done by uneven economic gains
within a group3. While CACM as a whole benefitted from their initial cooperation,
member-states experienced unbalanced growth with Honduras falling behind relative to
El Salvador. The regional imbalance caused tensions to rise between the states and
ultimately led to war (Cable, 1969). This moment of defection ultimately put a hold on
regional cooperation within CACM for over a decade and highlighted the impact unequal
economic conditions can have on political relations between states.
This research seeks to further fill the gap in the literature on regional cooperation
through a comparative analysis of Latin American organizations. In particular, it seeks to
add to the comparative analysis of emerging regions in order to capture both nuance and
unique motivations for cooperation often missed in comparisons to the EU. Taking a
political economy approach, it looks at the impact of economic relationships among
member-states in an organization on political indicators of regional cooperation to see
what factors help or hinder. Contrary to hegemonic stability theorists who argue that

3

The 1969 “Soccer War” is the only instance of inter-state war among Latin American
states post-WWII according to the Correlates of War Militarized Inter-State Disputes
database.
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regional agreements need to be stabilized by the presence of a large economic and
political power in, this work finds evidence that economic asymmetry among memberstates in an organization is detrimental to overall levels of regional cooperation.
Research Objectives and Structure
This study addresses regional cooperation in Latin America using a mixed
methods design (Cresswell, 2014). After further discussion of the existing literature and
the theoretical grounding for this research, the first phase of the study is a quantitative
analysis of regional organizations within Latin America using time series analysis to
explore the impact of major factors, particularly economic asymmetry, on cooperation.
The analysis considers the variation between the various organizations in Latin America
as well as within each organization over time. The second phase of the research presents
qualitative case studies of two regional organizations, CAN and Mercosur, in order to
better illuminate the causal relationships found in the quantitative analysis.
This research aims to better understand the driving factors and dynamics of
regional cooperation. In particular, it addresses the impact of economic indicators on
political indicators of cooperation in Latin American organizations and argues that
economic asymmetry leads to periods of defection. In an era of globalization, emerging
regions have much to gain from regional cooperation as they seek simultaneously to
integrate with the global economy and protect themselves from international volatility.
Through a better understanding what helps and hinders cooperation efforts, regional
organizations will be better aware of the challenges they face and able to explore policies
to minimize the impact of potentially detrimental factors.

9

Chapter Two: Explaining Regional Cooperation
Introduction
States have much to gain from regional cooperation particularly in emerging
regions such as Latin America. Such gains include increased trade and economic
relations as well as enhanced security within the region. In addition, attracting external
investment and increasing bargaining power can be helpful for countries in regions that
depend on extra-regional actors such as the United States or the European Union for trade
and investment (Krapohl & Fink, 2013). With such potential gains, neoliberal
institutionalists might expect states in these regions to regularly cooperate to achieve their
common interests. However, this is clearly not always the case.
From the liberal perspective, regional cooperation provides significant economic
benefits including increased efficiency as states utilize their comparative advantage and
access to larger and more diverse markets. Efforts to liberalize economic relations within
the region can signal a move towards further liberalization and commitment to liberal
practices in attempt to attract outside foreign investment and trade bringing money and
technology into the region. Through regional cooperation efforts, states can signal their
commitment to ‘good policies’ over ‘bad’ ones to extra-regional actors as they agree to
liberal policies on a more local level (Giordano & Devlin, 2011, p. 343). This provides a
stronger signal to extra-regional actors than unilateral policy changes as states are then
held accountable, or at the very least more closely observed, by their neighbors. This
10

signaling is particularly important for emerging regions such as Latin America often
seeking to join the global economy and promote internal development through foreign
investment. Through regional agreements, “[states] signal authorities’ commitments to
investors and lock-in policy reforms that otherwise might be more easily reversible”
(Devlin & Ffrench-Davis, 1999, p. 274).
A stable and interconnected region is an asset for states in Latin America
interested in integrating further into the global economy. Through regional cooperation
efforts, states are able to increase their competiveness and bargaining power on the global
market.
By engaging in market expansion (integration of larger regional markets) and by
employing selective protection/privileges (preferential treatment only to group
members), governments [have] perceived regionalism either as a form of gaining
and locking in access for their competitive export or of helping competitive
domestic industries before exposing them to global market competition (Tussie,
2009, p. 178).
States can operate as a larger market when cooperating as a region making them more
appealing and competitive on the global scale. In addition, cooperation among regional
groupings can also be a tool to increase bargaining power on the international stage with
a number of small economies grouping together to negotiate in multilateral arena for their
shared interests (Mansfield & Milner, 1999). This is particularly important in developing
or emerging regions such as Latin America where individual states may have little
influence in multilateral negotiations on their own. This motivation is often overlooked in
work on regional cooperation utilizing Eurocentric theories and comparisons with more
economically developed regions.

11

Even those states and regional organizations ideologically opposed to integrating
into the global economy, such as the Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our America
(ALBA)4, seek a great deal of potential gains from regional cooperation. Deepening
economic relations and political stability within the region is critical to decrease
dependency on global trade and increase local exports. Encouraging deeper economic ties
with neighboring states throughout Latin America and giving increased preference to
local markets assists with economic growth throughout the region and decreases reliance
on extra-regional imports (Devlin & Ffrench-Davis, 1999, pp. 274-276). In addition,
regional cooperation assists states in preserving and distributing natural resources
throughout Latin America the region such as the Amazon Basin (ACTO) and local oil
reserves (Petrocaribe).
Advantages of regional cooperation go beyond increased economic efficiency.
For an emerging region like Latin America, regional integration and cooperation can be
particularly useful for joint infrastructure projects and development.
Deeper integration provides a useful infrastructure and incentives for further
cooperation, including investments in regional public goods such as regional road
networks, energy transmission lines, or, more generally, cooperation in a wide
array of cross-border matter (Giordano & Devlin, 2011, p. 343).
Such cooperation in regional infrastructure projects has the additional benefit of assisting
with trade and furthering economic interconnectedness. This is particularly critical for

4

ALBA was formed in 2005 by president Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and President Fidel
Castro of Cuba in response to the neoliberal restructuring seen in Latin America
throughout the 1980s and 1990s. ALBA’s policies promote Latin American
independence and self-sufficiency.
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Latin America which struggles with infrastructure both domestically and throughout the
region as well as unusually low levels of intra-regional trade (Lanau, 2017).
Beyond economic benefits, increased cooperation among states can also increase
security within the region. While some regions, most traditionally Europe, have pushed
for regional cooperation to protect against further inter-state war, Latin America
traditionally has a very low level of inter-state conflict (Nolte & Wehner, 2012).
However, transnational security issues such as drug trafficking and civil unrest are
security concerns that require regional cooperation to combat. In addition, many states in
Latin America continue to struggle with democratization and state stability. One of the
many goals for regional cooperation efforts in the region is to assist with these concerns.
For example, in the case of Mercosur, “Integration, it was felt, was the appropriate
instrument to consolidate democracy and promote modernization and development,”
(Gardini, 2010, p. 164).5
Despite these gains, states in the region struggle with continued cooperation.
Rather than a steady increase in cooperation efforts, there is a wide variation in levels of
cooperation between the different groupings as well as within each grouping over time.
While there are many potential gains, both political and economic, to be had from
regional cooperation, concerns around maintaining state sovereignty, an inability to agree
on the right course of action, and a concern about free riders within agreements all pose
potential obstacles. A growing body of literature has sought to understand both why

5

For more on the relationship between regional cooperation and
security/democratization, see Giordano & Devlin, 2011.
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states would cooperate on a regional level as well as under what conditions they
cooperate best.
This research builds off of previous work on regional integration and finds that a
major impediment to cooperation is the potential for unequal distribution of gains. While
cooperation is expected to produce many gains in absolute terms for the region, such
gains are often distributed unequally. Some states within a region may stand to gain more
than others. I argue that if a state is more concerned with increasing its absolute gains, it
will likely cooperate at the regional level. However, if it is more concerned with the
relative distribution of these gains within the region, in particular other states gaining
more, it is likely to defect from regional cooperation schemes and act unilaterally. The
more unequally gains from cooperation are distributed among members of regional
organizations, the more likely those receiving relatively less than their counterparts will
fear being the relative “loser” giving the state more incentive to defect.
This particular study focuses exclusively on regional organizations within Latin
America in order to test the impact of asymmetrical economic gains on political
indicators of cooperation. This focus on Latin America allows for further insight into the
challenges faced by emerging regions as they seek to integrate. Through regional
cooperation, emerging economies work to gain not only from easing interactions with
each other but also signaling extra-regional actors and promoting development. This
likely heightens the influence of relative gains within the group as they compete for
extra-regional trade and investment as well as more relatively scarce regional capital.
Asymmetric economic gains are likely to be detrimental in regions such as Europe and
14

North America as well. However, their impact may be more nuanced with the regions’
primary focus begin easing and developing existing interdependence.
Conceptualizing Regional Cooperation
Regional cooperation is a complex variable that can be conceptualized on
multiple dimensions. Past literature on regional organizations puts a heavy focus on intraregional trade as a proxy for integration noting that the more states within a region trade
with each other, the more interdependent their economies are. While this measure does
capture a level of economic integration often caused by cooperation on economic
policies, it misses the full complexity of regional cooperation by ignoring the social and
political motivations. In addition, intra-regional trade is particularly biased against
regions with developing economies that tend to rely heavily on extra-regional trade
partners. Latin America has very low levels of intra-regional trade particularly when
compared to Europe or North America often leading researchers to conclude that there
has been little evolution in the region’s level of cooperation. However, Latin America
and other emerging regions often have different goals regarding regional cooperation
efforts. Rather than a strict desire to become more economically interdependent by
making trade more efficient, they often seek to increase development for member-states.
This does not always happen through intra-regional trade with other struggling
economies but can also take the form of standardizing policies and cooperating in order
to attract extra-regional trade and investment. Additional goals of regional cooperation
efforts often include the development of regional infrastructure and stabilizing memberstates’ democratic regimes to further growth and prosperity.
15

In conceptualizing cooperation for this research, I highlight three distinct aspects
(shown in Figure 2.1 below). The first dimension is a sliding scale from closed to open
cooperation. This dimension captures the angle or perspective of a cooperation effort as a
group’s position on it alters their goals and understanding of what the arrangement is
supposed to achieve. Closed cooperation refers to cooperation that emphasizes an “us vs.
them” mentality. In regional cooperation efforts, this often looks like an exclusionary
agreement meant to strengthen relationships between member-states while excluding
non-members from any benefits. An example of closed cooperation would be the
Bolivarian Alliance for the People of Our America (ALBA) formed as a reaction against
Western influence. In contrast, open cooperation refers to liberally-motivated
cooperation that seeks to drop barriers among member-states as well as with non-member
states. The newly formed Pacific Alliance6 is an example of such cooperation as it seeks
to increase economic relations with non-member states around the world.
How open or closed a cooperation effort is affects the goals of the group as well
as the type of agreements made. Both ends of the axis are likely to be impacted by
asymmetrical economic gains though the mechanisms behind the relationship would
differ. In open cooperation, states are focused on liberalization and integrating into the
global economy. They therefore find themselves competing for the same goals they are
cooperating to achieve such as foreign investment and increased global influence. In

6

The Pacific Alliance formed in 2011 with the goal of promoting neoliberal economic
policies and expanding global trade. In contrast to ALBA, the Pacific Alliance seeks to
integrate its members into the global economy in order to promote economic growth and
development.
16

contrast, closed cooperation focuses on developing intra-regional ties and protecting the
group from excessive extra-regional influence. As these states cooperate to promote
internal development, they may compete over limited regional resources such as capital.
The second dimension to cooperation highlighted in Figure 2.2 is the focus of
cooperation efforts as it captures the specific types of policies sought by the group. I list
three primary foci of cooperation: economic, political, and social. Economic cooperation
aims for harmonizing and increasing economic relations among member-states. Political
cooperation focuses on increased diplomacy among members, minimizing security
threats, and developing shared governing bodies. Finally, social cooperation includes
efforts to build a shared identity through efforts such as common educational policies.
These three categories are not mutually exclusive though the emphasis on each can vary
throughout different cooperation efforts. For example, the Union of South American
Nations (UNASUR) emphasizes economic cooperation through lower trade barriers as
well as political cooperation with a focus on regional security7. As cooperation efforts
expand and develop in one area, they are bound to spill into the other foci. For example,
an organization cannot tackle all aspects of economic cooperation without spilling into
political and social agreements.
The final dimension of cooperation is the primary focus of this study. It is a
sliding scale from defection (“rule-breaking”) to passive (“rule-following”) to active

7

UNASUR formed in 2004 bringing together all states in South America. While it
promotes economic interdependence among member-states, the organization’s primary
goals include increasing political dialogue and promoting human development within the
region.
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(“rule-making”) cooperation that aims to capture the direction and momentum of regional
cooperation efforts. The more active cooperation is, the more states in a regional
organization are attempting to pursue continued meaningful cooperation in any of the
three foci on either end of the scale between open and closed cooperation. This scale does
not attempt to capture the depth of cooperation efforts. While active cooperation in the
form of developing a free trade agreement is not equal to developing a monetary union
(the latter being an example of much deeper cooperation), both would be examples of
active cooperation. Though depth is an important aspect of cooperation, it has its own
dimension that is not crucial for this study which seeks to explain waves of increased
cooperation versus defection.
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Figure 2.1. Conceptualizing Cooperation
No matter the angle (open/closed) or the focus (economic, political, or social) a
group takes when approaching cooperation, regional efforts throughout Latin America
fluctuate along the vertical axis of cooperation shown in Figure 2.1 moving from periods
of defection to active cooperation. Despite many potential gains that can be achieved
through cooperation such as economic growth and regional security, there is not a
consistent upward trend in cooperation levels. This research seeks to understand the
importance of the impact of symmetrical economic gains on indicators of cooperation.
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The Importance of Relative Gains
Regional cooperation offers a number of potential economic, social, and political
gains particularly to states in emerging regions such as Latin America. While this may be
seen as a strong incentive for states to cooperate, states are often reluctant to deepen their
interdependence and adopt uniform regional policies. “[Regional cooperation efforts]
invariably face the formidable obstacle of the countries’ unwillingness (or lack of
incentives) to forgo their sovereignty rights to define their own domestic policies” (Blyde
et al, 2012, p. 207). Notably adding to states’ concerns is that expected gains from
cooperation efforts are not always equally distributed among participating states. In
particular, many economic gains from cooperation are expected to be distributed
asymmetrically among member-states of regional organizations, and are more likely to
flow to larger states first before trickling down to their smaller counterparts (Devlin &
Ffrench-Davis, 1999, p. 278). This heightens states’ concerns about adopting regional
policies as states do not want to lose relative to their neighbors.8
Previous work on the impact of relative gains over absolute gains builds on a
major debate in international relations theory between neoliberals and neorealists (Grieco
et al, 1993; Halas, 2009; Morrow, 1997; Powell, 1991; Werner, 1997). In this debate,
neorealists counter the liberal assertion that the potential for absolute gains and an
inherent harmony of interests encourages cooperation between actors. Instead, neorealists

8

If the region is already uneven, states may be hesitant to join in cooperation efforts to
begin with unless there is some sort of agreement made to satisfy this concern. This work
is not concerned with the formation of agreements, but rather with the variation of
cooperation levels within a grouping after they’ve been formed, as well as variation
between the many different groupings within Latin America.
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stress the importance of considering the relative gains between actors and the negative
impact that unequal distribution can have on cooperation at the international level.
According to neorealists, there is an inherent disharmony of interests among states as
each seeks to increase its relative position in the international system. Each state’s focus
on relative gains makes international cooperation tentative at best if not impossible.
Much of this work is primarily focused on traditional security concerns and the
potential for armed conflict between state actors. However, economic security and
prosperity are also a major concern for states. Neoliberals have shown that international
cooperation is possible, but there are few models for how countries are able to overcome
the relative gains problem underscored by realists. More work needs to be done through
an international political economy lens in order to understand the impact of relative gains
on economic security and cooperation. Regional cooperation efforts provide an
opportunity to study the impact of relative gains on economic security and cooperation as
most are primarily focused on enhancing economic prosperity and development for
member-states. In addition, the smaller membership of regional organizations allows us
to more thoroughly analyze relationships within the grouping than if we were to focus on
global economic cooperation efforts such as the WTO. Smaller group membership size is
beneficial to solving collective action problems. Therefore, regional organizations are
likely better equipped to overcome such problems in order to cooperate than their global
counterparts.
Regional cooperation appears to suffer under conditions of unequal economic
gains. Argentina defected from Mercosur’s policies when Uruguay benefited
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disproportionately from regional gains after the financial crisis of the late 1990s (Dabene,
2009). In the CACM, Honduras and El Salvador stopped cooperating after unequal trade
distributions between the two member-states. Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador have
strayed from the agreements in CAN looking for greener economic pastures with the
more rapidly developing Mercosur states. As Latin American regionalism has progressed,
states have continued to express concerns about the unequal distribution of the gains it
has created.
Requests for the creation of compensatory mechanisms have increased, as some
members judged that the benefits of integration were not equally distributed. As
an example, Mercosur has established a fund to deal with asymmetries, but all
members are eligible to access it (Giordano & Devlin, 2011, pp. 352-353).
States are concerned with the distribution of gains created by regional cooperation though
the impact of this concern is unclear.
One of the benefits states, particularly in emerging regions such as Latin America,
hope to gain from regional cooperation is an increase in FDI inflows. Absolute gains to
each state may occur if such efforts increase FDI inflows to the region. However, an
uneven distribution of FDI among member-states could be problematic.
While regional integration can clearly induce foreign direct investment in the
expanded subregional market, it can locate unevenly and - in the absence of
harmonized incentives - be a source of competition among partners and a fiscal
drain (Devlin & Ffrench-Davis, 1999, p. 278).
Despite the potential for absolute gains for all states involved, uneven distribution of FDI
inflows can become a source of conflict within the region and even deter further
cooperation efforts.
In addition to the distribution of FDI inflows, previous work on regional trade
agreements (RTAs) in Latin America has found that the benefits of increased trade are
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often not distributed equally among member-states. While uneven distribution of both the
costs and benefits of RTAs are thought to be problematic for regional cooperation, it is
unclear which states are inherently at a disadvantage.
On the one hand, [in the case of a typical RTA] smaller economies within an RTA
are the ones that tend to benefit disproportionately from a trade agreement that
ensures preferential access to large regional markets. On the other hand, the small
countries are more vulnerable to the RTA imperfections owing precisely to their
increased exposure to regional trade (Blyde et al, 2012, pp. 202-203).
States that are unhappy with the results of a RTA or feel that they have been treated
unfairly are able to take their disputes to either the WTO or the RTA itself if it has set up
a formal dispute settlement mechanism. In their work on regional disputes in Latin
America, Gomez-Mera & Molinari (2014) find that large differences in the overall
economic size of member-states tend to increase the occurrence of trade disputes within
RTAs. These findings show dissatisfaction among smaller states within a group and
somewhat contrast previous research that suggests larger states, or regional hegemons,
are often dissatisfied with regional agreements feeling that it limits their relationships
with larger extra-regional actors (Krapohl & Fink, 2014). Most often it is the state with a
smaller economy within the group that initiates the dispute. Research suggests that
asymmetry can be problematic for regional cooperation efforts but more work is needed
to understand the impact of the distribution of economic gains rather than just the overall
size difference among members.
Based on this past research, an asymmetrical distribution of economic gains
within a regional organization is expected to hinder regional cooperation. When memberstates receive relatively equal gains in terms of intra-regional trade flows, increased FDI,
and enhanced economic growth, states will be more inclined to continue and even further
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regional cooperation efforts. However, the less equal these gains, the more likely
members are to become concerned with the distributions of gains and defect from
cooperation. Figure 2.1 below highlights the expected relationship between asymmetric
economic gains and regional cooperation.

Figure 2.2. Expected Relationship between Symmetry of Gains and Cooperation
After a regional organization is created, member-states expect to gain from their
cooperation on economic, political, and social policies. Success in achieving these gains
for all members would be expected to have a positive impact on overall cooperation.
However, the distribution of these gains among the member-states also plays an
important role in the progression of regional cooperation. If the gains are distributed
relatively equally, member-states within an organization realize the benefits of
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cooperation and either continue with the status quo or decide to deepen ties. In contrast, if
the gains are distributed relatively unequally, power dynamics in the region will shift
leaving some states feeling potentially threatened or exploited. Those member-states
receiving relatively fewer gains will perceive the cooperation arrangement as unfair and
express concerns about being mistreated or left behind in the regional efforts despite any
absolute gains they may experience. Member-states that gain disproportionately more
than their neighbors might also pull back from regional agreements as they experience an
increased a strengthening of extra-regional ties, leaving them less reliant on the group.
Therefore, an asymmetric distribution of gains among member-states is expected to
decrease regional levels of cooperation. This can be observed through member-states
weakening their ties with the group, defecting from regional policies, or even initiating
conflicts with other states within the organization.
While the prospect of absolute gains is an incentive for states to participate in
regional cooperation efforts, the relative distribution of these gains matter. However,
additional factors may act as potential intervening variables altering the relationship
between the distribution of gains and cooperation by making member-states less
concerned with or threatened by unequal gains. First, institutional homogeneity among
member-states, particularly in terms of regime type, suggests a level of shared norms
within the organization potentially lessening any threat felt by states should their
neighbors gain disproportionately from cooperation efforts. Secondly, higher levels of
economic interdependence may decrease concerns with unequal distribution as close
economic ties may eventually lead to a spillover effect for smaller states. Finally, the
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presence of external influence from a global or potentially regional hegemon may force
states to maintain cooperation efforts despite concerns with unequal distribution9.
Both perceived gains from the formation of the regional organization and actual
gains received after its formation should impact overall cooperation among memberstates. However, this research will primarily focus on actual gains received by memberstates in a regional organization. The more unevenly economic gains are distributed
among members of a particular organization, the more likely states will be to defect from
cooperation through violating the agreements of the organization, exiting the
organization, and/or initiating an interstate dispute. Policies such as the preferential
treatment of lesser-developed states in the region should aid in minimizing unequal gains
and therefore aid cooperation through reducing asymmetry among member-states.
Literature Review
Most existing research on regional cooperation stems from work done on the EU
since its initial formation as the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s. This
work provides valuable insights into the motivations behind and potential benefits of
regional agreements. However, it helps much less in explaining why we see variation in
cooperation in emerging regions such as Latin America. More comparative research
involving non-European regions is needed to better understand the ebb and flow of
regional cooperation efforts.

9

The influence of a global hegemon may have a negative impact on cooperation through
discouraging regional cooperation via the encouragement of bilateral agreements. But the
presence of a regional hegemon may also have a negative impact on cooperation as it
may contribute to regional asymmetries and an unequal distribution of gains.
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There is a growing body of literature on regional cooperation in Latin America. A
large portion of this work focuses on comparing Latin American regional organizations to
the European Union (EU) or North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA)
(Dorrucci et al, 2004; Dorrucci et al, 2005; Duina & Buxbaum, 2008; Moxon-Browne,
2010; Munck & Hyland, 2013; Roy, 2010). These studies often utilize Eurocentric
theories on regional integration such as neofunctionalism and liberal
intergovernmentalism that stress, respectively, an escalating relationship between
(economic) interdependence and cooperation through either a spillover effect from
previous cooperation efforts or domestic-level pressures for economic liberalism.
Comparing regional cooperation efforts in Latin America to Europe and North America
using these Eurocentric theories does little to explain the variation seen within emerging
regions due to Latin America’s relatively low level of economic interdependence.
For example, Edward Moxon-Browne compares Mercosur and the EU to better
understand their different levels of political integration. He concludes that the former is
less integrated and remains focused on less consistent intergovernmental cooperation as
opposed to more binding supranational cooperation due, at least in part, to its relatively
low levels of economic interdependence (Moxon-Browne, 2010). Such studies comparing
Latin American organizations to their more developed international counterparts
highlight the broad differences between regions around the world and can help us narrow
down potential factors that drive regional cooperation such as economic interdependence.
However, they miss crucial differences between the various Latin American agreements
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that might better illuminate such mechanisms and how they relate to emerging and
developing regions.
Much of the work focused specifically on Latin American regionalism analyzes
the rapid success and subsequent stagnation of Mercosur (e.g. Gardini, 2010). Additional
research has sought to explain the revamping of regional cooperation in the 2010s among
Mercosur’s member-states by analyzing the impact of domestic pressures (Margheritis,
2013). Case studies of Mercosur provide insight into the internal workings of the
organization and can illuminate specific countries’ motivations for cooperation.
However, by leaving out the neighboring regional groupings, these studies cannot explain
variation in levels of cooperation throughout Latin America. With the recent 2004
creation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) scholars have expanded
their focus to look at the regional dynamics between CAN and Mercosur, the two major
member groupings in UNASUR (Carrasquilla & Rivero, 2015; Nolte & Wehner, 2012)
but do not explain the various failures and successes of regional cooperation seen within
each grouping.
In their analysis of regional integration schemes around the globe, Yi Feng and
Gaspare Genna (2003) seek to understand the relationship between domestic institutions
and regional cooperation. They argue that similar domestic structures throughout a region
enhance cooperation. Homogeneity of domestic institutions (such as regime type) makes
it both easier and more beneficial for states to cooperate as it reduces the cost of
implementation. In addition, similar institutions can promote similar interests and
therefore enhance the motivation for cooperation. Feng and Genna’s research on the
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effects of state-level institutions suggests that an increased homogeneity of domestic
economic institutions facilitates integration. Their research is not exclusive to Latin
America though they do look at CAN and CACM as two of their cases. Feng and Genna
ultimately find that both Latin American cases exhibit low levels of cooperation when
compared to the EU. While this work provides some insight into the impact of domestic
institutions on regional cooperation, it again does not explain the nuances found
specifically within Latin America.
Laura Gomez-Mera (2008) looks at the effects of extra-regional factors on the
implementation of regional agreements in Latin America. She argues that global
interdependence and global power asymmetries lead to increased economic vulnerability
in the region and hinder regional cooperation schemes. Gomez-Mera’s assertion that
global interdependence and international power structures impact regional cooperation
relates to a large debate in regionalization studies. There is a growing body of work on
the impact of globalization on regional relationships (Duina, 2006; Gomez-Mera, 2008;
Hancock, 2009; Shiff & Winters, 2003; Tussie, 1998). However, there is a debate as to
whether regionalization serves as a protectionist backlash to counteract global
liberalization or a form of “training-wheels” to prepare developing states for eventual
global economic integration. Some scholars in the former camp, see increasing
regionalization as a sign of declining US hegemony arguing that protectionist blocks
form as the global power structure shifts and is no longer able to promote a global
economic order (see Mansfield & Milner, 1999, pp. 608-609). Others argue that
regionalization is a protectionist reaction after globalization has failed to bring prosperity
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to much of the developing world (Duina, 2006). Rather than a hindrance to globalization,
scholars in the latter camp see regional integration as a building block to eventual global
multilateralism.
A new multilateralism can emerge as the regional units become part of the
collective decision-making process. Rather than being exposed directly to the
multilateral level…countries will have a first direct say at the regional level. The
new regional units will deal with each other on a more equal footing (Tussie,
1998, p. 93).
Further research is needed to better understand the impact of globalization on regional
cooperation efforts. Do globalization and economic openness stimulate regional
cooperation or are they detrimental to it, as Gomez argues?
In addition to her assertion that economic vulnerability from increasing global
interdependence hinders regional cooperation, Gomez-Mera (2008) finds that, within
Latin America, Mercosur struggles the most with implementing regional agreements
while CACM and CARICOM are relatively successful. Through a statistical test of
multiple explanatory variables, she concludes that regional hegemony is positively
correlated with the implementation of regional agreements but only for the regional
hegemon, not for the regional organization as a whole. For example, Brazil shows the
highest level of implementation in Mercosur despite low levels in the organization
overall. Gomez-Mera’s findings contradict the expectation of many hegemonic stability
theorists that a strong and dedicated hegemon is needed to increase cooperation
throughout the region (e.g. Mattli, 1999), as Mercosur, the only organization with such a
hegemon, shows the lowest levels of implementation of the cases observed.
There is a growing debate in the literature concerning the impact of a regional
hegemon on regional cooperation. Hegemonic stability theory (HST) comes from
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international relations and stresses the importance of a hegemon to building and
maintaining international cooperation and stability (Gilpin, 1981; Ikenberry, 1992;
Kindleberger,1978; Keohane, 1984). Due to its unusual size and strength, a hegemon is
thought able to provide international public goods such as institutions, as well as to help
states overcome collective action problems associated with implementing international
agreements. This same reasoning has been applied to regional agreements in which states
seek collective gains through mutual cooperation. When forming and implementing
regional agreements, states suffer from collective action problems in which states are
reluctant to fully cooperate, despite the potential for mutual benefit, due to fear of free
riders and defectors in the group. Therefore, a regional hegemon is considered necessary
to enforce cooperation through supplying the necessary conditions to overcome such
collective action problems, foster stability, and provide the collective good of regional
institutions (Chacha, 2014; Charaf-Eddine & Strauss, 2014; Genna, 2008; Hansen, 1969;
Mattli, 1999; Pedersen, 2002). Following HST logic, the absence of cooperation in the
presence of a regional hegemon could be explained by a regional hegemon that either
lacks the willingness to enforce cooperative behavior or is in decline and lacks the
capability.
In contrast to HST proponents, some argue that the presence of a regional
hegemon is often detrimental to cooperation efforts, particularly in developing regions
such as Latin America (Krapohl & Fink, 2013; Krapohl et al, 2014). They argue that the
economic strength and international connections of the regional hegemon allow it to
defect from regional agreements and act unilaterally when it will be beneficial. This
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behavior damages long-term cooperative relationships within the region and can build
resentment in the smaller states. Sebastian Krapohl and Simon Fink (2013) test this
theory using trade network data for Mercosur, the South African Development
Community (SADC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the EU.
They find that the regional hegemon in both Mercosur and SADC often exploits its
increased bargaining power and acts unilaterally when regional cooperation is less
efficient. Therefore, in contrast to HST proponents, regional groupings that include a
regional hegemon are expected in this view to show lower levels of cooperation.
Adding to the debate on the impact of a regional hegemon on cooperation, a
similar strain of literature seeks to combine both the international and regional emphasis
on hegemonic power. This literature posits that the international hegemon must assist a
regional hegemon in implementing regional agreements in order for them to be successful
(Katzenstein, 2005; Kupchan, 1998). When it is in the global hegemon’s best interest for
a region to cooperate, it can press for increased regional arrangements via a regional
hegemon. While this may support the different levels of integration seen between Europe
and East Asia (Katzenstein, 2005), further research is necessary to understand any impact
of the US/global hegemon’s influence on regional cooperation in Latin America. With
only one hegemon in the region, Brazil, how are Mercosur and other arrangements
including Brazil impacted by US influence? Additionally, does US influence play a
significant role in cooperation in any of the other regional groupings lacking a regional
hegemon?
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While the body of work on regional cooperation in Latin America continues to
grow, more comparative work must be done to understand the critical factors involved in
regional cooperation. In particular, it is important to expand our research comparing
regional groupings within Latin America rather than to their counterparts in Europe or
North America in order to more clearly see the factors facilitating and impeding
cooperation in this emerging region. This research will therefore explore the impact of
asymmetric economic gains on cooperation while controlling for the alternative
explanations discussed above.
Conclusion
Latin American states have much to gain from regional cooperation including
increased trade, external investment, and bargaining power in the international arena.
Even those states and regional organizations ideologically opposed to integrating into the
global economy can gain the benefits of decreased dependency on global trade, increased
preferences to local markets, and assistance with economic growth through joint
infrastructure projects. Despite these gains, states in Latin America struggle to continue
or increase their levels of cooperation. Rather than a gradual increase in regional
cooperation efforts, organizations experience a wide variation in levels of cooperation
both over time and when compared to one another.
Regional cooperation is a complex variable covering economic, political, and
social factors. Its full range cannot be captured through intra-regional trade levels alone.
This research will look particularly at political indicators of cooperation focusing on the
direction and momentum of regional cooperation efforts. What factors increase political
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indicators of cooperation? Perhaps even more importantly, what factors lead to periods of
defection throughout the region?
There is a great deal of existing literature on Latin American regional cooperation
and the topic of regional integration more broadly. A majority of this literature utilizes
Eurocentric integration theory focused on high levels of economic interdependence often
directly comparing the EU to emerging regions. This literature therefore misses the
nuances in less interdependent regions such as Latin America. In addition, there is a lack
of comparative work among regional organizations in emerging economies.
Working off of previous studies on regional and international cooperation through
a comparison of regional organizations throughout Latin America, this research expects
to find that unequal distribution of gains among member-states is a major impediment to
cooperation. Though cooperation is expected to produce many gains in absolute terms for
states, such gains are often distributed unequally. The more unequally gains from
cooperation are distributed among members of regional organizations, the more likely
those receiving relatively less than their counterparts will have incentive to defect. This
research explores the impact of unequal distribution of gains and economic heterogeneity
with an organization on regional cooperation efforts.
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Chapter Three: Methods and Results
Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, past literature on regional integration
expects member-states to experience overall gains as they join these regional
organizations. Gains can include economic benefits such as increased trade, FDI inflows,
and GDP growth within the region. Though these gains are expected though membership
in a regional organization, this research does not look specifically at whether or not they
are created. Instead, its focus is to understand if unequal distribution of such potential
gains (or losses) has an impact on an organization’s member-states ability to cooperate
with one another. Based on inferences from past research on international cooperation, an
asymmetrical distribution of economic gains among member-states within a regional
organization is expected to hinder their overall level of cooperation. The argument
presented here is that when member-states receive relatively equal gains in terms of intraregional trade flows, increased FDI, and enhanced economic growth, states will be more
inclined to continue and even further regional cooperation efforts. If the gains are
distributed relatively equally, member-states within an organization realize the benefits of
cooperation and either continue with the status quo or decide to deepen ties. However, the
less equal these gains, the more likely members are to defect from cooperation within the
organization. If the gains are distributed relatively unequally among member-states,
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power dynamics in the region will shift leaving some states feeling potentially threatened
or exploited and therefore less inclined to pursue cooperation efforts.
My primary hypothesis is that higher levels of economic asymmetry between
member-states will lead to lower levels of political cooperation within a regional
organization. H1 and H2 below aim to test this directly through looking at the overall
variation in economic measurements throughout each region. While H2 is not directly
testing economic indicators, the assumption is that a hegemon is a strong indicator of
economic asymmetry within a region. H3, H4, and H5 capture additional variables
expected to have a significant effect (either positive or negative) on cooperation based on
previous literature.
H1: An increase in economic variation (measured by balance of trade, FDI
inflows, GDP growth, and economic openness) between memberstates will lead to lower levels of cooperation.
H2: The presence of an economic regional hegemon will decrease levels of
cooperation.
H3: An increase in intra-regional trade and/or the similarity of regime type
between member-states will increase levels of cooperation index
(positive effect control variables).
H4: An increase in the total number of member-states within an organization
will decrease levels of cooperation (negative effect control variables).
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H5: An increase in the variation of US influence among member-state within
an organization will decrease levels of cooperation (negative effect
control variables).
To test the impact of asymmetric economic gains and potential additional
variables on regional cooperation in Latin America, I created a dataset for 16 Latin
American regional organizations. The years observed ranged from 1953 to 2015. Nine
independent variables were measured and tested for significant relationships with the
dependent variable of regional cooperation.
Case Selection
The 16 Latin American regional organizations observed including the year they
were founded and their total membership are listed below in Table 3.1. These 16
groupings represent the regional organizations that have formed in Latin America for the
purposes of promoting economic and/or political cooperation within the region. Free
trade agreements such as NAFTA, CAFTA, and LAFTA are not included due to the
extremely limited scope of their agreements and lack of institutional structure.
Additionally, 2/3 of NAFTA’s membership is composed of non-Latin American states.
Similarly, the Organization of American States was omitted for its inclusion of the United
States and Canada.
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Table 3.1
List of Latin American Regional Organizations
Year
Members (year joined if after
Name
Abbreviation
Founded founding)
Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas,
Barbados, Belize, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican
Association of
Republic, El Salvador, Grenada,
Caribbean
ACS
1994
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
States
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent
& the Grenadines, Suriname, Trinidad
& Tobago, Venezuela
Amazon
Cooperation
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
ACTO
1978
Treaty
Guyana, Peru, Suriname, Venezuela
Organization
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Association of
Colombia, Cuba (1998), Ecuador,
Latin American ALADI
1980
Mexico, Panama (2009), Paraguay,
Integration
Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela
Antigua & Barbuda (2009), Bolivia
Bolivarian
(2006), Cuba, Dominica (2008),
Alliance for the
Ecuador (2009), Grenada (2014),
ALBA
2004
People of Our
Nicaragua (2007), St. Kitts & Nevis
America
(2014), St. Lucia (2013), St. Vincent &
the Grenadines (2009), Venezuela
Central
American
Costa Rica (1962), El Salvador,
CACM
1960
Common
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua
Market
Bolivia, Chile (left 1976), Colombia,
Andean
CAN
1969
Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela (joined 1973,
Community
left 2006)
Antigua & Barbuda (1974), Bahamas
(1983), Barbados, Belize (1974),
Dominica (1974), Grenada (1974),
Caribbean
Guyana, Haiti (1998), Jamaica,
CARICOM
1958
Community
Montserrat (1974), St. Kitts & Nevis
(1974), St. Lucia (1974), St. Vincent &
the Grenadines (1974), Suriname
(1995), Trinidad & Tobago
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CELAC

2011

Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina,
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts & Nevis, St.
Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines,
Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago,
Uruguay, Venezuela

Mercosur

1991

Argentina, Bolivia (2015), Brazil,
Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela (2012)

OECS

1981

Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica,
Grenada, Montserrat, St. Kitts & Nevis,
St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines

Pacific Alliance

PA

2011

Central
American
Parliament

PARLACEN

1987

Petrocaribe

PC

2005

Latin America
& Caribbean
Economic
System

SELA

1976

Central
American
Integration
System

SICA

1991

Community of
Latin American
& Caribbean
States

Southern
Common
Market
Organization of
Eastern
Caribbean
States

Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica (2016),
Mexico, Peru
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic
(1998), El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama (1994)
Antigua & Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize,
Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic,
Grenada, Guatemala (2008), Guyana,
Haiti (2007), Honduras (2007),
Jamaica, Nicaragua (2007), St. Kitts &
Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent & the
Grenadines, Suriname, Venezuela
Argentina (1977), Bahamas (1998),
Barbados, Belize (1992), Bolivia,
Brazil, Chile (1977), Colombia (1979),
Costa Rica (2010), Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador (2009),
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti (1977),
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Paraguay (1986), Peru,
Suriname (1979), Trinidad & Tobago,
Uruguay (1977), Venezuela
Belize (2000), Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic (2004), El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Panama
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Union of South
American
Nations

UNASUR

Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Paraguay,
Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, Venezuela

2004

Data was initially collected for each variable by observing country data by year
(e.g. Colombia 1990). This data was then compiled to create an organizational aggregate
for each organization by year. Therefore, while the unit of observation was individual
states, the unit of analysis for each observation used is regional organization by year (e.g.
ACTO 1990). While individual state-level data was necessary in order to compile the
aggregate data for each organization over time, the analysis in this research is concerned
with the relationship of the measurements for each state, such as the variation or average,
among member-states in a given organization. Many states in the region are involved in
multiple organizations simultaneously. However, the measurement for each organization
is unique as it captures the unique nature of that particular organization in a given year.
For example, while Colombia is involved in measurements for both UNASUR and the
Pacific Alliance, the level of variation it has with its fellow member-states is different in
each case due to each organization’s unique membership composition. It is this
relationship among the measurements for each member-state within an organization that
the unit of analysis captures.
Each regional organization was observed from 5 years prior to their formation
through 2015 in order to capture the member-states’ variation and cooperation in the
years of negotiations leading to the organization’s formation. Organizational aggregate
data includes all member-states of an organization beginning 5 years prior to
membership. Member-states that exit an organization are no longer included in the
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aggregate measurement starting their first full year of non-membership. In total, the
dataset contains a total of 536 observations.
Measuring Regional Cooperation
The dependent variable for this research is regional cooperation. As discussed in
the previous chapter, regional cooperation is a complex variable that can be
conceptualized on multiple dimensions. This research is focused on capturing aspects of
political cooperation within regional organizations in an effort to highlight the strength of
relationships built politically between its member-states and explain why levels of such
cooperation in Latin America vacillate over time. While not all of the organizations
observed here are economically focused in their missions, asymmetric economic
indicators are likely to impact states’ ability to form deeper political ties within the
organization which they are all aiming for to some degree.
For this research, regional cooperation was operationalized using five indicators
meant to capture the depth of political relationships between states in an organization.
The first three indicators capture both active and passive cooperation within the
organization by observing the depth of formal agreements and diplomatic relations. The
more political ties established among member-states through these formal procedures, the
higher the organization’s level of cooperation is considered to be. In contrast, the next
two indicators capture defection or conflict within the group via interstate disputes. These
indicators highlight periods where relationships are strained among member-states within
an organization and cooperation levels decline.
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Positive Indicators of Cooperation. The first indicator to capture formal political
relationships between states is the level of diplomatic relations. As member-states
develop deeper diplomatic ties through the establishment of embassies and official
ambassadors, their formal connections deepen and political cooperation can increase.
Data on the level of diplomatic relations within Latin America were collected from the
Pardee Center for International Futures. The initial measure was between country dyads
to show the total level of diplomatic representation (LOR) of Country A in Country B
using an index from 0 to 1 with 1 representing the highest level of representation.10 In
order to aggregate this data for each regional organization, I first found the annual
average LOR score for each state with all of its fellow member-states. I then took the
average of the LOR score of all member-states within the organization to create a score
for the organization itself for each year. For example, the average LOR for Argentina
with each member of Mercosur was calculated for 1991. This was done for each member
of Mercosur and then these state scores were averaged in order to determine the overall
LOR score for Mercosur in 1991.
While the majority of the organizations observed either maintain or increase their
level of diplomatic representation over time, there are a few notable exceptions including
ALBA, CARICOM, and OECS. The low level of representation within CARICOM and
OECS is likely due to their relatively small member-states consisting exclusively of
island states in the Caribbean. In contrast, ALBA appears to decrease its LOR score with

10

A 1 indicates a strong diplomatic relationship between 2 states including a dedicated
embassy and ambassador. In contrast, a 0 indicates no formal diplomatic relations. See
Appendix A for a more details on the LOR scale.
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the gradual addition of new members suggesting that widening cooperation efforts does
not always deepen overall ties.
The second indicator to capture formal diplomatic relations within regional
organizations is an alliance index. This indicator measures the overall level of formal
military alliances between member-states with deeper alliances indicating a higher level
of cooperation. Data for the alliance index was collected from the Alliance Treaty
Obligations and Provisions Project (ATOP) at Rice University11 at a country dyad level
in order to capture the level of formal military alliances between two states for a given
year. The index variable includes nonaggression, defensive, and offensive agreements
weighting the presence of an offensive obligation the most heavily.12 Similar to the LOR
score, the average alliance index score for each state with its fellow members was
calculated for each year in each organization. The annual average for the organization
was then determined.
The possible range for the alliance index score is from 0 to 330. However, over
the time observed, Latin America as a whole only demonstrated a range from 0-101.67
and an average score of 91.11. All organizations observed either increase or maintain the
same alliance index score over time with the exception of ALADI that dropped
significantly with the addition of Cuba in 1998 (measurements including Cuba for
ALADI began in 1993, 5 years prior to official membership). This indicates deeper

11

This data was initially collected from ATOP by the Pardee Center for International
Futures and then used for this research.
12

See Appendix A for formula for alliance index.
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military cooperation within the region over time while highlighting more contentious
political relationships.
The final measurement to capture formal political cooperation within regional
organizations is a trade index that measures the depth of economic agreements between
states. Levels of political cooperation increase among states as they enter into more
binding and open economic agreements with each other. While the actual implementation
of these agreements drastically varies, the act of negotiating and signing such agreements
indicates deeper relationships among the member-states and an increase in cooperation
efforts. Data for the trade index was collected from the World Bank’s Preferential Trade
Agreements Database and formulated into an index by the Pardee Center for International
Futures in order to demonstrate the depth of trade agreements within country dyads by
year. The trade index observes the presence of any trade agreement ranging from an
enforced preferential trade agreement to a signed customs union accession agreement,
weighting the latter most heavily.13 First, the trade index score was found for all country
dyads within an organization for a given year. To create an organizational aggregate, the
annual average of all dyads within that organization was calculated.
The possible range for the trade index score spans from 0 to 102. However, over
the years observed, the range for Latin American regional organizations spanned from 0
to 48 with a mean of 15.73. This highlights the generally low levels of economic
integration efforts within Latin America during the time observed. However, the general
trend in the region shows a positive increase in the depth of trade agreements despite both

13

See Appendix A for the formula used to generate the trade index variable
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Mercosur and the Pacific Alliance seeing reduced levels of cooperation in trade
agreements as they took on additional members in recent years.
Negative Indicators of Cooperation. In contrast to the previous indicators of
cooperation, the next two indicators capture defection or disputes between member-states
in an organization highlighting a decrease in their overall cooperation level. In order to
capture dispute levels within the region, I measured both militarized interstate disputes
and formal disputes brought to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Data on
militarized interstate disputes was collected from the Correlates of War Project. For each
year, I calculated the total number of interstate disputes within each organization. If a
dispute spanned more than one year, it was included in all years it was active. For
example, a dispute between Honduras and Nicaragua lasting from 1981 and 1985 was
counted in each year’s total disputes for CACM. To weigh the magnitude of disputes, the
highest level of fatalities (coded 0-6) and highest level of militarized action (coded 0-5)
were also observed.14 This weight allows for more violent and heavily militarized
disputes to have a stronger negative impact on overall cooperation levels than their less
violent counterparts.
In addition to data on militarized inter-state disputes, data on WTO disputes was
collected from the WTO Dispute Settlement Database15. Formal disputes brought to the
WTO indicate a decrease in regional cooperation as member-states turn to a multilateral

14

See Appendix A for further information on the coding of level of fatalities and
militarized action.
15

This data was initially collected by the Pardee Center for International Futures and then
utilized for this research.
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organization for assistance in solving economic conflict. This indicator was measured as
a binary variable capturing whether or not a dispute is present between two states. The
total number of disputes taken to the WTO between member-states in an organization
was calculated for each year. There are no WTO disputes measured prior to 1995 when
the WTO was formed.
To capture the total level of disputes within an organization, I created an index
variable combining the number of interstate disputes, the highest level of fatalities, the
highest military act taken by either side, and the number of WTO disputes for each
organization by year. This index variable ranges from 0-1416 and gives more weight to
heavily militarized disputes than disputes taken to the WTO. Though there was only one
instance of interstate war17 within Latin America during the time period observed, all
regional organizations with the exception of ALBA and the Pacific Alliance experienced
at least one year of interstate disputes between their member-states indicating temporary
periods of decreased levels of cooperation.
Cooperation Index. After collecting the data for each indicator above, I assembled
an index measurement for cooperation. This was done to better capture the
conceptualization of cooperation as a multifaceted variable as laid out in this research.
While each indicator measures cooperation on its own, the combination of them into an
index variable generates a more thorough picture of the political ties within the regional

16

Theoretically, the index could continue indefinitely. It is only limited by the number of
disputes present within a region.
17

The 1969 “Soccer War” between Honduras and El Salvador in CACM
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organization in a given year. In addition, the creation of an index variable helped to
combat the sporadic distribution of each dependent variable on its own interfering with
valid regression analysis. To create the cooperation index, each indicator with the
exception of dispute level was standardized to fit a 0-1 scale and then added together to
create a total cooperation score using the formula below:
Cooperation = Level of Representation + Alliance Index + Trade Index – Dispute Level
The first three indicators of the cooperation index are equally weighted as they each
reflect variations of formal political ties between states that strengthen relationships. The
dispute level indicator was also standardized in order to prevent disputes from exerting an
extraordinary influence when calculating the overall level of cooperation. Should an
organization have perfect scores in level of representation, alliance index, and trade
index, yet a conflict between members, the dispute level would significantly reduce the
overall cooperation score though it cannot bring the score into the negative.
Figure 3.1 below shows the range of cooperation over the time observed
highlighting the highest, average, and lowest recorded levels for each organization. Some
organizations such as CAN and CACM have a wide range of cooperation over time while
others such as the Pacific Alliance have a small range, primarily due to its young age as
an organization. Despite struggling with membership loss, as of 2013 CAN had the
highest overall score for cooperation in the region while Mercosur, previously the
highest, has struggled in recent years. Overall, SELA displays the lowest average level of
cooperation while Mercosur has the highest. While, as a region, Latin America shows a
gradual increase in cooperation levels in the time observed, the trend is not consistent
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with organizations showing dips and peaks in cooperation levels over time. Both between
regional organizations and within them over time, overall cooperation levels show a great
deal of variation18.
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Figure 3.1. Cooperation levels by organization. Minimum, average, and maximum values
for each organization over period observed.
Capturing Economic Asymmetry
Five economic indicators were measured in order to capture the overall levels of
economic asymmetry within the regional organizations observed. These indicators
include the presence of a hegemon, balance of trade, FDI inflows, GDP growth, and
economic openness. While each variable was measured on a state level initially, both the

18

See Appendix B for a histogram demonstrating relatively normal distribution of the
cooperation index among all cases observed.
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average and the variation of these measurements19 utilized the data in order to create an
observation for each organization by year and capture the relationships between memberstates in each organization. Therefore, despite overlapping membership in many
organizations, each indicator is unique to the specific organization and year in which it
was measured. Higher average scores on these economic indicators throughout the
organization are an indication of economic health and are often stated as specific goals of
the organization itself. Therefore, higher average scores are likely to be beneficial for
cooperation if these gains are distributed relatively equally among the group. However,
higher variation of economic indicators among member-states in a regional organization
indicate a higher level of economic asymmetry and unequal gains among member-states.
This is expected to have a negative relationship with overall cooperation levels.
Presence of a Hegemon. The first variable that captures economic asymmetry
within the region is the presence of a hegemon. For this research, a hegemon was
considered any state with a GDP at least three times larger than the next largest state in
the organization20. The presence of a state with a significantly larger GDP than its fellow
member-states suggests that there is a clear economic power in the grouping and
therefore an increased level of economic asymmetry. A dummy variable was used to

19

Neither the average nor variation of the indicator for a regional hegemon was
calculated as it is a binary variable determined by the overall structure of the regional
organization and the relationship between its member-states’ relative size.
20

This measurement was used as it was the largest multiplier available to maintain
Brazil’s hegemony in Mercosur with the presence of Argentina. As there is a wide
consensus within the literature that Brazil is the economic hegemon within the
organization, this relationship was important to maintain in any operationalization of a
regional hegemon for this research.
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represent the presence of a hegemon with a 1 indicating its presence and a 0 its absence.
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of these scores over the organizations and time period
observed. 7 of the 16 organizations observed are categorized as having a hegemon and
include states such as Mexico, Brazil, and Venezuela21. None of the organizations
changed in terms of the presence of a hegemon over the time period observed.
Table 3.2
Presence of a Hegemon
Presence of Hegemon 0
Frequency
376
Percent
70.15%

1
160
29.85%

Total
536
100%

Balance of Trade. The next indicator of economic asymmetry is the variation in
overall balance of trade within the region. In order to capture asymmetric economic
gains, I looked at the distribution of trade within each region. For each state, I calculated
the net current account balance as a percent of GDP from data beginning in 1969. I then
took both the standard deviation and the average for each organization over time. Within
the period observed, the average balance of trade as percent of GDP varied from -29.13%
to 13.93% and an average of -5.35% suggesting that the region maintained a negative
balance over the majority of the time observed. The standard deviation in balance of trade
within the region reached its peak in the early 1970s showing a spike in economic
asymmetry and has been gradually declining since 2010. Figure 3.2 shows the variation
the members’ current account balances by organization.

21

When two or more of these states are present in the same organization, no economic
hegemon is present due to their more comparable economic size.
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Figure 3.2. Variation in member-state current account balances by organization. The data
in the figure reflects the minimum, average, and maximum variation between memberstates over the period observed.
Figure 3.3 shows the average balance of trade for each regional organization on
the left and the average variation in the balance of trade for each organization on the right
as they relate to the organization’s average level of cooperation throughout the time
period observed. While Figure 3.3 only highlights very general trends it suggests a weak
yet positive relationship between average current account balances and cooperation levels
between organizations. In contrast, organizations with a higher degree of variance
between their member-states’ current accounts appear to have a lower overall level of
cooperation. The presence of a hegemon is accounted for in the figures below.
Interestingly, there does not appear to be a notable difference in organizational balance of
trade indicators between organizations with and without a hegemon despite its unusually
large economic size.
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Figure 3.3. Balance of trade (BOT) and cooperation levels by organization. The figure
shows the average current account balance of member-states within an organization over
the period observed on the left. The right half show the average variation in current
account balances among member-states over the period observed.
I also calculated the regional balance of trade to capture the asymmetry of trading
relationships within the region alone without regard to overall current account balances
for member-states. This measurement captures any regionally specific trade imbalances
between member-states that may impact political cooperation efforts. To capture the
overall variation and asymmetry in regional trade flows, I took the difference for each
state between its exports and imports exclusively to its fellow member-states in an
organization as a percent of GDP for each year. Within the period observed, the average
regional balance of trade as percent of GDP varied from -20.78% to 3.51% and an
average of -1.89%. The standard deviation in balance of trade within the region reached
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its peak in the early 2011 and has been gradually declining since showing a slight
decrease in economic asymmetry throughout the region in recent years.22
FDI Inflows. Another indicator of economic asymmetry is the distribution of FDI
inflows to the region. To capture this, I calculated the total FDI inflows for each state
divided by its GDP in order to control for the overall economic size of each member-state
as larger economies are generally expected to draw more total investment.23 I then
determined the variance in these inflows among member-states through calculating the
standard deviation per year. To measure the average level of FDI inflows within an
organization, I calculated the total inflows to all member-states as a percent of their total
combined GDP. Figure 3.4 shows both the average level of FDI inflows as well as the
variance in the distribution of this FDI for all of Latin America over the time observed.
Though, as a whole the region has seen an increase in FDI inflows since 1970, there is
also increasing variation in its distribution. The figure suggests that as inflows to the
region rise, so does the variation in their distribution highlighting that the FDI inflows are
not rising equally throughout the region even when controlling for the GDP of individual
states.

22

While the average and variation of regional balance of trade among member-states
were calculated separately, they are closely related to each other. Unlike the previous
measurement involving overall current account balances, this measurement only
considers intra-regional trade. This means that a negative value in average regional trade
balances must coincide with an increase in variation of member-states’ regional trade
balances. In other words, they are highly negatively correlated.
23

Measurements for FDI inflows begin in 1970 due to data availability.
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Figure 3.4. FDI Inflows as % GDP for Latin America (1970-2015)

The trends of Avg. Average FDI Inflows (%GDP) and Avg. Stnd. Dev. FDI Inflows (%GDP) for Year. Color shows details about Avg. Average
FDI Inflows (%GDP) and Avg. Stnd. Dev. FDI Inflows (%GDP).

Figure 3.5 shows the average level and variation of FDI inflows for each
organization compared to its average level of cooperation throughout the time period
observed. While the figure only highlights very general trends among the organizations, it
suggests there is not a significant relationship between the average level FDI inflows and
an organization’s level of cooperation. In contrast, variation in FDI inflows among
member-states appears to have a strong negative relationship with overall cooperation
levels. In general, organizations in which FDI inflows are more unevenly distributed
therefore indicating increase economic asymmetry appear to have lower overall levels of
cooperation.
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Figure 3.5. FDI by organization. The figure shows the average levels of FDI inflows
within an organization as well as the average variation in FDI inflows among memberstates over the period observed.
GDP Growth. A third indicator of economic asymmetry is the variation in GDP
growth rates within an organization. To capture this variation, I calculated the GDP
growth for each state in an organization for a given year and found the standard deviation
among all member-states. In addition, the average GDP growth rate for each organization
as a whole was calculated to show the overall economic health of the group. Many
regional organizations cite economic growth as a motivation for cooperation efforts.
Therefore, while an increase in the overall growth rates for the region would suggest
successful cooperation and likely further efforts, asymmetrical growth is likely to hinder
such efforts. Over the period observed, the average GDP growth rates for Latin America
have been volatile with both the economic crises of the 1980s and 2008 contributing to
severe drops in growth rates throughout the region. Average growth rates have remained
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volatile in the time observed though the variation in growth rates within the Latin
American region as a whole has marginally declined since the late 1970s suggesting a
very slight decrease in economic asymmetry.
Figure 3.6 shows the relationship between cooperation and both the average
overall growth rate and the average variation in growth rates for each organization. While
the information in the figure presents only a general trend, it suggests that organizations
with higher growth rates tend to do slightly better in terms of cooperation. However,
similarly to the measure of FDI inflows, there is a stronger relationship between the
variation in growth rates and cooperation than the overall level of growth rates.
Organizations with a higher variation of growth rates among their members appear to
suffer over time in terms of overall cooperation levels.

Figure 3.6. GDP growth rates by organization. The figure shows the average levels of
GDP growth rates within an organization as well as the average variation in GDP growth
among member-states over the period observed.
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Global Integration. The final measurement of economic asymmetry for this
research captures the levels of economic openness within an organization. The overall
level of economic openness of a regional organization is expected to have mixed effects
on regional cooperation levels as not all organizations strive to open up to the global
economy. In contrast, high levels of variation in economic openness are expected to
hinder regional cooperation efforts as member-state pursue differing policies. Both the
average level of involvement in the global economy as well as the variance in global
integration levels within an organization were calculated. Measuring each state’s total
trade as a percentage of its GDP for each year from 1960 to 2015, average trade as a
percentage of GDP was determined for each organization as a whole. In addition, the
standard deviation of trade/GDP between member-states was calculated for each
organization in order to capture the variation in economic openness.
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Figure 3.7. Variation in trade as a percent of GDP by organization. The figure displays
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the minimum, average, and maximum levels of variation between member-states over the
period observed.
This data showed that, on average, there has not been a significant increase in the
trade to GDP ratio for Latin America over the time observed. However, within and
between the regional organizations, there is significant variance as the range of global
trade extends from 23.92% to 137.78% of GDP. Figure 3.7 shows the variation in the
standard deviation of economic openness among member-states within an organization.
This variation demonstrates that not only are some organizations more open to the global
economy than others, as expected, but within organizations member-states have wide
variation in how open they are.
Figure 3.8 shows the relationship between regional cooperation and both the
average level and the average variance of economic openness within each organization
among its member-states. Though only capturing general trends summarized in the data,
both factors appear to have a negative relationship with an organization’s average
cooperation levels. Interestingly, overall openness appears to have a slightly stronger
negative relationship with cooperation than the variation among member-states within an
organization. This suggests the possibility that the more member-states of an organization
are involved in the international economy through trade, the lower their overall
cooperation levels are likely to be in the long run.
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Figure 3.8. Economic openness by organization. The figure shows the average levels of
trade as a percent of GDP of an organization as well as the average variation in trade as a
percent of GDP among member-states over the period observed.
Additional Independent Variables
In addition to measuring the relationship between indicators of economic
asymmetry and regional cooperation, four more factors were considered including
membership size, intra-regional trade, regime type, and US influence. These variables
were considered due to their prominence in the literature on regional integration and their
potential to act as additionally significant variables affecting the relationship between
economic asymmetry and regional cooperation. While an increase in intra-regional trade
and similarity of regime type among member-states is expected to increase cooperation,
high or disparate levels of US influence and a large membership size are expected to
decrease cooperation levels within an organization.

59

Total Organizational Membership. The first potential control variable captures the
total membership size of each organization. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the
literature on collective action often argues that an increase in a group’s size can be
detrimental to cooperation efforts. With regard to regional cooperation, organizations
with larger memberships do offer the potential for increased gains by allowing additional
states to share in pooled resources and alliances. However, larger organizations also face
more difficulty in coordinating efforts and are more likely to have contention between
member-states if only due to the presence of more actors.
To test the impact of organization size on cooperation, the total membership for
each organization each year was calculated based on the information on each
organization’s website. Table 3.3 presents a summary of the findings with regard to
membership size throughout Latin American organizations. The range in membership
spans from a minimum of 2 (ALBA at its founding) to a maximum of 33 (CELAC). The
mean membership size for all organizations is just over 10 members per organization.
While membership totals did change over time for most organizations, CAN was the only
organization to see a decrease in membership. CAN lost members two times in the period
observed first with the exit of Chile in 1976 under Pinochet and then the exit of
Venezuela in 2006 as it pursued membership in Mercosur. In contrast, there were 44
observations where states joined organizations. Organizations with larger memberships
are expected to struggle more in maintaining and deepening political cooperation than
their smaller counterparts.
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Table 3.3
Summary Statistics for Membership Size
Observations
Membership Total
536

Mean
10.67

Std. Dev.
7.30

Min.
2

Max
33

Intra-Regional Trade. Intra-regional trade levels have typically been used as a
proxy to measure regional integration. Here it is meant to highlight the level of economic
interdependence within each grouping. Larger levels of intra-regional trade demonstrate
deeper economic ties between member-states and is therefore expected to correlate with
increased political cooperation through increasing the need and ability for states to
interact. Intra-regional trade was measured as the combined imports and exports
occurring between each member-state of a regional organization as a percentage of the
organization’s total trade with the world. Data was collected from the Direction of Trade
Statistics from the IMF for 1953-2015. While intra-regional trade for Latin America as a
whole has generally increased over the time period observed, it is significantly lower than
most other regions in the world including Europe and East Asia. Intra-regional trade
levels in Latin America peaked in 1995 and remain under 14% of total trade. This gradual
increase in economic interconnectedness is expected to have a positive, if slight, impact
on regional cooperation.
Figure 3.9 below shows the intra-regional trade levels within each organization
highlighting the minimum, average, and maximum levels observed over time. This figure
demonstrates a wide degree of variation within most organizations as well as between
them. While some organizations such as CACM show dramatic shifts over time, others
such as the PA show little variance.
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Figure 3.9. Intra-regional trade levels (as percentage of total trade) by organization.
Regime Type. Both levels of democratization and overall variation in regime type
throughout a region is expected to have an effect on regional cooperation levels. Feng
and Genna (2003) argue that homogeneity of regime types among members of an
organization is a key part to regional integration as it both shows similar values and helps
them foster similar (often times democratic) institutions internationally. A similarity in
regime type among member-states in an organization highlights the existence of similar
domestic political institutions and political values that can better foster cooperation.
Lower variation in regime types as well as a higher level of democracy within a region
are therefore expected to positively impact measurements of regional cooperation.
The regime type for each state was measured using data from Polity IV. The
Polity IV scale was adjusted from -10-10 to 0-20, 0 representing the most authoritarian
and 20 the most democratic. For each organization, both the average polity score and the
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standard deviation were calculated by year. Figure 3.10 shows the average polity score
for Latin America over time as well as the average variation in polity scores within the
organizations. The graph clearly shows the region democratizing as a whole over the
observed period while the variance in the region simultaneously decreases as states
become more uniformly democratic.
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Figure 3.10. Polity IV scores by organization. The figure shows the average polity scores
for an organization as well as the average variation in polity scores among member-states
over the period observed (1953-2015).

The trends of Avg. Stnd. Dev. Polity and Average Polity for Year. Color shows details about Avg. Stnd. Dev. Polity and Average Polity.

US Influence. The final potential control variable captures the level of US
influence on member-states within an organization. The literature presents conflicting
views on the expected impact of overall US influence as it both indicates the support of
the global hegemon as well as an alternative to regional cooperation for Latin American
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states. In contrast, high variation in levels of US involvement among member-states in an
organization is expected to be detrimental to overall cooperation levels as it suggests
member-states have differing policy approaches to external actors and therefore may be
less likely to deepen ties to each other. The level of US influence on Latin America was
measured using an index variable based on the work of Francisco Urdinez et al.24 Five
measures were compiled for each state by year: shared votes in the U.N. General
Assembly (UNGA), per capita military aid from the US, per capita economic aid from the
US, FDI balance with the US as a percentage of GDP, and exports to the US as a
percentage of total exports. The average of these measures was then taken for each state
for each year to determine its total level of US influence. Both the average level and the
variation in US influence was determined for each organization by year. As a whole, US
influence peaked in 1985 in Latin America, particularly for OECS, and hit its lowest
point in 1995. US influence was often lower and less varied in South American
organizations such as Mercosur and higher in the organizations consisting primarily of
Central American and Caribbean states. Figure 3.11 shows the variation in average levels
of US influence among member-states within each organization.

24

(Urdinez, Mouron, Schenoni, & de Oliveira, 2016)
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Figure 3.11. US influence by organization.
Table 3.4 gives the summary statistics for each of the variables meant to capture
economic asymmetry and performance within the region. Due to data availability, not all
indicators were captured for each observation. The data presented in the table reflects the
original measurements to show the true variance on each indicator. The data was later
adjusted in order to provide standardized coefficients in the statistical tests.
Table 3.4
Summary Statistics for Independent Variables
Measure
Observations
Mean
Balance of Variation
485
6.09
Trade Average
488
-5.35
Global
Balance of Variation
501
3.95
Trade Average
502
-1.89
Regional
FDI
Variation
497
3.09
Inflows
Average
497
3.78
GDP
Variation
503
0.03
Growth
Average
505
0.03
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Std. Dev.
3.36
5.07

Min.
0
-29.13

Max
17.62
13.93

5.36
2.92

0.20
-20.78

64.29
3.51

2.42
3.07
0.02
0.02

0
-6.58
0.01
-0.05

18.4
19.61
0.14
0.14

Global
Integration
Regime
Type
IntraRegional
Trade
US
Influence

Variation
Average
Variation
Average
N/A

523
523
472
472
536

25.92
71.77
4.06
15.30
11.15

12.83
24.51
2.33
3.02
5.46

2.80
23.93
0.45
4.25
0

80.00
137.78
9.90
19
25.19

Variation
Average

520
520

3.15
3.11

5.67
3.76

0
0.01

89.73
40.40

Statistical Analysis
The discussion above highlighted general trends found between measurements of
economic asymmetry and regional cooperation finding evidence to suggest that they are
negatively related. In order to further understand this relationship, statistical analysis is
necessary as it can test for strength and significance of relationships between the
measurements for economic asymmetry, controlling for the additional explanatory
variables from the literature, and the dependent variable of regional cooperation. Before
running a regression analysis on the data collected, I standardized variables as
percentages with values ranging between 0 and 1. Three variables were not converted to
this scale due to their unique nature; regime type (ranging 0-20), US influence (ranging
0-9025), and organizational membership (ranging 2-33).
For the statistical analysis, I used a Linear Mixed-Effects regression model
(LMEM) as it is better suited to capture the effects of both organizational groupings and
time on the data collected than a more common Fixed Effects (FE) regression. FE
regression models are commonly used for data that is grouped by organization or country.

25

I could standardize the US influence to a 0-1 scale with 90 representing 1…it has been
insignificant in all models though so I’m not sure how necessary this is in interpreting the
results.
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However, it is too limited in scope for this research as it controls out much of the
variance of interest rather than modeling it in (Bell & Jones, 2015, p. 134). While a FE
regression could thoroughly capture the variance occurring within each organization over
time, it is unable to capture the variance occurring between them. For example, if an
organization were to maintain high levels of economic asymmetry and low levels of
cooperation while another maintained the opposite over the time observed, a FE model
would risk a type II error by concluding there was little or no relationship between the 2
variables. In contrast, a Between Effects (BE) regression model would capture the
variance between the organizations but not within them over time. This type of model is
often not used because it aggregates the data and significantly lowers the number of cases
available for analysis.
Random Effects (RE) regression models capture a combination of the variance
observed in FE and BE regression models accounting for both variation within groupings
over time and between them. However, traditional RE models are unable to specify the
level of variance attributed to each type of variation. LMEM regressions can help solve
many of the drawbacks such as this found in RE models (Baayen et al, 2008, p. 391).
These mixed models have a goal of combining the variation observed in both fixed and
random effects models while being able to weigh the variation and its effects on the DV
appropriately. “[Mixed] models account for dependencies in the data, thereby producing
more appropriate inferences” (Catran & Fairbrother, 2016, p. 23). One particularly
attractive feature has been with LMEMs is that they can control for the effects of multiple
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areas of variance (such as time and grouping) within a single coherent framework (Bates
et al, 2015, p. 2).
There are different types of LMEMs to account for different data structures26. The
data in this research is nested in both year and regional organization observed. This
means that the specific observation for each variable is likely influenced by the period in
which it was observed as well as the organization for which it was calculated. For
example, we may expect data from 1980 to naturally vary from data in 2010. In addition,
we may expect the unique structure and policies of CARICOM to cause its data to differ
from that of CAN. By accounting for the variation caused both time and organization, we
can more clearly see the impact of the independent variables of interest on regional
cooperation levels. Cross-classified mixed models control for data nested in two different
factors while allowing the researcher to keep each factor independent rather than specify
a hierarchy between them. This model recognizes that observations from a given year are
likely to be more similar than from different years and observations from a given
organization are likely to be more similar than from different organizations while
considering the influence of years and organizations independently (Catran &
Fairbrother, 2016, p. 25).
An initial test (the null model) was run with just the dependent variable of
regional cooperation in order to capture the variation of the DV both between
organizations and within them over time. The null model results show that there is
significant variance in cooperation both between and within the organizations observed.

26

For a thorough overview of 6 different model types, see Catran and Fairbrother (2016).
68

Just over 31% of the variation in cooperation occurs within organizations over time. A
much larger part of the variation observed in cooperation (just over 46%) occurs between
the organizations themselves27. These results support the use of a cross-classified mixed
model in order to understand the impact of the explanatory variables on the variation both
between organizations and within them over time.
In order to utilize a cross-classified mixed model all independent variables were
converted to highlight variation between organizations and over time. To allow the model
to determine the variation in the independent variables between organizations,
organizational averages were calculated for each variable and given the label “org”. In
addition, all independent variables were converted to represent variation in specific years
within each organization by finding the difference between the measurement for the year
and the organizational average. This allows the model to determine variation generated
over time within each organization and were given the label “time”.
The initial model directly tests the main hypothesis of this research by calculating
the relationship between economic asymmetry (EAS) on regional cooperation while
controlling for membership size. Due to multicollinearity issues, the two balance of trade
variables were separated from the FDI measurements and run as two separate models28.
Results of the EAS models are below in table 3.5 for Models 1a and 1b. Both models are

27

Calculated with the Intra-class correlation (ICC) coefficient. See Appendix C for the
full results of the null model and ICC calculations.
28

See Appendix D for full correlation chart between all measured variables. I ran each
model as a regular OLS multiple regression first in order to run the VIF test to double
check for issues of multicollinearity. The VIF test results for each model actually utilized
are available in Appendix E.
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statistically significant and reduce the variance between years and organizations
significantly from the null model demonstrating that the independent variables account
for variation in regional cooperation both over time and between organizations. Notably
however, they do a better job explaining variation between organizations than within
them over time.
The model was adjusted to incorporate additional potential explanatory variables
from the literature including intra-regional trade levels, variation in regime type, and
variation in US influence to see if this increased prediction of the DV or altered the
explanatory power of any of the EAS variables of interest. Again, the model had to be
divided into 2 different regression tests in order to avoid concerns of multicollinearity.
The results of these tests are shown below for Models 2a and 2b. Both full variance
models are statistically significant and, similarly to the EAS models, explain variation in
cooperation both over time and, more strongly, between organizations.
Table 3.5
Economic Variance Models
Model
Prob > chi2
Observations
Random
Year
Effects
Org
Parameters
Residual
Global BOT
Org.
(Variance)
Time.
Regional
BOT
(Variance)

Org.
Time.

1a
0.0000
451
.2543835
.1931743
.2011576
-11.99***
(2.94)
-1.67***
(.49)
-1.46
(.87)
.26
(.34)

1b
0.0000
463
.2689799
.1382544
.2095399
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2a
0.0000
416
.1972637
.1722767
.1939596
-8.40*
(3.32)
-1.91***
(.51)
-1.65
(.90)
-.13
(.34)

2b
0.0000
463
.2607075
.1404254
.199867

FDI Inflows
(Variance)

Org.
Time.

GDP Growth
(Variance)

Org.
Time.

Econ.
Openness
(Variance)

Org.
Time.

Hegemon
Regime Type
(Variance)

-9.84
(9.94)
-.39
(.84)
-.76
(.60)
.36**
(.15)
-.08
(.11)

-17.59***
(3.56)
1.72**
(.64)
.11
(7.54)
-1.69*
(.82)
-.41
(.46)
.46**
(.16)
.09
(.09)

Org.
Time.

IntraRegional
Trade
(Org. %)
US Influence
(Variance)

Org.
Time.

-1.52*
(.64)
.24
(.16)
.04
(.11)
-0.08*
(.04)
-0.04***
(.01)
.69
(1.22)
2.71***
(.52)

Org.
Time.

Membership
Total

Org.
Time.

Constant

2.95***
(.29)

-.02***
(.01)
-.04***
(.01)
2.49***
(.23)

2.88***
(.23)

-15.42***
(4.12)
1.91**
(.62)
-2.20
(7.11)
-1.93*
(.79)
-.17
(.48)
.44**
(.15)

-.30
(1.07)
2.95***
(.48)
-.03
(.03)
.003
(.002)
-0.03***
(.01)
-0.06***
(.01)
2.61***
(.25)

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (standard errors in parentheses)

The variance models above found no significant relationship between the
variations in an organization’s regional BOT, GDP growth, or US influence and the DV.
In addition, the presence of a hegemon does not have a significant impact on cooperation
levels. In contrast, measurements for variance in organization’s current account balance
(Global BOT) and FDI inflows have a negative impact on regional cooperation between
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organizations as well as over time as expected. Finally, variation in an organization’s
economic openness appears to have a slight but positive relationship with cooperation
thought the results were inconclusive between models. Additional explanatory variables
including variation in regime type, level of intra-regional trade, and total membership
size all had a significant and expected impact on cooperation over the time observed
though only membership size proved significant between organizations.
The second model tests the relationship between the organizational average of
each variable rather than the variance among member-states observed above. The model
was first tested only using economic indicators including the average current account
balance among members in a given year as well as the average regional balance of trade,
level of FDI inflows, economic openness. This allows us to see the direct relationship
between indicators of economic health and policy on regional cooperation while
controlling for membership. The results of these tests are below in Table 3.6 for Models
3a-3c. The model was then adjusted to incorporate the additional potential explanatory
variables of regime type (or democratization levels), intra-regional trade levels, and
degree of US influence (Models 4a-4c). All tests showed the model to be statistically
significant and able to explain variation in cooperation levels both over time and between
organizations with the exception of model 4b that did not explain variation over time.
Table 3.6
Economic Averages Model
Model
Prob > chi2
Observations
Random
Effects
Parameters

Year
Org
Residual

3a
0.0000
468

3b
0.0000
463

3c
0.0042
456

4a
0.0000
433

4b
0.0000
428

4c
0.0000
421

.2533755
.2208452
.2177434

.2874108
.1738401
.2131373

.2630611
.3193706
.2050402

.2922951
.1916949
.2078783

.3200807
.1470886
.196644

.2559458
.1625279
.1846498
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Global
BOT
(Average)

Org.

Regional
BOT
(Average)

Org.

FDI
Inflows
(Average)

Org.

GDP
Growth
(Average)

Org.

Econ.
Openness
(Average)

Org.

5.60*
(2.20)
.03
(.34)

Time.

Time.

5.29**
(1.98)
-1.99**
(.76)

Time.

Hegemon
Regime
Type
(Average)

Org.

IntraRegional
Trade
(Org. %)

Org.

US
Influence
(Average)

Org.

Membershi
p Total

Org.

7.57***
(2.09)
-1.49
(.80)
-8.41*
(2.14)
.69
(.82)

Time.

Time.

3.89*
(1.69)
-1.00*
(.40)

52.01**
(16.60)
-1.46**
(.65)
-1.11***
(.30)
0.42***
(.12)
-.03
(.12)

-7.77*
(3.04)
1.71
(.96)

37.22*
(14.65)
-.63
(.59)

64.81**
(21.99)
-.60
(.60)

.01
(.10)

-.01
(.18)

Time.

Time.

13.67
(24.06)
-1.62*
(.71)
-1.20**
(.37)
.51**
(.15)
-.20
(.13)
0.11*
(.05)
-0.02**
(.01)
-.18
(1.15)
1.69**
(.49)

Time.

-0.03***
(.01)
Time.
-0.03**
(.01)
Constant
.73
1.02
-.33
(.63)
(.54)
(.80)
*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (standard errors in parentheses)

.43
(.67)

13.23
(18.20)
-1.21
(.65)

-.55
(20.27)
-.98
(.64)

-.20
(.12)
.06
.04
-0.02**
(.01)
.06
(1.01)
2.76***
(.51)

-.19
(.11)
.07
(.04)
0.01*
(.01)
.45
(1.02)
3.19***
(.52)

-.06
(.03)
-.01
(.004)
-0.04***
(.01)
-0.06***
(.01)
1.23*
(.53)

-0.04***
(.01)
-0.08***
(.01)
1.25*
(.60)

Just as in the initial variance models, the presence of a hegemon and the level of
US influence within an organization did not have a significant impact on cooperation
levels. The results for the relationship between organizational growth rates and
cooperation were inconclusive with due to variation in the level of statistical significance.
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However, it appears that there might be a positive relationship between growth and
cooperation between organizations. The average current account and regional trade
balances within organizations appear to have a positive impact on cooperation between
organizations. However, their impact on cooperation over time within an organization
was inconclusive. Interestingly, both the level of FDI inflows and economic openness for
an organization had a negative relationship with cooperation between organizations
suggesting that integration into the global economy may harm regional cooperation
efforts.
The final model tested incorporated significant variables from both the variance
and average models above in order to generate a more complete model to explain
variation in regional cooperation. Variation in global BOT, FDI inflows, and growth
among member-states were included to test the overall impact of economic asymmetry on
regional cooperation. In addition, economic conditions of an organization are accounted
for with the inclusion of the average growth and economic openness of its members.
Finally, the additional explanatory variables from the literature of intra-regional trade
levels and similarity of regime type were included while controlling for membership size.
Due to issues of multi-collinearity, the variables were tested in three different versions of
the model. The results of these final tests are shown below in Table 3.7. All models were
statistically significant and, on average, better explain variation in regional cooperation
both between organizations and, to a lesser degree, over time than the previous two
models discussed above.
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Table 3.7
Final Model Regression Results
Model
Prob > chi2
Observations
Random Effects Year
Parameters Org
Residual
Global BOT
Org.
(Variance)
Time.
FDI Inflows
(Variance)

5a
0.0000
418
.2271622
.1354236
.1806619
-8.32***
(2.34)
-1.68***
(.46)

Org.

Org.
Time.

GDP Growth
(Average)

Org.
Time.

Econ. Openness
(Average)

-5.69
(18.16)
-1.04
(.62)

-32.90
(22.91)
-.66
(.67)

-.04
(.04)
-0.03***
(.01)
.50
(.85)
3.37***
(.52)
-0.03***
(.01)
-0.06***
(.01)
2.80***
(.79)

-0.12*
(.05)
-0.02*
(.01)
-2.75**
(.95)
2.13***
(.50)

Org.
Time.

Regime Type
(Variance)

Org.
Time.

Intra-Regional
Trade

Org.
Time.

Membership Total

Org.
Time.

Constant

5c
0.0000
481
.2558363
.1478105
.2103782

-26.69***
(3.71)
1.73**
(.67)

Time.
GDP Growth
(Variance)

5b
0.0000
428
.2249551
.1621173
.2125208

*p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 (standard errors in parentheses)
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4.33***
(1.00)

-4.14
(8.20)
-1.02
(.80)
29.87*
(13.60)
-1.55*
(.63)
-.84***
(.23)
0.44***
(.12)

1.08
(.89)
2.58***
(.46)
-0.03***
(.01)
-0.03***
(.01)
1.56*
(.63)

The final model found evidence to support the hypothesis that economic
asymmetry has a negative impact on regional cooperation. Figures 3.12 and 3.13A below
show the relationship between the indicators of economic asymmetry and regional
cooperation found in the model using a 95% confidence interval. Higher variation of the
members’ current accounts within an organization has a negative impact on cooperation
both between the different organizations and over time as expected. Additionally,
variance in FDI inflows among member-states of an organization also has a negative
relationship with cooperation levels when comparing organizations. In other words,
organizations with a higher variance in FDI inflows are expected to have significantly
lower levels of cooperation than their counterparts. However, this relationship does not
hold up when observing changes within organizations over time. There is an unexpected
positive, though less significant, relationship between variation in FDI inflows and
cooperation within organizations. Finally, the relationship between variation in growth
rates among member-states and cooperation is unclear. While there is some suggestion
that this variation might have a negative impact on cooperation over time and possibly
between groups, it does not appear to be statistically significant. The strongest
relationships between economic asymmetry and regional cooperation are captured though
variation in balance of trade and FDI inflows among member-states.
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Figure 3.13B.

The economic conditions of an organization provide additional explanatory power
to the model accounting for some of the variation found in regional cooperation. While
the relationship between average growth rates and cooperation within an organization
shown in Figure 3.13B are inconclusive, an organization’s economic openness and level
of intra-regional trade are significant and shown in Figure 3.14. The average level of
economic openness within an organization has a positive impact on overall cooperation
meaning that those organizations more integrated into the global economy tend to less
cooperation among their member-states. In contrast, increasing economic openness over
time within an organization has a less impactful but still significant positive relationship
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with cooperation. Levels of intra-regional trade do not explain variation in cooperation
between organizations as organizations that trade more do not have significantly different
levels of cooperation. However, as expected, an increase of intra-regional trade among
member-states within an organization over time coincides with higher overall levels of
cooperation.
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Finally, Figure 3.15 shows the relationship between variation in regime type
within an organization and regional cooperation as well as the influence of overall
membership size. As expected, variation in regime type has a negative relationship with
cooperation over time though this impact is quite small. Similarly, a higher variation in
regime type potentially also has a negative impact on cooperation between organizations
though this relationship is inconclusive in the model. Overall membership levels of an
organization have a negative relationship with cooperation both between organizations
and over time supporting concerns over collective action problems. Larger organizations
tend to have lower levels of cooperation than their smaller counterparts. In addition, an
increase of membership over time also has a negative impact on cooperation suggesting
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that increasing the size of an organization does not help deepen the cooperation efforts
between members despite increasing potential gains.
Regime Variation Over Time
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Conclusion
Using a cross-classified mixed model, this research found statistical evidence to
support the primary hypothesis that economic asymmetry has a negative impact on
regional cooperation. However, only two measures of asymmetry stated in H1, balance of
trade and FDI inflows, proved significant. Variation in GDP growth rates were not found
to be consistently significant. In addition, variation in economic openness among
members was not a strong indicator of regional cooperation. However, the overall level
of economic openness throughout an organization positively affects regional cooperation
levels within each organization over time. No evidence was found to support H2
predicting a lower level of cooperation in organizations with an economic regional
hegemon. Instead, the presence of a hegemon appears to be consistently insignificant.
Additional explanatory variables including intra-regional trade levels and
similarity of regime type, enhanced the model’s prediction of overall levels of
cooperation. Both indicators were found to have a positive relationship with regional
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cooperation supporting H3. Finally, an increase in membership size leads to a decrease in
cooperation over time with larger organizations showing lower levels than their smaller
counterparts. This provides support for H4. However, no evidence was found to support
the hypothesis (H5) that US influence on member-states significantly impacts regional
cooperation either negatively or positively. These findings and their implications are
discussed in more detail in the following chapter.
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Chapter Four: Data Discussion
Introduction
Gains from regional cooperation are often not distributed equally among states.
Through a quantitative analysis of 16 Latin American regional organizations, this
research found support for the argument that asymmetrical distribution of economic gains
is detrimental to regional cooperation efforts. The less equal these gains are, the more
likely members are to defect from cooperation within the organization through either
minimizing their political ties to their fellow member-states or participating in inter-state
disputes. In particular, unequal distribution of FDI inflows and trade imbalances within a
regional organization lower overall cooperation among its member-states. When
perceived economic gains from cooperation are distributed relatively unequally among
member-states, power dynamics in the region shift, potentially leaving some states
feeling threatened or exploited from the regional arrangements and therefore more
inclined to defect from cooperation with their fellow member-states. In contrast, when
member-states receive relatively equal gains, they are more inclined to continue with
existing cooperation efforts and even deepen political ties within the region. In addition
to economic asymmetry, factors such as regime type heterogeneity, membership size, and
overall levels of intra-regional trade significantly impact the level of political cooperation
within regional groupings. These factors have the potential to mitigate the negative
impact on cooperation caused by economic asymmetries.
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The quantitative analysis presented in the previous chapter tested the relationship
between five indicators of economic asymmetry. To control for factors highlighted in
existing literature on international and regional cooperation, it also tested the effects of
four additional factors: intra-regional trade, regime homogeneity, membership size, and
US influence. The quantitative analysis found support for the primary hypothesis that an
increase in economic variation between member-states leads to lower levels of
cooperation. In addition, the data supported in part the secondary hypotheses outlining
the expected relationships between the additional factors listed and regional cooperation.
Intra-regional trade and similarity of regime type were found to have a positive
relationship with cooperation as expected and membership size had a negative impact.
Contrary to the hypotheses presented, neither the presence of a regional hegemon nor the
level of US influence was shown to have a significant relationship with regional
cooperation levels.
This chapter begins with an overview of the model used in the quantitative
analysis and its primary findings. It then provides an in-depth discussion of the
relationship found for each variable tested with regional cooperation beginning with
indicators of economic asymmetry and then additional control variables. Finally, the
chapter concludes with the expected implication of the quantitative findings on in-depth
case analysis discussing what steps can be taken through qualitative research to better
understand the relationships highlighted in the quantitative findings.
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Overview of the Quantitative Model and Findings
The quantitative analysis in this research utilized a cross-classified mixed model
in order to simultaneously test for the effects of each variable between organizations on
average and within each organization over time. This model was designed to
acknowledge that each organization represents a unique combination of member-states
and that such different combinations likely impact an organization’s overall level of
cooperation. Whereas a more common fixed-effects model simply controls for each
organization, this mixed model compared the differences among the organizations to see
if the indicators account for their different average levels of regional cooperation. In
addition, the model looked at changes within each organization over time. No
organization maintained a static level of cooperation over the time observed. By
accounting for variation over time, the model looked to see how changes for each
indicator within an organization help or hinder its cooperation levels.
Due to the mixed nature of the quantitative analysis, each variable was essentially
tested twice within the model to see how well it explained changes in cooperation over
the time observed as well as different average levels of cooperation for each organization.
The model was able to show that the relationships between each variable and regional
cooperation were not always consistent, but rather more nuanced in some instances, when
accounting for variance among organizations versus over time. The initial analysis looked
exclusively at the distribution of the dependent variable, regional cooperation, through
running the cross-classified analysis with no independent variables. This null model
83

showed that, while cooperation levels vary significantly both between organizations and
within each one, the variation is highest when comparing organizations to one another29.
When analyzing the different independent variables, each test of the model presented in
the previous chapter helped explain both variation of cooperation between organizations
(why they all have different average levels) and within them (why the level of
cooperation changed within an organization over time). While both types of variation
were accounted for by the independent variables, the results were consistently stronger in
explaining the different levels of cooperation found among the organizations30.
The quantitative analysis found statistical evidence to support the primary
hypothesis that economic asymmetry has a negative impact on levels of regional
cooperation. While economic asymmetry is a significant indicator of lower levels of
cooperation, only two of the measures of asymmetry tested, balance of trade and FDI
inflows, proved significant in the model. Variation in economic openness among
member-states was tested as a measure of asymmetry; however, it was not found to be
significant. In contrast, the average level of economic openness throughout an entire
organization was found to significantly impact cooperation levels within an organization

29

Approximately 46% of the variation of cooperation was due to differences in
organizations while around 31% was due to changes over time within each organization.
This was measured using the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC). Calculations are
provided in Appendix E.
30

On average, the final models presented in the quantitative findings (5a-5c) explained
about 2/3 of the variation in cooperation found between organizations and 1/3 of the
variation found within organizations over time. This was noted in the reduction of the RE
parameters for organization and year in the models from their initial values in the Null
Model.
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over time. An additional economic indicator and measure of economic interdependence,
intra-regional trade levels, significantly relates to overall levels of regional cooperation as
well.
The model also tested the impact of non-economic indicators to see if they had a
significant relationship with regional cooperation. In particular, higher variation of
regime type and overall membership size (number of member-states) both had negative
effects on cooperation levels when looking at the differences between organizations and
within organizations over time. The addition of these variables to the indicators of
economic asymmetry increased the explanatory power of the model allowing it to better
account for variation in levels of regional cooperation.
Figure 4.1 provides a visualization of the expected relationships generated from
the quantitative findings. As the model captured both levels of cooperation between the
different organizations and changes in cooperation over time within each organization
itself, the figure highlights these simultaneous forces at play by mimicking the design of
a race track. On the race track, organizations can head either toward defection or full
cooperation over time. Variables that explain changes in cooperation over time within
organizations impact which direction an organization is heading and at what speed.
Variables marked in red indicate that increased levels would slow down cooperation or
lead to defection within organizations. In contrast, those in green indicate variables that
have a positive relationship with cooperation. The font size is relative to the overall
coefficient to demonstrate the degree of the impact from each variable on an
organization’s regional cooperation levels.
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While the variables highlighting variation over time explain organizations moving
towards either defection or cooperation, those that account for variation between
organizations help determine which “lane” an organization starts in. The closer an
organization starts to the “inside lane”, the higher the level of cooperation that it is
expected to have as it has less distance to travel. In other words, it starts at a higher
expected level of cooperation than those in the “outside lane”. This represents the
differences found between organizations as those with lower average levels of these
variables have, on average, higher levels of cooperation. All the variables impacting the
lane of an organization are marked in red as they all push an organization towards the
outer lane leading to decreased expected levels of cooperation. In addition, the size of the
font indicates the degree of impact the variable has on average cooperation levels with
larger font size indicating a larger coefficient.
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Figure 4.1. Visualization of Quantitative Findings
Overall, the research here found that levels of regional cooperation vary
significantly both between organizations and within them over time. Not only do
different organizations start at various levels of cooperation when they form, their levels
do not necessarily steadily increase over time. Instead, they can move both forward and
backward on their track to cooperation and experience periods of defection among their
members. While multiple factors contribute to this variation found in regional
cooperation, the findings support the hypothesis that indicators of economic asymmetry
have a significant negative impact on an organization’s cooperation levels.

87

Economic Indicators of Regional Cooperation
In order to capture economic asymmetry within a region, I looked at five distinct
indicators. The indicators capture the relationship among member-states of an
organization both to each other and the global economy (including their balance of trade,
economic openness, and the presence of a hegemon) as well as their relative gains in the
economic goals sought by regional cooperation efforts (such as GDP growth and FDI
inflows). Out of these five indicators, two had strong statistically significant relationships
with regional cooperation levels: balance of trade and FDI inflows. The other indicators
were either insignificant in the model or had inconsistent results. These results suggest
that economic asymmetry plays an important role in states’ ability to cooperate at a
regional level though likely in a more specific and targeted way than initially expected.
Variation in balance of trade levels among member-states of an organization was
one of the strongest indicators of regional cooperation levels found in the statistical
analysis. This measure looked at the balance of trade for each member-state as a
percentage of GDP. The standard deviation was calculated to capture the variance
between states within each organization. This variation does not capture whether a region
as a whole is maintaining a deficit, surplus, or trade balance. Instead, the measure
captures the differences in current account balances among the different member-states
with variation increasing as some members have a growing surplus and others a growing
deficit. States in Latin America often join regional organizations in order to assist with
economic development and become more competitive in the global economy. In general,
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states with deficits are likely to feel this goal is not being met31. If there is variation
within the region and some member-states are gaining surpluses, the deficit state(s) are
likely to feel disadvantaged by the existing arrangements. This is dissatisfaction is
reflected in the data. When comparing organizations, those with lower levels of variation
on average had significantly higher overall levels of cooperation than their counterparts.
In addition, an increase in variation of members’ balance of trade within an organization
over time led to decreased levels of cooperation.
Member-states running a deficit are often less economically competitive than their
surplus holding neighbors and therefore more concerned with implementing protectionist
measures to boost their domestic market. Meanwhile, states running a surplus will push
for decreased barriers in order to export more efficiently to their neighbors. This variation
in current account balances over time leads to conflicting interests with regard to regional
policies among member-states therefore complicating cooperation efforts. In addition,
deficit states may feel disadvantaged by regional agreements as they struggle in
comparison to their fellow member-states. Deficit states may therefore be inclined to pull
back from existing arrangements that are less beneficial to them in order to protect their
domestic industries from imported goods and boost their relative competiveness. In
contrast, as member-states become more homogenous in terms of current account
balances, interests are more likely to align and agreements are seen as equitable rather
than unfairly benefitting certain members over others. The effect of the variation of

31

The data from models 3c and 4c does support the notion that organizations running
more of a deficit on average in global trade levels have lower levels of cooperation.
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member-states’ balance of trade is even stronger between organizations than within
them32. This suggests that regions with continuously high variation in their global trade
balances are less likely to pursue deeper cooperation agreements to begin with likely due
to initial concerns of an unequal arrangement and competing interest among members.
Attracting FDI to the region is another often cited goal of regional organizations
in Latin America in order to assist their member-states with development. Interestingly
however, an increase in average FDI inflows to a regional grouping was not found to
significantly increase its overall levels of cooperation suggesting that cooperation is not
dependent on the organization’s success in its mission to attract FDI. To the contrary, the
data found some evidence that organizations with lower average FDI inflows actually
have higher levels of cooperation than their counterparts. This relationship may reflect
those groups with low levels of FDI more actively cooperating in order to attract the FDI
their counterparts have been receiving or it may signal that reliance on FDI from extraregional actors is detrimental to regional cooperation efforts. More research is needed to
develop a clearer picture of this relationship.
Whatever the level of FDI inflows to a region, the distribution of these inflows
among member-states, when controlling for GDP, strongly affects overall cooperation
levels giving support to the primary hypothesis that economic asymmetry is harmful to
regional efforts. When looking at variation in cooperation between organizations,
distribution of FDI inflows has the largest overall effect of any variable observed. Those

32

In analyzing cooperation levels both between organizations and within them over time,
variation in balance of trade is the second strongest indicator of regional cooperation
levels.
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organizations with higher average variation in FDI distribution have dramatically lower
levels of cooperation among member-states. This suggests that regions that see FDI
inflows concentrate among only a few members rather than spread out evenly among the
group have a much more difficult time cooperating. In other words, they start on the
“outside lane”. In particular in Latin America and other emerging regions where
attracting FDI is often a goal of members in regional organizations, high variation in FDI
inflows is problematic. Those states receiving less FDI relative to their economic size
have little incentive to continue cooperation and are may even be actively discouraged
seeing their fellow member-states as competition rather than partners for the FDI. In
addition, those states receiving a high level of FDI might be more inclined to further
extra-regional relationships rather than deepen cooperation efforts with their neighbors.
Interestingly, while variation in FDI inflows among member-states has a large
negative effect on cooperation levels between organizations, it appears to have a
significant, though smaller, positive effect on cooperation levels within organizations. As
FDI inflows within an organization are distributed less evenly over time, cooperation is
expected to go up. This is contrary to expectations and will be further analyzed in the two
case studies presented in the following chapters. This inverse relationship may relate to
an organization’s growth rates or overall increase in FDI to the region as states might
continue to pursue cooperation efforts while the region as a whole is benefitting
economically. However, neither GDP growth rates nor average FDI inflows were
significant in the quantitative analysis.
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The results for the relationship between GDP growth rates and regional
cooperation were inconclusive. While a high level of variation in GDP growth rates
among member-states may have a negative effect on cooperation levels within
organizations as expected, the results were not consistently significant when additional
factors were accounted for33. In addition, no consistent relationship was determined
between an organization’s average growth rates and cooperation. These results were
unexpected as GDP growth rates are a major indicator of economic health that often finds
its way into political rhetoric and therefore was expected to be a key indicator of
economic asymmetry influencing a state’s decision-making process when cooperating
with its neighbors. However, this does not appear to be the case.
While the GDP growth rate is often an important indicator of a state’s economic
health, it highlights internal production capacity and is not necessarily indicative of a
particular foreign policy or relationship. This may be the reason that it is not a
consistently significant indicator of regional cooperation levels. In contrast to GDP
growth rates, balance of trade and FDI inflows are indicators that highlight the external
economic relationships of a state on both regional and global levels. A state’s balance of
trade captures its interactions with its trading partners and is a sign of how it is
integrating into the international market. Large deficits suggest a need for the state to
alter its relationship with other players. Similarly, FDI inflows are, by definition, brought
in from sources outside the state. Unlike GDP measures, FDI inflows are a signal of
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Models 1b and 2b found variation in GDP growth rates to have a significant negative
relationship with regional cooperation within groups. However, the relationship was
insignificant in model 5c.
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growth that is directly relatable to a state’s external relationships and therefore more
likely to affect the foreign policy decisions involved in regional cooperation.
The final measure of economic asymmetry was the presence of a regional
hegemon within an organization. No evidence was found to support a lower level of
cooperation in organizations with an economic regional hegemon. Instead, the presence
of a hegemon appears to be insignificant suggesting that the relative economic size of
members (as measured by GDP) is not a determinant of cooperation. This measure only
captured differences between organizations rather than within them. There was no
variation of the presence of a hegemon within organizations over time as no state became
grew to/fell from hegemon size during the period observed and no hegemonic states
entered/exited an organization.
The lack of relationship between a regional hegemon and cooperation levels is
contrary to the expectations set up in the literature. While there is an ongoing debate on
the necessity of a regional hegemon in cooperation efforts, hegemonic stability theorists
argue it is necessary to provide enforcement and public goods within the region. Others
such as Krapohl and Fink (2013) argue that, particularly in emerging regions like Latin
America, hegemons are detrimental to cooperation efforts. This research does not find
support for either argument. The lack of significance of a regional hegemon with regard
to cooperation levels may indicate that its presence is irrelevant to cooperation efforts or
that both of the expected effects are occurring throughout the period observed at different
times or within different organizations therefore cancelling each other out. In other
words, a hegemon in one organization or at one point in time may assist cooperation
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whereas another may harm cooperation efforts. This null finding supports the idea that, at
the very least, hegemons can have varying impacts on cooperation; regional organizations
without a hegemon can be as likely to succeed as their counterparts.
Two additional economic factors, economic openness and intra-regional trade,
have significant relationships with regional cooperation though they do not capture
economic asymmetry. Economic openness or global integration was measured by
calculating the level of global trade as a percentage of GDP. Variations in levels of
economic openness among member-states were expected to have an impact on regional
cooperation levels but the results were inconclusive. However, the average level of
economic openness of an organization significantly affected cooperation levels both
between organizations and within them over time. When comparing organizations, those
with a higher average level of economic openness have a slightly lower level of
cooperation. This suggests that less liberalized organizations are better able to deepen
their internal connections whereas groups that are more incorporated into the global
economy are not as inclined to rely on each other. As average levels of economic
openness increase within an organization, there is a positive effect on cooperation
indicating that the group deepens internal ties as it liberalizes. While these two findings
may seem contradictory, they are capturing two separate processes. Less liberalized
organizations have an increased incentive to cooperate in order to better their position as
they integrate into the global economy. As they cooperate, they are likely to liberalize at
least among each other. Such liberalization is included in the measure of economic
openness that looks at the total trade to GDP.
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Intra-regional trade levels are often used as a proxy measure for regional
cooperation. However, this research looked at their relationship to the political indicators
comprising the measurement of regional cooperation as the dependent variable. Intraregional trade captures the percentage of total trade that took place among member-states
of an organization in a given year. As expected, higher levels of intra-regional trade had a
positive relationship with cooperation levels within organizations; they are the strongest
indicator identified of varying cooperation within an organization over time. When
member-states increase their mutual trade, they are more likely to deepen regional ties.
Increased trade creates a degree of economic interdependence within an organization
increasing the benefits of cooperation and the costs of defection.
Unexpectedly, intra-regional trade is not a significant predictor of varying
cooperation levels between organizations. While increasing trade over time helps deepen
cooperation efforts, organizations that start with a higher level of trade are no more likely
to cooperate than those with low levels. This finding might be unique to Latin America as
a region with particularly low levels of intra-regional trade. Cooperation efforts
throughout Latin America are often meant to spark coordinated development and
integration into the global economy rather than make existing trade more efficient as we
might see in organizations like the EU or NAFTA. Though it is often expected that higher
levels of trade are necessary precursors to cooperation efforts, the data here do not
support this.
Economic indicators of asymmetry and openness have a significant effect on a
region’s political indicators of cooperation. In particular, unequal distribution of
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economic gains from trade and foreign investment negatively impact the overall
cooperation levels among member-states of an organization. This supports the argument
that absolute gains for a region are insufficient on their own. If these gains are not
distributed relatively equally among members, cooperation efforts will suffer.
Additional Influences on Regional Cooperation
While the economic factors discussed above play a key role in regional
cooperation efforts, they do not fully explain the variation seen among the organizations
in Latin America. In addition to these economic indicators, three non-economic variables
were tested for significant relationships to regional cooperation levels: regime type,
membership size, and US influence. The inclusion of these variables helped control for
additional non-economic factors at play and expanded the explanatory power of the
model.
The first additional variable observed were the regime types of member-states
within the region. Past work has found that increased heterogeneity of domestic
institutions is detrimental to regional efforts (Feng & Genna, 2003). This research
supported those findings. As expected, variation in regime type among member-states
had a negative impact on regional cooperation levels both between organizations and, to a
slightly lesser degree, within them over time. More homogenous regimes suggest more
similar values among member-states as well as the use of more common institutions.
Both of these factors are beneficial to maintaining or deepening cooperation efforts. In
addition, similar regimes (typically democracies) can be a prerequisite for membership in
regional organizations like the EU. While such policies are not as strictly enforced in
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Latin America, some organizations such as Mercosur actively promote democratic values
among their members encouraging regime homogeneity over time. While the effect of
regime heterogeneity was significant, it was notably smaller than any of the economic
indicators observed suggesting that it is less of a primary concern.
The overall membership size of an organization (total number of member-states)
had a significant negative relationship with cooperation in all tests both between and
within organizations. Though the coefficient for membership size is significantly smaller
than many other factors, it still accounts for a significant amount of variation between
small sub-regional and large pan-regional groupings. For example, a small organization
such as the PA with four members is expected to have significantly higher levels of
cooperation than a more all-encompassing organization like CELAC with 33 members.
These findings are consistent with the literature on collective action that expect larger
groups to have an increased difficulty with free-riders and defectors. Despite larger
organizations offering the potential for greater benefits, smaller organizations appear
better able to coordinate action among their members and prevent defection.
The impact of membership size is slightly larger on variation of cooperation
within organizations than between then. This suggests that as members are added to an
organization, there will be a slight decrease, perhaps only temporarily, in overall
cooperation levels. The addition of a member in many ways is a boost to cooperation
therefore making these findings somewhat counterintuitive. Adding member-states shows
that an organization is desirable and that the new member has a desire to deepen its ties
of cooperation within the region. However, the results of this research highlight the
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struggle of incorporating new members into existing groups. These members much adjust
to pre-existing arrangements and likely experience a delay in doing so. This suggests that
states do not necessarily join regional arrangements because of their high pre-existing ties
but rather increase their ties to the other members after joining. Additionally, these
findings expect to see a slight benefit to cooperation when a member leaves an
organization. While the exit itself is clearly an indicator of defection, states may be able
to better cooperate after the problematic member has left. Membership exit has only
happened twice in the period observed; both exits took place in CAN. The impact of
these exits will be explored further in the next chapter.
The final variable tested for a significant relationship with regional cooperation
levels was US influence. This measurement captured the relationship between memberstates and the US by observing the FDI, economic aid, and military aid received from the
US, as well as exports sent to the US and shared UNGA votes. Neither the average level
of US influence nor variation in US influence among member-states had a significant
relationship with regional cooperation in any of the tests. Given the regional rhetoric in
Latin America around US hegemony, this finding is a bit surprising. It may be the case
that US influence benefits some organizations while deterring others therefore cancelling
out the impact on regional cooperation, or it may simply be an insignificant factor. The
role of US influence and its impact on regional cooperation will be explored further in the
next chapter on CAN particularly when analyzing the exit of Venezuela in 2006.
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Moving into Qualitative Analysis
The quantitative analysis presented in this research provides strong evidence in
support of the primary hypothesis that, in general, economic asymmetry has a negative
impact on regional cooperation levels. Though these results are consistent throughout the
region, further testing is needed to determine the applicability of these findings to regions
outside Latin America. The statistical analysis most strongly emphasizes the different
levels of cooperation found between organizations within the region. These findings
suggest that the overall composition of an organization matters more than the changes
made within it after it is formed. In other words, organizations that start in the “outside
lane” will always have a further distance to travel to achieve higher levels of cooperation.
While the findings regarding differences between organizations are both
significant and consistent with regard to the relationship between certain indicators of
economic asymmetry and regional cooperation, this part of the analysis was only able to
compare 16 organizations. The relatively small number of organizations in the sample
limits the strength of the model’s conclusions and the generalizability of its findings with
regard to group comparison. The inclusion of additional organizations will generate more
robust and generalizable results in future research. In contrast, the relationships found in
the analysis within organizations over time are more robust as they utilize a significantly
larger variation among the sample. These results are therefore expected to be more
consistent through in-depth case analysis.
The quantitative analysis highlights general relationships between the indicators
observed and regional cooperation. However, in order to better understand how these
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variables interact with one another and why economic asymmetry in particular
significantly impacts overall levels of cooperation, a more in-depth qualitative analysis is
necessary. Analyzing periods of cooperation and defection within specific regional
organizations can help illustrate the relationships illuminated in the statistical analysis. In
addition, further analysis will help fine tune our understanding of how these factors
impact regional cooperation. Finally, the statistical model does not explain as much of the
variation in levels of cooperation within organizations as well as it does between them.
By further observing specific cases using historical analysis, we can better see the process
occurring between key variables as cooperation levels change within an organization over
time.
The remainder of this research looks at two regional organizations in Latin
American, CAN and Mercosur. In many ways, CAN is a “most likely” case in that it
frequently behaved as expected by the statistical model in comparison to other
organizations. Mercosur on the other hand frequently exhibited higher overall
cooperation than expected by the indicators tested. In addition, these two organizations
have a unique relationship with each other due to the shift of Venezuela from CAN to
Mercosur as well as their formation of the joint South American organization, UNASUR.
CAN and Mercosur are analyzed using historical explanation in order to help highlight
and refine our understanding of the relationship between economic asymmetry and
regional cooperation. These two organizations are not presented as a case comparison but
rather a preliminary look within the cases themselves to better understand the findings
discovered in the broader quantitative analysis of the region.
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When looking at these cases, particular attention is paid to critical junctures in
cooperation within each organization, in particular periods of defection among memberstates. Both CAN and Mercosur have clear periods of defection throughout their history
with member-state exits in the former and multiple WTO disputes in the latter. The case
analysis utilized both data from the quantitative analysis as well as more specific countrylevel data to better understand the organizational aggregates that were analyzed in the
statistical model and the historical trend between these variables and cooperation over
time. By de-aggregating the organizational data, we can see more clearly see the
dynamics at play within the region. In addition, news articles from the periods of
defection and previous scholarly work help explain the political motivation behind
periods of defection through including statements from the member-states and
organizations involved. Through an in-depth look at both CAN and Mercosur, I hope to
provide a clearer picture of what rhetoric was used by the states and organizations during
periods of defection and show how the significant variables found in the quantitative
analysis behaved in the period leading up to and right after defection.
The quantitative work presented here sets up expectations for the relationships
found between key variables and the cases observed in the next two chapter. Particular
focus will be given to the relationships found within organizations over time rather than
between them. In observing both CAN and Mercosur, three variables are expected to
have a positive relationship with levels of regional cooperation: intra-regional trade,
economic openness of the group, and variation in FDI inflows. As such, these indicators
are expected to decrease around the periods of defection found in each organization. In
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contrast, three variables are expected to have a negative relationship with cooperation
levels: variation in member-states’ current account balances, membership size, and
variation in members’ regime types. These indicators are expected to increase around the
periods of defection. The analysis will pay particular attention to variation in FDI inflows
among member-states to help illuminate why this has an unexpected positive effect on
regional cooperation. In addition, analyzing CAN allows us to better understand the
impact of losing a member-state on future cooperation within the group.
The quantitative analysis has shown support for the argument that economic
asymmetry is a hindrance to regional cooperation. However, economic asymmetry alone
does not explain the variation with other factors such as intra-regional trade and regime
type playing a key role. The remainder of the study will highlight the intricacies of the
relationships found in the statistical analysis through analyzing cooperation within the
organizations of CAN and Mercosur. This analysis will aim to help clarify some
confusing or inconclusive findings presented here. In addition, an in-depth look at these
two organizations will better our understanding of the rhetoric of member-states
participating in periods of defection to see how well their proclaimed motives connect to
the indicators discussed in the quantitative data.
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Chapter Five: The Andean Community – a Tale of Two Exits
Introduction
Formed in 1969, the Andean Community (CAN) was part of the original wave of
regionalism in Latin America post-WWII. Over its 48 years, CAN has experienced many
waves of cooperation and defection among its member-states. Perhaps the most unique
aspect of CAN is that it is the only organization in this analysis to have had a memberstate exit; Chile exited the group in 1976 and Venezuela followed in 2006. Exits from
regional organizations are particularly rare, having happened only a handful of times34.
Such exits are a clear indicator of defection as a state actively chooses to separate itself
and its policies from the group. A further look at CAN will further illuminate what
conditions pushed these states to defect from the group and exit.
This chapter provides an in-depth look at these unique periods of defection within
CAN in order to gain further insight into the factors involved in regional cooperation.
Specifically, the analysis focuses on the key factors identified by the quantitative analysis
as having a significant impact on cooperation levels, seeking to better understand the
nuanced relationship. In looking at periods of defection, the analysis focuses on the
conditions around the two instances of member-state exits as well as Peru’s declared
intention to exit in 1997. How did indicators of economic asymmetry, particularly
34

Other notable instances of member-state exiting a regional organization include
Tanzania’s exit from COMESA and the U.K. beginning exit talks with the EU
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variation in current account balances and FDI inflows, impact the region at the time of
the exits and play into the rhetoric of the member-states involved? Did additional factors
such as economic openness, levels of intra-regional trade, and regime type variation shift
within the region during these periods as expected by the quantitative analysis? Finally,
what impact did the loss of each member have on cooperation levels in CAN as it moved
forward? Did the decrease of membership size assist the organization or did the exit
discourage members from moving forward?
In order to address these questions, I analyzed two main sources of data. The first
source involved disaggregating the data utilized for the quantitative analysis to get a
country-specific view of the indicators over time. By looking not only at the
organizational aggregates such as the variation or average of variables, the reasons
behind and the states involved in any shift in regional variation or averages were
highlighted. This allowed for a clearer picture of the inter-state dynamics within the
organization around the time of defection. In addition to the quantitative data, the
analysis looked at news articles covering the exits as well as experts reporting on these
critical junctures and previous academic research to understand the rhetoric and reasons
given for the exits by the states involved.
Ultimately, analysis of the periods of defection within CAN show that economic
asymmetry within the region contributed to the exits of both Chile and Venezuela as well
as the period of defection by Peru. Despite these struggles, CAN continued to gradually
increase its overall cooperation levels. In many ways, the organization even benefitted
from the exits as it removed the more incompatible members and allowed the other states
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to deepen ties. In the case of Peru where the exit was not completed, cooperation and
concessions from economically stronger member-states allowed for Peru’s membership
to continue, suggesting strong political will within the region to maintain cooperation.
This chapter will first give an overview of CAN’s history and brief comparison to
the other groups analyzed in the quantitative analysis. It will then look at the periods
surrounding Chile’s exit, Peru’s exit threat, and the most recent exit of Venezuela. The
discussion for each exit will provide context for this defection within the organization. In
particular, it will dive into how each of the critical factors previously identified in the
quantitative analysis behave and the political rhetoric of the states involved to see their
interpretation of the issue. This will help us better understand the relationships previously
identified in the statistical models as well as potentially identify additional factors at play
in order to further refine our understanding of regional cooperation.
An Overview of CAN
CAN initially began as the Andean Pact in 1969 with the ratification of the
Cartagena Agreement by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. During this time,
regional organizations were gaining popularity around the world and within Latin
America; with the Pact’s formation, regional organizations spanned Central America and
the Caribbean as well. The organization’s membership has varied slightly throughout its
lifespan with Venezuela joining in 1973, Chile leaving in 1976, and Venezuela leaving in
2006. When the Andean Pact was created, dependency theory and anti-US imperialist
sentiment were prevalent throughout Latin America and shaped the sentiments of the
organization as it adopted an inward orientation and policies such as import-substitution
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industrialization (ISI) to encourage development. The Pact was formed in response to
concerns with global asymmetry from a powerful US as well as growing regional
asymmetry in Latin America. The members of the Andean Pact wanted to balance
themselves against big states in the region such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina by
deepening their economic and political ties to one another (Dabene, 2009, p. 18). After a
long period of regional stagnation and debt crises in the 1980s, the Andean Pact shifted
away from its inward orientation and reinvented itself in 1996 as the more economically
liberal Andean Community (Mouline, 2013).
When the Andean Pact initially formed, the group was concerned with
minimizing economic asymmetry among themselves. The Cartagena Agreement stated
the goal of “balanced and harmonious development of the member countries under
equitable conditions” and to “reduce existing differences in levels of development among
the Member Countries” (Dabene, 2009, p. 181). Determined to foster equality among all
member-states, the Andean Pact allowed for the special treatment of Bolivia and
Ecuador, the least economically developed members, by allowing them exemptions and
extended timelines for adjusting to the group’s policies (Vargas-Hidalgo, 1979, pp. 214215). In addition, Bolivia and Ecuador were given exclusive rights to sectors that had no
production in the region allowing them the opportunity to grow their markets without
regional competition (Ocampo & Ros, 2011, p. 6).
The first few years of the Andean Pact were successful in fostering cooperation
levels among the member-states. The organization adopted a diverse platform looking
past purely economic issues to social and political issues such as a common migratory
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document, confronting the cholera epidemic, and combatting drug trafficking (Dabene,
2009, pp. 122-124). Venezuela was initially hesitant to join the Pact when it formed.
However, it decided to do so in 1973 after the Pact’s initial success. Unfortunately, this
initial success was not long-lived. Less than ten years after the Cartagena Agreement was
signed, conflict grew among the member-states and the group lost its first member when
Chile exited in 1976. Due to rampant debt crises in region and the onset of ongoing
territorial disputes between Peru and Ecuador, the 1980s were a period of stagnation for
the group both in terms of member-states’ development and deepening cooperation
within the organization. However, the Andean Pact remained intact.
In the 1990s, the Andean Pact attempted to break the period of stagnation and
debt suffered the previous decade and revamp itself during the wave of “new
regionalism” in Latin America. Contrary to the prevalent ideologies in Latin America
during the Andean Pact’s formation, “New Regionalism” focused on economic
liberalization and influenced the founding of new organizations like Mercosur in the
region. In an attempt to modernize, the Andean states shifted their focus. “CAN’s
objectives have changed over the years, and rather than a model of inward-looking
integration it is now seen as a vehicle for driving the Andean region’s integration into the
global economy” (Anonymous, 2006). The group moved away from the isolationist ISI
policies of the past and rebranded themselves as a more liberal Andean Community in
1996. In addition to a shift of economic policies, the group refocused its efforts on
solving the internal disputes that were highlighted by the Peruvian exit threat of 1997. In
particular, CAN became more involved in the ongoing territorial dispute between Peru
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and Ecuador and reignited its efforts to provide support for its less economically vibrant
members.
The new-found momentum of the 1990s increased regional cooperation levels and
CAN continued to institutionalize. CAN has developed into a well-institutionalized
organization with institutions such as an Andean parliament and a dispute resolution
mechanism allowing it to make joint decisions more efficiently among its member-states
on regional policy issues (Phelan, 2015, p. 842). Today,
The Andean Community is one of the most institutionally advanced sub-regional
integration schemes among developing countries. Inspired by the integration
process in Europe, it has several elements in common such as its supranational
character (i.e., Andean laws stand above national laws) and its integration efforts
that go far beyond trade (Duran et al., 2008, p. 5).
Overall, CAN has the highest level of cooperation in the region with deep political
interconnections between members and has even adopted a common passport. However,
the organization continues to suffer from internal divides and conflicts among memberstates that threaten its effectiveness.
CAN suffers from the general problems of other regional organizations in
developing regions, particularly concerning members’ desire to benefit at least as much
as their neighbors. “The unequal distribution of costs and benefits is the root cause of all
major conflicts experienced by developing countries within integration systems” and
CAN is not immune (Vargas-Hidalgo, 1979, p. 213). In addition, the organization is
suffering from ideological divisions that can be seen with Colombia and Peru joining the
economically liberal PA while Bolivia and Ecuador participate in the socialist-oriented
ALBA. Finally, CAN faces competition for membership within the region from
Mercosur. Venezuela left CAN and joined Mercosur in 2006 in part to pursue stronger
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economic connections with Brazil and Argentina. Bolivia joined in 2015 though it
maintained its membership in CAN. Both Mercosur and CAN are seeking to bridge the
gap between them and minimize membership conflicts as they pursue a more continental
organization, UNASUR.
Table 5.1
Andean Community: Timeline
1969 • Cartagena Agreement creates the Andean Pact
1973 • Venezuela joins the Andean Pact as full member
1976 • Chile exits
1979 • Creation of Andean Council of Foreign Ministers, Andean Court of Justice
(went into effect 1983), and Andean Parliament
1990 • Creation of Andean Presidential Council
1992 • Temporary suspension by Peru of its obligations to the Liberalization
Program
1993 • FTA established among all members except Peru
1995 • Goals set for CET among members except Peru
• Peru and Ecuador have large scale militarized border dispute
1996 • The Andean Pact is renamed the Andean Community (CAN)
1997 • Peru declares it is exiting CAN.
• Agreement is reached among members to prevent Peru’s exit and
incorporate Peru into the FTA gradually.
• Andean General Secretariat is created
1998 • Peace treaty signed between Ecuador and Peru to end border dispute
1999 • Agreement reached for Common Foreign Policy guidelines
2000 • Common regime on industrial property approved
• Commitment to Democracy approved
2006 • Peru is fully incorporated into the FTA
• Venezuela exits
2010 • Andean passport is put into effect
Information Source: www.comunidadandina.org
CAN consists of the poorest states in South America with the exception of
Paraguay and is one of the least economically developed organizations in Latin America
based on its average GDP per capita. It has low levels of intra-regional trade even for
Latin America – the third lowest level of intra-regional trade just shy of the 6.7%
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average. Despite these lower levels of economic development, CAN has the third highest
level of cooperation over its lifespan when compared to its fellow Latin American
organizations. However, these levels of cooperation vary significantly over time with
most periods of defection involving inter-state conflicts. Where does CAN stand in
relation to its fellow Latin American organizations with regard to the factors identified in
quantitative analysis as significant indicators for variation in cooperation between
organizations? In other words, what “lane” does CAN start in?
With its high average level of cooperation, CAN should have relatively lower
levels of economic asymmetry. In terms of overall variation of economic size, CAN
began as one of the most symmetrical organizations in Latin America. While the region
as a whole had a ratio of 50:1 between smaller and bigger economies, this ratio was only
19:1 in the Andean Pact (Ocampo & Ros, 2011, p. 5). The findings from the quantitative
analysis suggest this asymmetry should also be low with regard to variation in current
account balances and FDI inflows among its member-states. As expected with its
relatively high levels of cooperation, CAN has the fourth lowest level of current account
variation among member-states and the third lowest variation in FDI inflows.
In addition to economic asymmetry, the quantitative analysis found low economic
openness, small membership size, and low levels of regime variation to indicate an
organization will have higher overall levels of cooperation. As expected with CAN’s
relatively high average levels of cooperation, CAN is the least economically open
organization in Latin America with very low levels of international trade. In addition, it
has the third smallest membership of any Latin American organization with an average
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number of 4.89 members. With regard to variation in regime type however, the
organization cooperates more than expected given its relatively large differences in
member-state regimes and lower overall levels of democratization.
With the exception of regime variation, CAN behaves as expected by the
quantitative model when compared to the other Latin American organizations. This
supports the quantitative findings regarding indicators that influence the variation in
cooperation found between the different organizations. However, the analysis of periods
of defection within CAN will look at the factors from the quantitative analysis that are
significant to the variation of cooperation levels within organizations over time. In
particular, the remainder of this chapter will describe how these factors changed within
CAN in the time period surrounding the member-state exits. Table 5.2 outlines the
significant factors for regional cooperation within organizations that were significant in
the quantitative analysis. In looking at the member-states’ exits, particular focus is given
to understanding the role of economic asymmetry, both actual and perceived by leaders at
the time.
Table 5.2
Significant Indicators for Variation in Cooperation WITHIN an Organization
Positive
Negative
• Intra-Regional Trade
• Variation in Current Account Balances
• Variation in FDI Inflows
• Membership Size
• Level of Economic Openness
• Variation in Regime Type
The First Exit: Chile
CAN experienced its first major instance of defection when Chile exited the
organization on October 30, 1976. Initially, the organization focused on internal
development and reducing dependency on extra-regional actors. While it worked to
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minimize reliance on the global economy, CAN encouraged liberalization within the
organization to assist states with development. In its first few years of operation, CAN
was successful in deepening economic ties and cooperation among its member-states. By
1976, the pact had “been successful in reducing duties and other restrictions on trade
among the members” (de Onis, 1976a). In addition, the group had begun negotiations on
a common external tariff (CET) and dramatically increased intra-regional trade. From its
founding in 1969 to 1976, trade more than quintupled among the members of CAN (de
Onis, 1976c).
In 1973, three years prior to its exit, Chile experienced a sharp regime change via
the military coup that put Augusto Pinochet in power. The coup occurred after a severe
economic downturn in which Chile suffered high inflation, prolonged recession, and
increasing unemployment (Gott, 1977). Chile’s change in regime led to a dramatic shift
in policies and began the regional crisis that led to Chile’s exit (Gutierrez, 1997). The
Pinochet government had inherited significant debt from the previous administration and
sought to implement more liberal economic policies. “[The Pinochet government] has
been seeking foreign loans and investments with an open-door policy to foreign banks,
mining companies and almost anyone offering to buy state enterprises” (de Onis, 1976a).
This shift in economic policies generated tensions within the region. Pinochet’s military
government had overthrown the left-wing government of Presidente Allende Gossens
whose policies had been more socialist and therefore compatible in nature with the
founding ideology of CAN (de Onis, 1976c). Under the new regime, Chile became
increasingly dissatisfied with the status quo in the region and its position in CAN.
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While Chile experienced a military coup, CAN was attempting to deepen
cooperation within the group through establishing a CET (Vargas-Hidalgo, 1979, p. 222)
and Venezuela joined the group as its sixth member. The addition of Venezuela quickly
proved problematic as it threw off the existing balance of the group and increased
concerns over the distribution of benefits (Vargas-Hidalgo, 1979, p. 216). The presence
of a new and economically powerful state increased competition within the region and
Chile’s dissatisfaction with its position. “The root of the crisis seems to have been that
Chile felt it was at a disadvantage in obtaining capital to carry out its development within
the region in comparison with Venezuela and Colombia” (de Onis, 1976c). In addition,
the inclusion of Venezuela deepened the ideological divide among member-states. With
its inward economic focus, Venezuela strengthened the position of Bolivia and Ecuador
within CAN while isolating the more economically liberal Chile and Colombia (Puyana,
1982, p. 9).
We can see this regional tension reflected in a downturn in the cooperation index
scores for CAN at the time. Figure 5.1 shows the cooperation levels for the region from
the group’s founding until a year after the Chilean exit. Cooperation levels within the
region had been going up from the beginning of the organization in 1969. However, they
stalled out around 1974. “In this period [from 1973-1975] there appeared unequivocal
signs that the phase of easy and rapid advance was over…In general the period was
marked by stagnation” (Puyana, 1982, p. 9). Finally, there was a steep decline in
cooperation between 1975 and 1976 immediately preceding Chile’s exit. What caused
this reversal? What specific tensions were occurring between the members in the lead up
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Chile’s change in regime was triggered by a severe economic crisis in the country

that had made Chile less competitive relative to its fellow CAN states, especially
Venezuela. “Chile in the period of 1972-1974 suffered the worst political economic crisis
of its history, while in that same period Venezuela began to enjoy the economic
advantages of being an oil exporting country” (Vargas-Hidalgo, 1979, p. 216). Rather
than quickly resolving the crisis, the military coup added political turmoil to the mix
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further threatening the economic health of the country. The new regime led to a dramatic
shift not only in political policies but also in economic policies as the Pinochet
government attempted to reignite growth. Inspired by liberal economist Milton Friedman,
Chile began denationalizing the economy and deregulating internally after the military
coup (Gott, 1977). This shift in policies increased tensions with Chile’s Andean
neighbors who were less favorable to economic liberalization.
The Chilean military coup created an authoritarian regime within the state and
further polarized the region in terms of political ideology. Chile’s shift to
authoritarianism, led to an increase in the variation of regime types CAN and highlighted
a stark division between the more democratic Colombia and Venezuela and the more
authoritarian Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru. As expected by the quantitative findings, the
region saw the regime variation increase around the time of the downturn in cooperation.
In fact, this period leading up to Chile’s exit exhibited the highest variation in regime
type than any other period in CANs history.
Even among the dictatorships within the region, there was conflicting ideology
between the left-wing Velasco government of Peru and right-wing Pinochet regime in
Chile. Tensions between these two states rose in the 1970s particularly after Chile’s coup,
leading military observers throughout the US and Latin America to predict a major
military conflict between Peru and Chile before the end of the decade (Masterson &
Ortiz, 2006, p. 47). Chile harbored growing suspicions when Peru militarized via the
Soviet Union though Peru accused the US of fear mongering and exaggerating the
tensions (Novitski, 1975). The conflict between these two CAN members culminated in
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minor militarized border disputes and shows of force in 1975 and 1976, about a month
before Chile’s exit (The Correlates of War Project, 2014). Tensions began to lessen after
Peru experienced a regime change. “The ouster of General Velasco in August 1975 and
the more moderate policies of his successor General Francisco Morales Bermundez
(1976-1980) soon reduced diplomatic tensions [within the region] except with the
lingering problems with Ecuador” (Masterson & Ortiz, 2006, p. 47).
Chile’s military coup did not only represent a shift in political ideologies for the
state; Pinochet’s regime led to a dramatic change in economic policies that were
ultimately incompatible with the rest of the region. Since its formation, CAN had
remained relatively closed to extra-regional economic relationships and adopted
protectionist policies. However, heavily influenced by the “Chicago boys”, the Pinochet
government thought economic liberalism was a necessary step for economic recovery and
growth (Dabene, 2009, p. 92). Chile’s new regime wanted to open the state up to the
global economy in attempt to reverse the economic crisis it suffered the first half of the
decade under the previous government. The Pinochet government disagreed with the ISI
policies encouraged by CAN (C5) and complained that the CET the group was working
on was far too high. In addition, Chile was unhappy about limits placed on capital flows
by the group. The junta argued that “the foreign investment rules of the Andean Pact
were prejudicial to Chile’s development” (Gott, 1977) and “favored lower taxes on
imports and liberal conditions for foreign investors to attract foreign capital and
technology” (“Chile Refuses to Reverse,” 1976). This clash of economic ideologies
between CAN and Chile as the latter attempted to reverse policies that had led it into
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crisis in the early 70s caused Chile to reject regional policies and push for change. As a
result of disagreement in the region, CAN’s attempt at a CET missed its first
implementation deadline of December 31, 1975 with Chile arguing that the CET on
extra-regional products was too high (“Chile Cuts Ties,” 1977).
The average level of economic openness (measured here by total trade as a
percent of GDP) was initially quite low for CAN as a region. However, these levels
began to increase from the group’s formation into the 1970s, coinciding with increasing
levels of cooperation as expected by the quantitative findings. This increase did not
happen uniformly among the member-states. Figure 5.2 shows the level of economic
openness within CAN by state in the years leading up to the Chilean exit. Economic
openness continued to increase until 1974 when member-states diverged with Chile’s
continuing to increase economic openness while the other members pulled back. Though
Chile’s levels took a dip in the years of the political crisis preceding the coup, they then
increased at a higher rate than other CAN states before decreasing again between 1975
and 1976. The organization experienced lower levels of cooperation as its average
economic openness also decline beginning in 1975.
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At the same time that Chile found itself with high levels of debt and pursuing
economic liberalization to correct a major economic crisis and was opening up to fix the
problem, both Venezuela and Colombia, major exporters in the region, were adopting
greater economic protectionism. Venezuela had begun nationalizing its primary exports
of oil and iron. Meanwhile, Colombia had been enjoying high coffee prices and started
demanding foreign banks to give up at least 51 percent of control to Colombians (de
Onis, 1976a). This economic ideological clash within the region increased tensions as
Chile pushed to change CAN’s policies to allow it to liberalize. While other members
were willing to compromise in the short-run, they did not want to reorient the
organization’s economic policies. According to a high-level Colombian official at the
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time, “‘We are prepared to be flexible because of special circumstances, but we cannot
allow Chile to introduce a new ideology into the pact’” (de Onis, 1976a). The low levels
of economic openness, a desire to integrate into the global economy, and the
unwillingness of CAN to change its policies contributed to Chile’s decision to exit the
group in 1976.
Despite the debate over economic liberalization with extra-regional actors, CAN
significantly liberalized policies among its member-states by the mid-70s bringing the
average tariff within the group down by a third (Ocampo & Ros, 2011, p. 6). As a result,
intra-regional trade within CAN increased significantly from the formation of the
organization up until Chile’s exit. During this time, Chile in particular increased its trade
reliance on its fellow member-states due to a slight increase in exports to the region and
its economic crisis making extra-regional imports less affordable. However, this increase
in intra-regional trade also brought an increase in economic asymmetry in the region
particularly with regard to member-states’ current account balances. After the CAN’s
initial phase of internal liberalization, tensions over perceived imbalances within the
group made some members more inclined towards protectionism (Ocampo & Ros, 2011,
p. 6). Levels of intra-regional trade dropped after Chile’s exit as there was now one less
market within the region. Intra-regional trade remained volatile along with overall
cooperation levels after the exit and throughout the 1980s.
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Variation in current account balances within CAN spiked to their highest levels in
197435 The years leading up to this spike saw an improvement in the terms of trade
throughout the region which initially helped states to overcome balance of payment
problems (Puyana, 1982, p. 54). However, not all states were benefitting equally as they
increased both global and regional trade. While Venezuela and Ecuador (and to some
degree Colombia) improved their current account balances and were able to finance the
expansion of their economies, Peru, Bolivia, and Chile continued to suffer from chronic
deficits. In particular, Peru and Chile had built up large current account deficits putting
pressure on their economies whereas “the other countries [had] managed to reduce their
deficits, with an occasional surplus, which has allowed some degree of investment
promotion” (Puyana, 1982, p. 55). Chile was the largest importer in the region and had
fallen far behind its neighbors by its exit in 1976 (Puyana, 1982, p. 100). Its adoption of
strict monetarist and laissez-faire policies were an attempt to control this balance of
payments issue as well as increase the confidence of international lenders (Salcedo &
Akoorie, 2013, p. 120). As an organization, CAN attempted to equalize the region in
mid-1976 by creating a stabilization fund to assist states incurring balance-of-payments
deficits with intra-regional trade.
To shore up the wavering unity of the pact, Venezuela and Colombia have
agreed to finance most of a $300 million Andean stabilization fund that
could be drawn upon by other members incurring balance-of-payments
deficits in their trade within the Andean region. This would favor Chile
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Variation in current account balances in CAN reached their highest levels of the 20th
century in 1974. While the variation in 1995 was at similar levels, the organization did
not surpass the variation seen in 1974 until 2001 where it had a 5-year high.
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and Peru particularly, since they are both heavily in debt outside the
region and run deficits in the region (de Onis, 1976a).
Unfortunately, the fund did not come to fruition before Chile exited later that year.
Finally, private FDI flows within CAN were very volatile during the 1970s. This
foreign investment was of major concern to Chile as it struggled to recover from
economic crisis early on in the decade. In the first few years of CAN, Chile had adopted
very nationalistic policies leading to very low levels of foreign investment. “As
conditions for foreign capital [in Chile] were found to be discouraging, a sharp fall in FDI
inflows resulted. The stock of FDI decreased towards the end of 1973 to…one of the
lowest in Latin America” (Salcedo & Akoorie, 2013, p. 118). While Chile struggled to
attract investment, Venezuela, Peru, and Colombia saw an increase in FDI that same
year. The Pinochet government adopted economic liberalism particularly focused on
attracting foreign investment and felt that CAN hindered its development through
restricting foreign investment from outside the region (de Onis, 1976c).
The coup blamed Chile’s economic struggles on the nationalistic policies of the
previous regime and sought to liberalize in order to attract investors. However, Chile
struggled initially to attract FDI due to the legacy left over from the Popular Unity
government from 1971-1973 and the violence associated with the post-coup repression
(Salcedo & Akoorie, 2013, p. 119). Chile’s internal struggles meant that, even after
liberalization policies, “foreign capital did not flow into industry, or at least not as much
as was expected” (Puyana, 1982, p. 188). Despite Pinochet’s efforts, the state saw a
dramatic decrease in private FDI inflows between 1974 and 1975. Venezuela suffered a
similar fate at the time (Puyana, 1982, p.187). In contrast, Peru benefitted from steady
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increases in FDI from 1972-1977 with a particularly large influx of private FDI from 7175 (Puyana, 1982, pp. 187-189). This variation in FDI inflows within the region, notably
between Chile and Peru, potentially exacerbated already existing tensions between the
states.
While the quantitative analysis found a positive relationship between variation in
FDI inflows and regional cooperation, this variation appeared to increase regional
tensions for Chile shortly before it exited CAN. These contradictory findings are likely
due to both a time lag issue and a matter of data availability36. The variation in FDI
inflows went up in CAN as the group strengthened ties and before there was a dip in
cooperation. However, between 1975 and 1976, variation continued to rise and
cooperation levels dropped significantly. By 1976, the variation of FDI inflows within
CAN began a three-year decline. This positively correlated with a decrease in
cooperation seen immediately after Chile’s exit and supports the conclusion that Chile
was responsible for a large part of the FDI variation seen throughout the 1970s.
Though Chile exited CAN in October 1976, withdrawing from the organization
was not the state’s first choice. For three years prior to the exit, the Pinochet government
attempted to persuade CAN to change its economic policies. Chile argued that global
economic attitudes had changed since the organization’s formation and that the rules it
was enforcing had been developed in a time of more radical and nationalist ideals within
the region (Gott, 1977). In particular, the Pinochet government attempted to change the
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The quantitative data does not include FDI data from Chile until 1975. Data used here
for FDI inflows during this period in CAN came from Puyana (1982).
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rules of CAN regarding foreign investment and lower the CET. Chile had the primary
goal of opening up in order to attract foreign capital and felt the pact was preventing this
through such policies. CAN did attempt to compromise with Chile by “raising the annual
authorized margin to remittable profits from 14 percent to 20 percent. But Chile insisted
on no limitations, which the other members rejected” (de Onis, 1976b). When an
agreement ultimately could not be reached, the Pinochet government took unilateral
action and attempted to attract foreign capital. “In April 1976, the Chilean
regime…[eliminated] all limits on the repatriation of capital for foreign investments,
when the Andean area as a whole only allows 20 percent of the annual profits [annual
remittances of profits for foreign investors].” This action was met with strong disapproval
of the fellow member-states (Gutierrez, 1997) and Chile withdrew from CAN.
Chile’s economic situation improved immediately following its exit from CAN.
From 1977-1979, FDI inflows increased, inflation slowed, and the state maintained a
balance of payments surplus (Salcedo & Akoorie, 2013, p. 121). In contrast continuing
members of CAN initially struggled. Bolivia and Ecuador lost a large percentage of their
intra-regional exports with Chile’s exit and their levels of intra-regional trade dropped to
approximately those they had at the formation of the organization. Cooperation levels
within the region continued to decline for two years. Despite having decreased in
membership size, it took until 1979 for CAN to get back to pre-exit levels of cooperation
and, even then cooperation levels were volatile with overall stagnation throughout the
1980s. Much of the volatility was due to continuing territorial battles between Peru and
Ecuador. While economic asymmetry was a significant factor in Chile’s decision to exit
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CAN, decreased asymmetry after its exit was not enough to repair the damage within the
region as it attempted to move on during the crises of the 1980s.
The Peruvian Exit Threat
Overall, the 1990s saw a large increase in cooperation for CAN and a boost in
trade for its member-states both intra-regionally and globally (Rodriguez, 1998). After
the economic stagnation of the 1980s, CAN worked on revamping itself as a more
economically liberal group in order to integrate into the global economy. Despite these
gains, the decade was characterized by an ongoing struggle with Peruvian membership as
it dealt with an economic crisis in the early 1990s. This struggle led to CAN’s second
major period of defection when Peru threatened to leave the organization. “Peru formally
announced on April 23 [1997] that it would leave the Andean Community” (Hall, 1997,
para. 11). However, the exit was never finalized. CAN and Peru were able negotiate
Peru’s continued membership in the organization and the state has since continued with
full membership.
Cooperation levels within CAN vacillated during the 1980s as the group struggled
to recover from the Chilean exit and was dealing with debt crisis throughout the region.
However, by 1989, cooperation had increased to the organization’s highest level since its
formation. Figure 5.3 shows the level of cooperation within CAN throughout the 1980s
and 1990s. Much of the volatility during this period was due to sporadic militarized interstate disputes between Peru and Ecuador over a continuing border conflict. In particular,
outbreak of a large military conflict between Peru and Ecuador in 1995 brought the
organization to its lowest levels of cooperation in more than a decade. After this conflict,
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the region recovered quickly beginning an upward trend in cooperation for the rest of the
decade that dipped only momentarily in 1997 around Peru’s exit threat.
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Figure 5.3. Cooperation levels in CAN, 1980-1999
There were significant political tensions within Peru as well as between Peru and
its neighbors throughout the 1990s. Regionally, the ongoing territorial dispute between
Peru and Ecuador culminated in a deadly two-month battle between the two states.
Though the major direct engagement ended after this time, tensions were still high
between the Peru and Ecuador as Peru declared its exit from CAN in 1997. The conflict
remained unresolved until 1998 with both states continuing to engage in militarized
aggression. Internally, Peru was dealing with a political crisis beginning in 1991 as it
experienced an “authoritarian drift” during a self-coup under then-President Alberto
Fujimori (Dabene, 2009, p. 4). As CAN attempted to revamp itself and made efforts to
deepen cooperation in the 1990s the “Peruvian crisis paralyzed the integration process”
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(Dabene, 2009, p. 93). Regime variation between the member-states of CAN had been
low (and relatively un-democratic) throughout the 1980s. However, with Peru’s shift
towards authoritarianism, the variation within the region dramatically increased as shown
in Figure 5.4. This increase in overall variation of regime type is consistent with
expectations of decreasing cooperation from the quantitative findings as Peru was then
further isolated from the group.
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Figure 5.4. Variation in regime type within CAN, 1990-2000
Despite these clear political issues, there was an economic undertone to much of
the conflict within the region surrounding Peru’s declaration that it was exiting CAN.
While Peru’s military conflicts were exclusively with Ecuador over their border, the state
was dissatisfied with its relative economic position among the group’s larger members.
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Peru was much more likely to initiate trade disputes using the complex dispute settlement
procedure in CAN against the bigger states like Colombia and Venezuela rather than its
smaller neighbors Ecuador and Bolivia (Gomez-Mera & Molinari, 2014, p. 272). This
suggests that the relative economic positions within the group were of concern.
By the early 1990s, as CAN began revamping itself, intra-regional trade had been
largely liberalized in the group. While CAN was liberalizing internally, Peru had been
declining in terms of its share of GDP per capita within the group since 1975 as its
neighbors developed more quickly by this measure (Duran et al., 2008, p. 5). In
particular, Peru’s GDP per capita sharply contracted hitting its lowest levels between
1990-1993. After this contraction began, Peru refused to join CAN’s FTA cut itself off
from trade commitments in the region in August 1992 (Gutierrez, 1997). Meanwhile,
negotiations on a CET for CAN reignited between 1992-1993 with all members except
Peru adopting the CET system by 1995 (Duran et al., 2008, pp. 10-11). Rather than
participating in regional efforts, “[Peru] negotiated bilateral trade arrangements with each
of its Andean counterparts that helped to partially liberalize their reciprocal trade flows”
(Rodriguez, 1998, p.6).
Initially after the onset of Peru’s economic downturn, the state received
preferential treatment from CAN exempting it from joining the CET and liberalizing
internal trade to the same degree as other members. However, by the mid-1990s the
organization began to pressure Peru to conform by joining the FTA and implementing the
CET. Peru resisted arguing that such policies were unfair to its still weak economy and
that it was not properly prepared to adopt these measures. This pressure from CAN to
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shorten the timeline for Peru’s integration into the free trade zone in particular led Peru to
declare its exit (Gutierrez, 1997). “The break up happened when the other four Andean
countries rejected the Peruvian proposal to extend the period for the total removal of
tariffs in the sub regional free trade zone until the year 2004, instead setting a cutoff date
of Dec. 31, 1999” (Abraham, 1997, para. 2). Dissatisfied with its economic standing,
Peru decided that it would be more beneficial to severe ties with CAN than to force
economic liberalization in accordance with its neighbors.
Unlike the Chilean exit, the rhetoric surrounding the Peruvian exit was primarily
about intra-regional liberalization rather than economic openness to extra-regional
partners. While overall levels of openness in the region increased in late 1980s, they
stayed relatively stagnant during the 1990s, even declining slightly as expected right
before Peru’s 1997’s exit threat. Beginning in 1980, Peru was significantly less integrated
than its peers with the global economy. However, integration had been increasing very
gradually up until 1997. This potentially explains Peru’s hesitancy to adopt new
economic policies that may have altered this trend and its willingness to walk away from
CAN as it slowly grew its extra-regional relationships.
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Figure 5.5. Level of economic openness in CAN by state, 1990-2000
CAN suffered from especially low levels of intra-regional trade after Chile’s exit
all the way through the 1980s. However, between 1990 and 1995 as the group re-vitalized
its cooperation efforts and established a CET, intra-regional trade rapidly increased to
approximately 12.3% (almost double that of the previous peak in 1976 of 6.5%). From
1996-1997 Peru’s intra-regional trade levels increased particularly with Ecuador and with
CAN as a whole. This increase in intra-regional trade coincided with an increase in
variation between member-state’s current account balances including a significant spike
within the region in 1996. This spike in member-state’s current account balance variation
was primarily due to a large surplus at the time in Venezuela while Peru, Bolivia, and
Colombia maintained large deficits. In the years leading up to the potential exit Peru was
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consistently behind its neighbors, running a large current account deficit. In contrast,
Ecuador’s deficit had shown some signs of improvement and was almost eliminated in
1996. Peru’s deficit was in part due to its imbalance of trade within the region as it
maintained low levels of intra-regional exports but relatively high level of regional
imports in the years leading up to the crisis.
These trade imbalances within CAN added pressure to the negotiations around
Peru’s adoption of the CET and incorporation into the FTA. As a consistent deficit
country, Peru wanted to maintain its preferential treatment, fearing the imbalance would
worsen if it were forced to liberalize further. Peru argued that it should be allowed
leniency not only because of its deficit but also the gains its imports from other memberstates gave to the region. In particular, Venezuela and Colombia benefited from their
trade balances with Peru.
‘I do not understand why Colombia and Venezuela – which benefit from
their trade balance with Peru – have toughened up their position so much,’
said [Eduardo] Farrah [president of the National Society of Industries
working to solve the Peruvian crisis]. ‘Even if Peru is not in the free trade
zone, the other Andean countries share a balance of more than a billion
dollars in surplus in trade with [Peru]’ (Abraham, 1997).
As predicted by the quantitative findings, variation in current account balances created
significant tension within the region during this period of defection. As a regional
importer, Peru was simultaneously relatively more reliant on its neighbors and
performing more poorly economically at a time when it was still in a political conflict
with Ecuador increasing tensions within the region. These imbalances impacted Peru’s
policy decisions and increased its resistance to further economic integration with its
fellow member-states in CAN.
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In addition to trade imbalances within CAN, variation in FDI inflows among
member-states potentially contributed to Peru’s defection. From 1993 to 1999 variation in
FDI inflows increased in the region dipping only slightly between 1994 and 1996. This
period also saw an average increase in cooperation levels, meaning that the two indicators
had a positive correlation as expected from the quantitative findings. However, the
relationship is more complex when looking at country-specific data as it highlights
disparities between Peru and the rest of the member-states. The regional variation was
primarily caused by an increase in FDI into Peru at the beginning of this period (19931994) followed by Bolivia (1995-1999). FDI into Peru declined after 1994, most steeply
between 1996 and 1997, though averages for CAN continued to rise. Through the turn of
the century, Peru saw a long and steep decline in FDI inflows while overall inflows for
the region peaked during the same time period. Peru was losing out on FDI inflows
relative to its neighbors adding to its dissatisfaction with regional agreements.
Ultimately, Peru’s exit was never finalized and it decided to maintain its full
membership status within CAN. This decision was at least in part due to organizational
negotiations to satisfy Peru’s requests. Other member-states were willing to make
concessions in order to prevent further fractioning within the region. “‘We all need each
other mutually in order to enter the year 2000, and we cannot advance isolated in the
world of today, separated from the integrated regional scene,’ explained Andean
diplomats in Caracas” (Gutierrez, 1997). In 1997, CAN agreed to extend Peru’s special
status with regard to the FTA and CET though Peru would be required to gradually adopt
these policies by 2005 (Rodriguez, 1998, pp. 6-8). In addition, the militarized border
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disputes between Peru and Ecuador were resolved with a new peace agreement signed in
1998.
Venezuela Jumps Ship
In April 2006, Venezuela became the second and most recent member to exit
CAN as it began the process of joining neighboring Mercosur. Unlike the previous
junctures observed here, this exit did not come after a period of economic crisis for the
exiting state. The main reason given by Venezuela for the withdrawal was essentially a
clash over economic and political ideologies within the region. In particular, Venezuela
was concerned with member-states within the region increasing their relationships with
the US.
Venezuela justified its intention to withdraw on the grounds that Peru and
Colombia had undermined CAN’s tenets by signing separate bilateral trade
agreements in the US. Venezuela, which has hostile relations with Washington,
has argued that the free-trade agreements with the US will prompt an ‘invasion’
of US products in the Andean region (Anonymous, 2006).
In this case, the exiting state appeared more concerned with relative gains among extraregional partners than within the organization itself. Was this the sole reason for
Venezuela’s exit? What role did factors such as regional economic asymmetry play, if
any?
Cooperation levels within CAN (see Figure 5.6) reflect the tension seen within the
region around the time of Venezuela’s withdrawal from the organization. After turn of
the century, the region experienced the highest levels cooperation in CAN’s history. The
few dips in cooperation during this time were due to minor militarized disputes between
Colombia and Venezuela in 2000 and 2003. Overall cooperation levels began to decline
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in 2005 and 2006 leading up to the exit. However, these levels recovered to their
previously high levels and stabilized by 2010.
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Figure 5.6. Level of cooperation within CAN during Venezuela’s exit, 1995-2013
In the time leading up to the exit, tensions grew between Venezuela and the US
under the increasingly authoritarian Chavez government. At the same time Venezuela
sought to minimize its connections to the US it called for deeper cooperation within Latin
America. Not all members of CAN agreed with this anti-US sentiment. In particular, Peru
and Colombia pursued bilateral agreements with the US in hopes of increasing global
trade. Venezuela condemned these agreements citing a fear of flooding the Andean
market with US goods and increasing dependence on extra-regional actors. According to
analysts at the time, “a steep rise in imports from the United States will affect negatively
some sectors in Colombia and Peru, and this will have some knock-on negative effect on
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the Venezuelan economy” (“Latin America: Andean Community,” 2006, para. 7).
Though Venezuela might have benefitted in the long run, it feared allowing US
competition freely into the Andean states.
Venezuela’s exit was motivated at least in part by its anti-US sentiment and an
attempt to resist US economic and political influence. Measurements of US influence
spiked notably throughout CAN right after the turn of the century reaching levels not
seen in the region since the 1960s. This spike was primarily due to an increase in
economic aid from the US. This influence remained relatively high through 2006 in
comparison to other Latin American organizations as shown in Figure 5.7. In contrast,
Mercosur consistently showed the lowest levels of US influence in all of Latin America.
Figure 5.8 breaks down US influence within CAN by state. Venezuela maintained
exceptionally low levels of influence compared to its fellow member-states whereas US
influence in Colombia had been rising in the years leading up to the exit as it pursued
bilateral agreements. Somewhat ironically, Chavez’s commitment to Latin American
cooperation weekend the organization through separating Venezuela from those that
sought deeper extra-regional ties with the US.
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Figure 5.7. Level of US influence by organization, 2000-2014
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Figure 5.8. Level of US influence by state, 2000-2006
While US influence was not found to be a significant indicator of regional
cooperation in the quantitative analysis, it did appear to play a strong role in the decrease
in CAN’s cooperation in 2006 as Venezuela exited the organization. In addition, levels of
US influence help explain in part why Venezuela turned to Mercosur upon its
withdrawal. While Venezuela disagreed with CAN members’ increasing relationships
with Washington, Mercosur maintained a low level of US influence and was therefore
more compatible with Venezuelan sentiment. However, this was not the only factor
drawing the state away from CAN towards Mercosur. Mercosur represented a
significantly larger market for the exporting-market of Venezuela with access to both
Brazil and Argentina. Despite having lower levels of trade with Mercosur states leading
up to 2006, the potential for growth within Mercosur was greater. Due to both
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organizations having differing CETs and FTAs, simultaneous commitments to both CAN
and Mercosur was considered incompatible. Therefore, when faced with a choice,
Venezuela chose Mercosur (Del Castillo et al., 2006).
Despite the large role of US influence in Venezuela’s decision, other internal
issues within CAN, particularly those highlighted in the quantitative analysis, played a
significant role. Similar to other two exits observed, variation in regime type within CAN
increased as cooperation decreased with the exiting state adopting a more authoritarian
government. Under the Chavez government, Venezuela had grown increasingly more
authoritarian creating larger variation within the organization and straining cooperation.
In addition, beginning in the mid-1990s, Venezuela and Colombia had increasingly tense
relationships and experienced numerous small-scale militarized inter-state disputes.
However, Colombia remained economically reliant on the Venezuelan market. In 2006,
“Venezuela [was] Colombia’s second biggest trading partner – absorbing 10% of all
exports – after the United States” ("Latin America: Andean Community," 2006, para. 18).
Colombia responded to Venezuelan critiques of its bilateral negotiations by defending its
relationship with the US and its desire for an FTA (“Week’s Top Story - Colombian,”
2006). This argument only furthered aggravated already tense relations between the two
states as militarized inter-state disputes continued.
Contrary to expectations around a period of defection, CAN’s average economic
openness continued to rise significantly after the turn of the century through 200637. This

37

Levels of economic openness reached an organizational peak in 2008 before beginning
a downward trend for the rest of the period observed.
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rise in overall openness did coincide with increasing variation among states. While most
members contributed to the rising average, Colombia’s levels stayed relatively stagnant
and Venezuela decreased between 2005 and 2006 right before it left CAN. This notable
increase in economic openness among CAN’s members did not correlate with increased
cooperation as the organization’s levels declined in the years leading up to Venezuela’s
exit. While contrary to the expectations of the quantitative analysis, this finding
highlights Venezuela’s dissatisfaction with increased global integration, primarily with
the US and Europe. Whereas many of the organizations observed seek to increase global
trade through cooperation, disagreement around this goal created tension within CAN
prior to the exit.
Economic asymmetry, specifically variation in current account balances, was on
the rise in CAN at the same time its levels of economic openness were growing likely
counteracting any benefits to cooperation this openness gave. Internal variation in current
account balances started to rise in 1998 and peaked to their highest levels of this century
in 2005. Unlike the previous exits observed, the defecting state boasted a growing surplus
during this period. This increasing variation among CAN’s members was due to
Venezuela and Bolivia running large surpluses while Colombia maintained a persistent
and slowly increasing deficit from 2000 to the exit and beyond. These disparate balances
of Venezuela and Colombia in the years before the exit is highlighted in Figure 5.9.
Venezuela was a notably stronger trading partner than its fellow CAN members due to its
large oil reserves. As this asymmetry grew, rather than being frustrated with a persistent
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deficit like defectors in past exits, Venezuela sought deeper relations with the larger
markets in Mercosur.

Figure 5.9. Current account balance by state, 2001-2007
Trade throughout the region slightly declined in the two years leading up to the
exit as expected around a period of defection. Throughout its membership in CAN,
Venezuela maintained a low level of intra-regional trade relative to the other memberstates. This was primarily due to the state’s extra-regional relationships through its oil
exports. Venezuela’s trade with CAN peaked in 1995 and then maintained a downward
trend through its exit as it decreased its exports to the region. While Venezuela’s imports
from the region had been increasing, CAN members made up a declining amount of the
state’s export market beginning at the turn of the century and with notable declines
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between 2004 and 2006. This decrease in intra-regional exports made Venezuela less
reliant on its agreements with CAN. Interestingly, though Venezuela turned immediately
toward Mercosur, it had consistently had higher trade levels with the Andean states from
the 1980s through 201038 suggesting that it was seeking to gain new markets rather than
liberalize existing trade relations. This supports the notion that regional arrangements
play more of a signaling role than one of efficiency for developing states likely in part
due to low overall levels of economic interdependence.
Finally, variation in FDI inflows to CAN members declined at the turn of the
century and spiked in 2005, one year prior to Venezuela’s withdrawal. This spike was not
caused by any major shifts in Venezuela but rather due to a significant increase in FDI for
Colombia while Bolivia was suffering a severe decline. Variation in FDI inflows dropped
between 2005 and 2006 coinciding with a decrease in cooperation levels before the exit.
After the turn of the century, both Colombia and Peru (the two states pursuing bilateral
agreements with the US) saw gains in their overall FDI inflows while Bolivia, Ecuador,
and Venezuela saw varying degrees of declining FDI. While FDI inflows did not appear
to play a role in the rhetoric around the Venezuelan exit, they do highlight the growing
divide within the region between those seeking extra-regional relations and those pushing
to strengthen Andean ties. This schism, presented as a debate of CAN/US relations, was a
major contributor to Venezuela’s decision to leave the organization.

38

In 2010 Venezuelan trade in general began to significantly drop off though
disproportionately more with CAN members than Mercosur (International Monetary
Fund, 2017a).
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As tensions grew within the region, Venezuela maintained a close relationship
with its fellow CAN member Bolivia. Under newly elected President Morales, Bolivia
worked to salvage Andean relations and keep Venezuela in the organization by calling a
meeting of CAN shortly after Venezuela declared its intent to exit. Venezuela was open
to the negotiation saying that it preferred to remain in the group but continued to insist
Colombia and Peru abandon their bilateral deals with the US Bolivia sided with
Venezuela in the talks explaining that it too was concerned about increasing US influence
in the region. “Bolivia warned it would also exit the Andean Community if Peru,
Colombia and Ecuador do not shelve the free-trade deals with the US” (“Week’s Top
Story - Colombian,” 2006). However, the differences appeared to be un-resolvable with
Venezuela claiming it could not get past its differences in approaches towards the US
with Colombia and Peru. “Chavez says free-trade deals with the US benefit big
international companies at the expense of the region’s poor…One-on-one trade deals
with the US undermine continental unity” (“Week’s Top Story - Venezuela,” 2006). By
the end of the meeting, Chavez declared that CAN was “dead” due to American
Imperialism (Lucas, 2006).
Venezuela’s exit increased concerns that Bolivia would be next and halted CAN’s
negotiations with the EU (Lucas, 2006). The exit highlighted a deep schism within the
organization between those states pursuing economic liberalization and those preferring
protectionist measures for the region.
Peru’s foreign trade minister at the time [of Venezuela’s exit], Mercedes Araoz,
commented that even without Venezuela, the Andean Community consisted of
‘two countries with leftist tendency – Ecuador and Bolivia – and two more open
countries, Colombia and Peru’” (Gray, 2013, p. 153).
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Bolivia and Ecuador remained in CAN but echoed Venezuelan concerns over Peru and
Colombia’s flirtation with the US This divide proved problematic as the group continued
negotiations with the EU to establish an inter-regional trade deal (“Latin America:
Andean,” 2009). During the negotiations, Bolivia was highly skeptical of trade
liberalization while Ecuador maintained a more moderate position. In addition, Bolivia
complicated the negotiations through its “continuing investments disputes with individual
EU member-states” (“Latin America: Andean,” 2008, para. 16). While Ecuador was more
willing to negotiate in talks with the EU, it insisted negotiations be done as a block rather
than the bilateral agreements sought by Peru and Colombia are seeking. Despite this
rhetoric, Ecuador did eventually complete bilateral negotiations with EU in January 2017
(“Ecuador Joins EU-Colombia,” 2016). The internal divide continued beyond CAN’s
negotiations with the EU and was further exemplified by Ecuador and Bolivia joining the
socialist Latin American organization ALBA while Colombia and Peru formed the
economically liberal PA with Mexico and Chile.
Despite the ongoing ideological schisms within CAN, Venezuela’s exit was
ultimately a boost for the region’s cooperation levels. Unlike after the Chilean exit, the
organization was quick to recover. After the decrease in membership in 2006, CAN’s
cooperation levels immediately went up, supporting the quantitative findings on internal
changes in membership size. With the exception of a slight dip in 2009, cooperation has
continued on an upward trend within the organization through the period observed with
CAN surpassing Mercosur in 2010 with the highest levels of regional cooperation in
Latin America.
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Conclusion
Upon Venezuela’s exit, Chavez exclaimed that “North American imperialism
killed the CAN” (Lucas, 2006, para. 10) and concerns rose around the future of the
organization. However, CAN has endured and even thrived since losing its second
member in 2006. The organization has had increasing levels of cooperation and memberstates have continued to express the desire to further integrate. Bolivia did not leave CAN
as feared though it did join Venezuela in Mercosur in 2015. Rather than a departure from
its Andean neighbors, Bolivian membership in Mercosur has been seen as an attempt to
bridge the gap between the two organizations (“Bolivian President Favours,” 2012). In
addition, CAN and Mercosur continue to merge their policies through the development of
UNASUR further preventing the need for member-states to choose between the
organizations.
Though CAN has continued to grow as an organization, it has not be without its
issues in recent years. After an economic downturn, Ecuador put up protectionist barriers
within the region and began to discuss its potential exit (“Latin America: Andean,”
2009). The current situation mimics much of what was seen with the Peruvian crisis in
the 1990s. Similar to Peru, Ecuador cited concerns with the organization’s policies
regarding its continuing large trade deficit (Tassano, 2016). Tensions grew as CAN
pushed Ecuador to remove the preferential treatment it has been granted within the region
(Scherffius, 2015). However, despite the mention of an exit, Ecuador has not taken any
steps to severe ties with the group and continues negotiations with CAN to find mutually
agreeable solution to its economic downturn.
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The analysis of these three periods of defection within CAN support the argument
that economic asymmetry within a region is detrimental to cooperation levels. In each
period observed, economic asymmetry, particularly current account variation among
members, magnified the situation. For Chile and Peru, the asymmetry within CAN left
them feeling particularly disadvantaged by their status in CAN and sparked exit talks. For
Venezuela, the concern appeared to be much more about global asymmetry and levels of
US influence within the region despite that being an insignificant factor in the larger
quantitative analysis. However, economic asymmetry within the organization also
contributed to the state’s defection. Venezuela’s unique size and strength within CAN
incentivized it to seek larger markets in Mercosur. In addition, an asymmetry of
economic policies and investment in region furthered divide among member-states and
minimized Venezuela’s incentive to continue cooperation within the group.
Each period of defection within CAN had its own unique context. However, they
all involved increased economic asymmetry, decreased intra-regional trade, and increased
variation in regime type among member-states supporting these findings from the
quantitative analysis. Despite these exit struggles throughout its history, CAN continued
to gradually increase its overall cooperation levels. In many ways, the organization even
benefitted from the exits as it removed the more incompatible members and allowed the
remaining states to deepen their regional ties. When economic asymmetry was met with
concessions by other larger members that benefitted from existing regional arrangements,
as was the case with Peru, the exit was preventable. Member-states participating in such
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negotiations suggests a strong political will within the region to maintain cooperation
within CAN for the long-run.
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Chapter Six: Mercosur – The Declining Star
Introduction
Mercosur was formed in 1991 with the Treaty of Asuncion between Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay with the initial goal of opening a customs union between
its members. Its formation was part of a new wave of regionalism within Latin American
as states refocused their development efforts towards economic liberalism and global
integration (Ocampo & Ros, 2011, p. 7). The organization was a quick success as it
rapidly liberalized trade among its members and broadened its cooperation efforts past
economic coordination to include social and political goals. “Mercosur has been quite a
successful regional integration effort, developing a sense of community among its
members, promoting democracy in the sub-region and projecting itself as an important
actor in the international arena” (Carranza, 2007, p. 320). Mercosur was in many ways
the “golden child” of new regionalism in Latin America attracting new membership from
Venezuela and Bolivia as it grew. However, despite its rapid initial success, cooperation
within Mercosur began to decline around the turn of the century with its member-states
falling into numerous disputes with one another. What caused this shift towards defection
within Mercosur? What role did economic asymmetry, particularly the distribution of
gains in trade and investment seen in the first few years of the organization, play in the
inter-member-state disputes that developed later on?
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This chapter looks at periods of defection within Mercosur to better understand
the relationship between economic asymmetry and regional cooperation. In the previous
case of CAN, economic asymmetry within the organization led to dissatisfaction among
members and the eventual exit of both Chile and Venezuela. While these exits were
tumultuous, they ultimately left the remaining members more strongly bound through
higher levels of cooperation. Unlike CAN, no member-states have exited Mercosur thus
far. However, economic asymmetry has played a key role in inter-state disputes within
the organization as well as declining levels of cooperation. Mercosur is significantly
more asymmetrical than CAN in terms of the overall size of its member-states; Brazil is
the clear regional hegemon with a significantly larger economy, population, and
geographical size than its neighbors. This size variation within the organization has
inhibited Mercosur’s ability to pursue supranational institutions as Brazil hesitates to
cede power to its smaller neighbors (Blyde & Fernandez-Arias, 2008, p. 36). Though
there is a clear asymmetry in terms of size, how have the gains from economic
cooperation been distributed throughout Mercosur? Many of the states within Mercosur
share similar factor endowments and technology exacerbating trade competition and
minimizing intra-regional trade more generally (Blyde et al., 2012, p. 8). This
competition likely increases concerns over relative gains as states compete within the
same export markets and for similar investment opportunities. As members of Mercosur
deepen their connections, do larger states such as Brazil and Argentina gain more than
their proportional share in terms of trade and investment? Finally, how has this
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distribution contributed to intra-regional disputes and the decline of cooperation levels
within Mercosur?
As an organization, Mercosur’s cooperation levels continued to climb from its
founding until 2005, with the exception of a dip in overall levels between 1999 and 2002.
This chapter focuses on the temporary dip in cooperation levels at the turn of the century
and the beginning of Mercosur’s steady decline starting around 2005 to better understand
the role of the indicators identified in the quantitative analysis. The type of defection
observed in Mercosur looks slightly different than what was seen in CAN. Since its
formation, Mercosur has not experienced either the membership exits or the militarized
inter-state disputes that have riddled CAN’s history. Instead, Mercosur has dealt with
formalized economic disputes between its members, in many cases utilizing extraregional organizations such as the WTO and International Court of Justice (ICJ) to
mediate the conflict. To understand the relationship between economic asymmetry and
cooperation within Mercosur, this analysis looks at country-level data of the variables
utilized for the quantitative analysis to get a country-specific view of the indicators over
time. This shows not only how the group as a whole was doing during these periods of
defection but also gives a clearer picture of the inter-state dynamics within the
organization during member-state disputes. News articles covering the regional disputes
as well as studies on these critical junctures were also analyzed to further understand the
inter-state dynamics and rhetoric from the members as cooperation levels declined within
Mercosur.
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This chapter will first give an overview of Mercosur’s history and brief
comparison to the other groups analyzed in the quantitative analysis. It will then look at
the disputes between Brazil and Argentina at the turn of the century when Mercosur first
dipped in overall cooperation levels. Finally, it looks at the inter-state disputes between
Uruguay and Argentina that coincided with the beginning of the period of decline seen
within Mercosur since 2005. The discussion for each dispute period will provide context
for this defection within the organization as well as discuss how each of the critical
factors previously identified in the quantitative analysis contributed to the political
rhetoric of the states involved in the conflict.
An Overview of Mercosur
After the economic stagnation of the 1980s, Latin American regionalism was
reborn with efforts to “cure Latin America of its ‘bad habits’ of protectionism”
(Theodore, 2015, pp. 6-7). Mercosur embodied this new wave of regionalism through its
focus on economic liberalization among its member-states as they jointly opened up to
the global economy. Rather than the protectionist policies of the 1960s and 1970s when
Latin American organizations attempted to insulate themselves from the forces of the
international market, Mercosur focused on promoting development via global integration.
“Regional integration presented itself as a mechanism to reach out for economic
globalization to participate in this new era of the world economy in a more positive way,
leading to national development” (Soreanu Pecequilo & Alves do Carmo, 2013, p. 58).
Mercosur led the wave of new regionalism within Latin America as it sought to help its
member-states cooperate with each other in order to be more competitive as they opened
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to the global economy. Regional integration was as a stepping stone to globalization
rather than a fortress against it.
In contrast to the more holistic approach taken by CAN, Mercosur’s initial goals
were primarily economic in nature as it sought to liberalize trade internally and attract
extra-regional trade and investment.
The agreement was established under the following four core objectives:
(1) the free movements of goods, services, and factors of production
among countries, (2) the establishment of a common external tariff and the
adoption of a common commercial policy, (3) the coordination of
macroeconomic and sectoral policies between the parties, and (4) the
harmonization of laws in order to strengthen the integration process
(Blyde et al., 2012, p. 197).
Mercosur made quick progress on many of these goals after its 1991 formation.
Internally, the group rapidly liberalized the majority of trade between its members within
the first few years. Externally, Mercosur had established a CET that covered about 85%
of the goods traded extra-regionally by its member-states by 1995 (Carranza, 2007, p.
325). However, Mercosur struggled to coordinate member-states’ macroeconomic
policies which would prove detrimental to regional cooperation when crisis hit in 1999.
In addition to its economic goals, Mercosur brought together Argentina and Brazil
in attempt to smooth regional relations and quell their longstanding rivalry (Heine, 2012,
p. 211). The historic mistrust between the two largest states within the region had been
detrimental to economic development and cooperation within the region.
Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo… stated that ‘regional economic
cooperation is the first step toward ending decades of misperceptions between
Argentina and Brazil. The development and prosperity of the two have suffered as
a result of regional distrust’ (Kaltenthaler & Mora, 2002, p. 83).
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The negotiations for the formation of Mercosur aimed to rebuild relationship in order to
help the group move forward. According to Alcides Costa Vaz, an advisor to the
Brazilian government during the negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Asuncion,
political goals and minimizing rivalry within the Southern Cone were key to the region’s
development. Vaz stated that cooperation efforts between the two states expressed “‘the
necessity of confronting domestically any military threat or influence that could be
associated to or justified by the existence of a strategic competition/rivalry in the
Southern Cone’” (Kaltenthaler & Mora, 2002, pp. 81-82). By rebuilding trust between the
two states, smoothing internal relations, and increasing political stability, the region
would become more economically attractive to external trade and investment. While both
states shared these political goals, Argentina was more interested in the group’s economic
objectives than Brazil and was encouraged to deepen cooperation when the early period
of Mercosur saw a reduction in Argentina’s trade deficit.
When Mercosur was formed, member-states expressed concerns about economic
asymmetries in the region. Out of the four states in the organization, Brazil was the clear
regional hegemon. Table 6.1 shows the distribution of Mercosur’s total population,
territory, and GDP as well as each member’s GDP per capita when the organization was
formed in 1991. The smaller members worried that deepening regional ties with Brazil
would exacerbate already unbalanced economic size and trade within the group. In
particular, Argentina was concerned about its terms as it primarily exported agro-based
goods while Brazil was exporting more expensive manufactured goods (Carranza, 2008,
pp. 78-79). These concerns from the smaller members of Mercosur can be seen in
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expectations from producers throughout the region. “Eighty-two percent of Brazilian
firms surveyed expected to gain from Mercosur, as opposed to 45 percent of Argentine
producers, 41 percent of Paraguayan firms, and only 19 percent of Uruguayan firms”
(Jenkins, 1999, p. 42). Brazilian firms were less intimidated by the idea of regional
integration with their neighbors. In addition, member-states of Mercosur were concerned
Brazil might have disproportionate influence over the group’s agreements due to its
hegemonic status. These concerns were not unfounded.
Several studies show that the CET approved in Ouro Preto [by Mercosur in 1994]
was more consistent with Brazil’s interests than those of the other members…The
small countries tried to protect their interests by means of exceptions that delayed
the full enforcement of the CET (Laens & Terra, 2008, p. 81).
Agreements disproportionately benefitting Brazil increased incentive for the smaller
members to defect from regional coordination.
Table 6.1
1991 population income and territory distribution at founding of Mercosur
Country
Population
GDP
GDP/Capita (2011 US Territory*
$)
Argentina 17.15%
15.67%
$7,688.15
23.41%
Brazil
79.00%
81.97%
$8,730.23
71.68%
Paraguay 2.23%
0.86%
$3,231.25
3.42%
Uruguay
1.62%
1.50%
$7,822.36
1.48%
*from Amoroso Botelho (2014, p. 46)
Disagreements between the two larger states, Brazil and Argentina, were
dominated by concerns about disparities between them. In contrast, the smaller members,
Uruguay and Paraguay, expressed concerns about disparities between them and their
larger counterparts leading them to ask for funds from the larger members or exemptions
to regional agreements (Flores Jr., 2008, p. 255). With such extreme variation in the size
of the organization’s member-states creating tensions, Mercosur needed to focus on
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establishing a degree of equilibrium within the region that would allow all members to
gain from its agreements. In order to assist with this, Mercosur granted special treatment
to the smaller states allowing them differential practices such as exemptions for the CET
(Giordano et al., 2008, p. 19). However, concerns about disparities within the group
persisted.
As an organization, Mercosur is less institutionalized than its counterpart CAN.
However, the economic integration of the first few years of the organization went hand in
hand with political cooperation on policy issues such as drug trafficking and transparency
in arms acquisitions (Kaltenthaler & Mora, 2002, p. 83). Mercosur also deepened its
political ties through the creation of a dispute settlement mechanism and regional
parliament to assist with cooperation efforts. The states of Mercosur further aligned
politically when they declared their commitment to democratic values in 1998 through
the “Compromiso Democratico”. Having relatively recently democratized, Brazil and
Argentina hoped that the promotion of democratic values through Mercosur would both
ensure their democratic consolidation as well as further regional cooperation efforts
(Dabene, 2009, p. 73).39 In addition to this policy coordination, Mercosur was able to act
as a group to assist with diffusing the 1996 coup attempt in Paraguay (Carranza, 2007, p.
325). Despite this political cooperation, Brazil opposes the creation supranational
institutions within the region. The large asymmetries within the region made a slower and

39

Mercosur’s commitment to democratic values was the reason given for Paraguay’s
suspension from the group in 2012. However, at this same time, Venezuela was granted
full membership despite its slide into authoritarianism under the Chavez regime
(Farnsworth, 2013). Venezuela was later suspended for violating democratic principles in
2016.
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more intergovernmental approach to integration more compatible with Brazil’s interests
(Dabene, 2009, p. 94).
Table 6.2
1991 •
1994 •
1998 •
1999 •
2000 •
2001 •
2002 •
•
2005 •
•
2006 •
•
•
2007 •
2012 •
•
2015 •
2016 •

Mercosur: Timeline
Treaty of Asuncion creates Mercosur
Ouro Preto Protocol creates institutional structure and begins steps towards
establishing a customs union and common external tariff
The Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic Commitment is established declaring
Mercosur’s focus on establishing and maintaining democratic values among
its members
Currency crisis begins within the region. Brazil devalues its currency
unilaterally
Brazil takes Argentina to the WTO over protectionist measures
Brazil takes Argentina to the WTO over protectionist measures
Mercosur dispute settlement mechanism is established (put into force in
2004)
Argentina defaults and floats its currency breaking its peg with the dollar
FOCEM created in attempt to reduce regional asymmetries
Parlasur (Mercosur Parliament) created
Disputes between Argentina and Uruguay over development of a pulp mill
begin. Argentina takes Uruguay to the ICJ while Uruguay takes
Argentina to Mercosur Dispute Settlement
Venezuela begins membership process but it blocked by Paraguay
Argentina takes Brazil to the WTO over protectionist measures
The Social Institute of Mercosur is established
Paraguay is temporarily suspended for violating democratic principles of
Mercosur
Venezuela is voted in as full member
Bolivia becomes full member
Venezuela is temporarily suspended for violating democratic principles of
Mercosur. Venezuela was suspended again in August 2017 and remains so
at time of writing.

Although struggling with internal asymmetries, Mercosur is considered to be one
of Latin America’s most successful attempts at regional integration. It is the world’s
second largest customs union after the EU and an important actor on the international
stage (Carranza, 2007, p. 325). The early success of Mercosur increased its attractiveness
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to other states in the region. Both Venezuela and Bolivia (members of CAN) joined
Mercosur in the past decade due to the organization’s strong reputation and its relatively
large markets. While a sign of Mercosur’s strength, this increase in membership has put
additional strain on the organization as it incorporates the new states into existing
agreements and must contend with more divergent opinions in group negotiations. In
addition to expanding its membership, Mercosur has also partaken in negotiations with
CAN to harmonize South American policies as the two groups joined to form UNASUR
in 200440. While the formation of UNASUR complicates obligations for Mercosur states
as they adapt to new pan-continental policies, it is also a sign of political will for
increased levels of regional cooperation.
As a group, Mercosur has the highest average levels of cooperation within Latin
America as well as the highest recorded levels observed in Latin America between 2004
and 2005. Figure 6.1 shows the levels of cooperation within Mercosur from the years
leading up to the Treaty of Asuncion. The organization began with the highest levels of
cooperation in the region when it was first fully formed in 1991 and maintained this
status through 2009 with the exception of a brief dip in 1999-2002. However, cooperation
levels in Mercosur began to decline after 2005. By the end of the period observed here,
Mercosur had dropped to the third highest level of cooperation in the region and was still
declining reaching levels lower than seen at its formation in 1991 by 2013.

40

UNASURs membership also includes Chile, Guyana, and Suriname that are not
members of either CAN or Mercosur in order to create a fully South American group.
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Figure 6.1. Cooperation levels among members of Mercosur, 1986-2013
With the exception of Paraguay, Mercosur’s member-states boast higher GDP per
capita levels than their CAN counterparts. It is the second smallest organization in Latin
America next to the PA in terms of membership size with an average of 4.2 members.
Despite Mercosur’s small size, it has the third highest level of intra-regional trade with an
average of just under 16%. However, the organization is relatively economically closed
compared to its Latin American counterparts and has higher levels of asymmetry with
regard to current account balance variation, FDI inflow distribution, and regime type. In
this sense, Mercosur is an over achiever in terms of cooperation with a higher level than
expected from the quantitative analysis having started in an “outer lane” on the
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cooperation track. This trend of over-achieving appears to be dwindling in recent years as
levels of cooperation within the group decline. High levels of asymmetry and the political
tensions they have created are in part to blame for this decline.
The next two sections of this chapter look specifically at the periods of declining
cooperation within Mercosur starting with the first dip between 1999 and 2002. These
periods of decline include disputes between member-states that ultimately went to
multilateral institutions such as the WTO and ICJ. What did the economic asymmetry and
other critical factors from the quantitative analysis look like around these periods of
decline? What did the individual states have to say about the conditions that caused the
disputes? The analysis focuses specifically on factors identified as significant in
explaining the variation within organizations over time. Intra-regional trade, variation in
FDI inflows, and levels of economic openness are expected to decrease as cooperation
declines. In contract, the variation in current account balances among members, overall
membership size, and variation in regime types within the region are expected to increase
within Mercosur during these periods of defection.
Mercosur’s Fist Downturn: The Brazil/Argentina Crisis, 1999-2002
Mercosur’s first few years were marked by a rapid liberalization among its
member-states and increasing levels of intra-regional trade as the region recovered from
the economic crises of the 1980s. Much of this trade was driven by the removal of trade
barriers within the region. Approximately 95% of tariffs among Mercosur states were
liberalized in its first four years (Ocampo & Ros, 2011, p. 11). The GDP for the region as
a whole grew at an average of 4.7% between 1991 and 1997 with Argentina leading the
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pack by growing at an average annual rate of more than 7% in the first few years of
Mercosur (Carranza, 2008, p. 68). Regardless of this growth and increasing liberalization
within the group, Mercosur had huge asymmetries in market sizes and trade flows among
its member-states. Brazil in particular maintained its primary trading relationships with
extra-regional partners including the EU and US minimizing its incentive to coordinate
with its South American neighbors (Krapohl et al., 2014, p. 884). With the external focus,
Mercosur’s growth and coordination began to lose momentum by the latter part of the
decade. “In the second half of the 1990s the grouping has experienced increasing
difficulties, intra-group trade has stagnated, and the common external tariff (CET) has
become largely symbolic” (Carranza, 2007, p. 320). By the turn of the century, Mercosur
was in need of a revival to overcome the impasse it had reached.
Shortly after intra-regional trade and growth stagnated in the late 1990s, economic
crises reemerged in Mercosur, straining relationships among member-states. Triggered by
the recessionary impact of the Mexican peso crisis, the first notable dispute within the
group occurred in 1995 between Brazil and Argentina after Brazil implemented a
temporary quota on automobile imports to combat its persistent trade deficit. While this
crisis was resolved through presidential negotiations between the two states, crisis hit
again shortly. Between 1999 and 2002, the Mercosur states suffered financial crises due
to contagion from the Asian Financial crisis. In spite of global efforts to contain the crisis
to Southeast Asian state, Latin America felt the effects by the beginning of 1999 with
Brazil and Argentina hit particularly hard (Carranza, 2008, pp. 80-81). Though extraregional factors played a key role in igniting the regional crisis, internal disputes quickly
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arose as states figured out their best course of action. Brazil and Argentina had differing
opinions on how Mercosur as a group should handle the financial crisis. As the two
largest states in the organization, this debate on how to handle such a crisis highlighted a
power struggle for leadership and influence. Argentina wanted to strike a deal with the
US and use dollarization but Brazil found this plan unacceptable (Carranza, 2008, p. 85).
An impending dispute lingered as it became clear that the divergent policies of Argentina
and Brazil would prevent Mercosur from acting in unison against the financial crisis. This
was the first clear failure of Mercosur to act as an organization leading to a downturn in
regional cooperation levels. “In the second half of the 1990s divergent macroeconomic
policies between Argentina and Brazil became a serious political problem for Mercosur”
(Carranza, 2007, p. 325; emphasis in original). Mercosur was designed in part to
minimize the rivalry between Argentina and Brazil but had been unable to do so at this
critical time.
Brazil acted unilaterally and devalued the real while Argentina maintained its
peso’s peg to the US dollar. This devaluation immediately assisted Brazil by increasing
the competitiveness of its exports both intra- and extra-regionally. Brazil’s unilateral
action in a time of crisis was not unexpected given its unique power position within
Mercosur.
In developing regions…member states not only compete with other world
regions for extra-regional investment and export shares, but they also
compete with their neighbors. With such an intra-regional competition,
regional powers may face incentives to forgo the gains of regional
integration and to act unilaterally in order to maintain or improve
competitive advantages (Krapohl et al., 2014, p. 880).
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This is especially true in times of economic downturn and exactly what Brazil did in
1999. The decision to devalue the real unilaterally (and in secret) was a regional
defection on Brazil’s part. By the end of 1999 the real had devalued more than 30%
(Krapohl et al., 2014, p. 887).
Brazil’s devaluation helped its economy recover but also started off a series of
bitter trade disputes with Argentina. “Brazil’s Real devaluation led Argentina and
Mercosur to one of their worst crisis since its launch in 1991 and the arrangement was
questioned in its survival” (Soreanu Pecequilo & Alves do Carmo, 2013, p. 60). As the
real depreciated, Brazilian exports around 40% cheaper in dollar-terms (Sissell, 1999).
Intra-regional exports to Brazil plummeted and its exports flooded its fellow Mercosur
states. Though economic conditions improved for Brazil, they worsened for Argentina
leading it to put up trade barriers and accuse Brazil of abusing its neighbors. Argentina
implemented tariffs against Brazilian sugar, protectionist measures against Brazilian
steel, and imposed labeling requirements on shoe imports in order to counter rising
Brazilian imports (Anonymous, 1999). In addition, Argentina accused Brazil of
intentional dumping practices, claiming to have proof that Brazil was selling chicken to
its neighbors at artificially low prices (Colitt, 2000). In mid-2001, the tensions between
Argentina and Brazil were clear and the continuation of Mercosur was in question.
Economy Minister Cavallo [of Argentina] accused Brazil of deliberately
devaluing its currency while ‘betting on the collapse of Argentina’s currency
board system’…Brazilian president Cardoso replied that Cavallo’s comments had
gone ‘beyond the limit’ and, in protest, cancelled a visit to Argentina (Carranza,
2008, p. 85).
Initially, Brazil ignored the complaints of Mercosur’s smaller members. However,
it ultimately reacted against Argentina’s protectionist measures by implementing
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protectionist measures of its own against Argentina. While some disputes were settled
through bilateral negotiations as they had been in the past, this method of resolution no
longer proved sufficient as Brazil threatened to end Mercosur. Instead, Brazil ended up
taking its complaint about Argentinian protectionist measures to the WTO in 2000. The
organization found in favor of Brazil but the crisis continued into a second round of
formal disputes between the states the following year (Carranza, 2008, pp. 82-84).
Though unsuccessful, Argentina justified the protectionist measures by citing WTO rules
allowing states to introduce safeguards when their economy is in danger of being harmed
by surging imports (Dyer, 2000). This period of crisis from 1999-2002 is reflected in
Mercosur’s cooperation levels seen in Figure 6.1. Though they had been increasing since
the organization formed, they dipped during this period. The ongoing dispute between
Mercosur’s two largest members led to concerns that Mercosur would not survive. The
indicators from quantitative analysis supported this decline within the group, though not
all of them behaved in a way that is detrimental to cooperation levels.
In the period of increasing cooperation leading up to the 1999 crisis, regime
variation decreased throughout the region with Paraguay’s democratization. Though
Paraguay’s regime backslid slightly in 1998, Mercosur had reached its highest levels to
that point of regime homogeneity during the crisis. However, during this same period
Argentina had a presidential election that increased tensions within the group as the
campaign highlighted political tensions within the group. During his campaign in 1999,
then-candidate President Fernando de la Rua expressed concerns that Brazil’s industrial
might in comparison might undermine Argentina’s development and leave the country
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stuck as a provider of raw materials and primary products (Dyer & Warn, 1999). The
election of de la Rua spurred further aggressive rhetoric within the region as the crisis
developed.
From Mercosur’s formation in 1991 until 1997 intra-regional trade increased
approximately fourfold (Carranza, 2007, p. 325). The smaller members of Mercosur
particularly benefitted from Brazil’s regional liberalization as it was the main destination
for their exports. This period was accompanied by high levels of GDP growth. However,
from 1998 to 2002 Mercosur’s overall growth rates slowed as the region was hit harder
by the financial crisis than rest of Latin America. This decline in growth was not uniform
among the members. While growth rates in Brazil and Paraguay declined, they remained
positive. In contrast, Uruguay and Argentina saw approximately -5% growth during the
same period (European Commission, 2007, p. 9) increasing their dissatisfaction and
concern with regional economic arrangements. The crisis led to a decrease in intraregional trade beginning in 1998. By 2002, Mercosur’s intra-regional trade levels had
declined to approximately their 1991 undoing the progress of the past decade.
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Figure 6.2. Intra-regional trade in Mercosur by member-state, 1986-2003
The decline in intra-regional trade coincided with a decline in cooperation levels
as expected. Brazil and Uruguay were the major drivers of the decreased trade as they
turned to extra-regional partners, while Argentina and Paraguay did not decrease trade
with their Mercosur partners between 1999 and 2001. Brazil and Argentina increased
bilateral trade specifically as intra-regional levels rose in the 1990s; Argentina gained an
increasingly large share of Brazil’s market. However, when the crisis hit this relationship
quickly unraveled to the disadvantage of Argentina.
While total bilateral trade between Argentina and Brazil declined sharply between
1998 and 2002…the share of Argentine goods in Brazilian imports fell
substantially, while Brazil took a much larger share of the Argentine imports,
reaching over 33 percent in 2003 (Heymann & Ramos, 2008, p.289).
163

The decrease in trade was primarily a result of Argentinian products losing
competitiveness.
A. IMPORTS FROM BRAZIL TO ARGENTINA B. IMPORTS FROM ARGENTINA TO BRAZIL

Figure 6.3. Argentina-Brazil Imports as a Share of Total Imports and Trend (Ventura,
2008, pp. 388-389)
Trade relations within Mercosur reflected the size differential between Brazil and
the other member-states. In 1998, Brazil got only 11% of its export earnings from
Argentina, whereas Argentina sold 30% of its exports to Brazil. Uruguay and Paraguay
had similar relationships selling approximately 35% and 40% of exports respectively to
Brazil (Carranza, 2008, pp. 82-83). Figure 6.3 shows import levels between Brazil and
Argentina from 1970 to 2004. Argentinian exports to Brazil rose significantly after the
formation of Mercosur but dropped dramatically after the economic crisis. In contrast,
Brazilian exports to Argentina were not negatively impacted and actually grew. These
trade imbalances in the region were reflected in the variation in member-states’ current
account balances. This variation rose significantly between 2000 and 2002 as expected
with declining cooperation levels. Argentina in particular developed a significant deficit
as it decreased exports within Mercosur while increasing imports. Argentina reacted to
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these imbalances by moving to ‘managed trade’ on many products sparking the disputes
with Brazil (European Commission, 2007, p. 11)
FDI inflows to member-states increased significantly after the formation of
Mercosur in 1991. This increase was accompanied by a rise in the number of MNCs
investing in the region over the decade and triggered by increased confidence in the
region with the success of Mercosur (Dyer & Warn, 1999).
‘Most of the big foreign investments in the region over the last few years [prior to
1999] have not been based on the market in Brazil or Argentina, but on
Mercosur,’ said Jose Roberto Mendonca de Barros, a former economics secretary
at the Brazilian finance ministry (Dyer & Warn, 1999, para. 3).
Though Mercosur was the driving force for the increased investment and all states
benefitted to a certain degree, Brazil received the overwhelming majority of the total
inflows.
At least partly due to the creation of Mercosur, investment inflows
increased from 0.56 per cent of the regional GDP in 1991 to a maximum
of 5.88 per cent in 1999…The main profiteer of this development was
Brazil, which received more than 70 per cent of the investment inflows
[and] contributed almost 70 per cent to the intra-regional exports (Krapohl
et al., 2014, p. 886).
Brazil’s disproportionate FDI inflows compared to its neighbors disappears when
controlling for the members’ GDP size. When FDI is considered as a percent of total
GDP, Brazil only led the region during the crisis from 2000 to 2002. Though the whole
region saw a decrease in FDI during this period, the decrease was less extreme for Brazil
than for Argentina at a time when Argentina desperately needed assistance due to
Brazil’s unilateral devaluation.
Variation in FDI inflows among member-states during this same time reached
their highest levels in 1999 before plummeting again through 2002. This means that
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variation in FDI inflows decreased at the same time cooperation decreased within the
region following the positive relationship outlined in the quantitative analysis. Argentina
was the main reason the spike in variation in 1999 as it received more than three times
the amount of FDI it has the previous year before falling back down to less than half its
1998 levels, and the lowest in the region, by 2001. Brazil’s FDI inflows peaked in 2000
right as Argentina’s began their decline. This variation between the two states, though not
reflected in the regional aggregate contributed to their growing tensions during the
financial crisis.
Finally, Mercosur as a whole had been increasing its global trade and economic
openness through the early 1990s, coinciding as expected with the regions higher levels
of cooperation. However, beginning in 1995, economic openness began to decline. The
group maintained the downward trend through 1999 and remained stagnant until 2002
when levels began to increase again and cooperation levels recovered. Though
Mercosur’s levels of economic openness dipped during the downturn in cooperation
between 1999 and 2002, Brazil’s levels continued to increase throughout the period as it
increased extra-regional exports to the US and EU minimizing Brazil’s reliance on
regional commitments.
After Brazil’s unilateral devaluation and the ensuing trade disputes, Argentina’s
trust in Brazil was damaged and the bond that held Mercosur together appeared
weakened. Mercosur’s smaller member-states suggested the group abolish the customs
union and revert back to a simple FTA (Krapohl et al., 2014, p. 888). However, the group
began to recover by 2002 when Argentina finally followed Brazil’s lead in devaluing its
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currency to combat economic downturn. Once Argentina devalued, there was renewed
hope in Mercosur that Argentina and Brazil could repair their relationship (Carranza,
2008, p. 70). While the relationship between the two states improved, underlying tensions
remained.
After the crisis, Argentina slowly began to recover but still continued with debt.
Its relationship with Brazil had improved but remained fractured as Argentina’s
devaluation led to a further drop in trade between the two states. “Brazilian exports to
Argentina fell by more than 60% in 2002; Brazilian imports from Argentina fell by about
26%” (Carranza, 2007, p. 326). While Brazil recovered from the debt it had incurred,
Argentina struggled with repayments and pushed back against Brazilian leadership in the
region. Internally, Argentina reacted aggressively towards the new structural convergence
fund backed by Brazil. Externally, it refused to support Brazil’s bid for a permanent seat
on the UN Security Council (Lapper, 2004).
Despite struggles with Argentina, Brazil continued to take a leadership role within
the group. However, Mercosur still had a high degree of asymmetry not just in its balance
of trade but also in policy orientation, making it harder to work together as Brazil
continued to look to extra-regional partners.
Since 1999, Brazil’s trade structure has been highly oriented towards
world markets (trade with other Mercosur members represented a mere
9.4% of Brazil’s trade over the period of 2002-2005)…On the other hand,
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay show a stronger trade dependence on
their partners in Mercosur, notably 25.8% in the case of Argentina, 37.0%
for Uruguay and 55.7% for Paraguay (European Commission, 2007, p.
11).
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Brazil did continue to increase its exports to the bloc and reorient itself toward regional
relationships. In addition, it tried to mitigate protectionist moves from Argentina saying
that Brazil would prefer to avoid increased protectionism within the group and help
Argentine companies compete with their more efficient Brazilian rivals through
continued convergence efforts (Lapper, 2004). While the crisis of 1999 led to a period of
defection within the group, it ended with an increased role for Brazilian leadership and
renewed political will as the group chose to remain intact. “The absence of US leadership
to deal with the crisis strengthened political solidarity among the Mercosur partners”
(Carranza, 2007, p. 326). The organization negotiated as a group with international
financial institutions to assist Argentina as it struggled to recover. In addition, Mercosur
further institutionalized with the creation of a regional dispute mechanism, the Mercosur
parliament, and a convergence fund.
The Beginning of Mercosur’s Decline: The Argentina/Uruguay Crisis of 2006
Like Argentina, Uruguay was hit particularly hard by the financial crisis in 1999.
With a heavy reliance on the Argentine market, Uruguay’s economy suffered a three-year
recession during this period incurring debt and losing its investment grade rating (“Latin
America: US,” 2002). The entire Mercosur region suffered a spike in public debt around
2001 though this debt was most significant for Uruguay and Argentina hitting a peak of
approximately 75% and 90% of GDP respectively (Moccero & Winegrad, 2008, p. 331).
By 2003 however, the Mercosur states were recovering from this downturn. Argentina
and Uruguay led the group in GDP growth while Mercosur sped past the rest of Latin
America with the higher than average growth rates for the region (European Commission,
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2007, p. 9). By 2005, Uruguay’s economy was doing well with a GDP growth of 6.6%,
decreasing inflation, increased exports earnings of 16%, and an increase in investment of
over 20% and show no signs of slowing down (“Uruguay: Economic Success,” 2006).
Argentina on the other hand continued to present slowed growth with high levels of debt,
inflation, increased imports, and continued high unemployment (“Argentina: Structural
Issues,” 2005). Finally, by 2006, Argentina’s growth appeared to be back on track though
the state remained cut off from foreign capital due to its prior debt default (European
Commission, 2007, pp. 9-10). Though both member-states had dealt with extreme
economic turmoil at the turn of the century, Uruguay was recovering more quickly than
Argentina in part due to its pivot away from the Argentine market and growing reliance
on extra-regional partners.
Even with Argentina’s slow recovery, tensions within Mercosur had calmed after
the Argentine devaluation of 2002. However, regional asymmetries continued to generate
conflict as the organization moved forward. At a 2006 Mercosur summit in Sao Paulo,
Paraguay and Uruguay expressed concern that they had been ill-served by Mercosur’s
arrangements with group decisions exclusively focusing on the two larger states
(“Mercosur/Venezuela: Regional,” 2006). This complaint reflected on-going tensions
within the group, particularly after the 1999 financial crisis that led the organization to
take action in order to assist its smaller members and encourage economic convergence.
Under the leadership of the Paraguayan presidency in 2003, Mercosur took action
in attempt to correct regional asymmetries. After more than two years of negotiations, the
Mercosur Structural Convergence Fund (FOCEM) was created. Under FOCEM, regional
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funds were earmarked to develop Mercosur institutions, create a structural convergence
program to build regional infrastructure, establish a competition program to integrate
production chains, and create a social cohesion program to reduce poverty (Vaillant,
2008, p. 133). The financial structure of FOCEM is designed to essentially transfer funds
from Brazil and Argentina to Mercosur’s smaller members, Paraguay and Uruguay as the
former contribute far more while the latter are the primary recipients.
The amount yearly designated to FOCEM is US$ 100 millions, with 70%
coming from Brazil, 27% coming from Argentina, 2% coming from
Uruguay and 1% coming from Paraguay. In the yearly distribution of
resources for three of the four existing programs, to which one adds the
non-allocated resources in previous years, Paraguay has the right to 48%,
Uruguay to 32% and Argentina and Brazil to 10% each. The fund may
also receive spontaneous contributions from member states, non-member
states and international organizations (Amoroso Botelho, 2014, p. 48).
The fund became operational in 2006 right as tensions within Mercosur began to
resurface led by a dispute between Argentina and Uruguay.
Argentina and Uruguay share strong social, cultural, and economic ties leading to
a traditionally amicable relationship. “Relations between Argentina and Uruguay have
proven to be highly amicable and have cultivated a climate of cooperation between their
governments” (Pavon Piscitello & Andres, 2007, p. 161). To help manage their shared
border along the Uruguay river, the states signed a treaty in 1961 and made agreements in
1975 to establish rules for its joint use. However, this shared border became the center of
a dispute between the states in 2006. At the time of FOCEM’s adoption, both Argentina
and Uruguay were recovering economically though the latter was doing so more rapidly.
Regardless of its slower growth, Argentina was required to make more of a contribution
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and receive fewer funds from FOCEM than Uruguay. This imbalance did little to quell
the growing tensions between the states that had previously been quite closely aligned.
During Uruguay’s economic recovery, FDI came into the state to support the
development of pulp mills along the Uruguay river border with Argentina. Two pulp
mills were approved for production by Uruguay in 2003 and 2005 (Pavon Piscitello &
Andres, 2007, p. 162) as the state received a significant amount of funds for the projects.
Both Argentina and Uruguay had paper mills already in place at the time though
Argentina was the larger producer in the sector having already developed more advanced
technology for its production facilities. “Argentina already has a dozen paper mills in the
region that use the same technology as the factories being built in Uruguay, but
Uruguay’s far larger plants will equal Argentine production” (Mander, 2006, para. 3).
Uruguay’s newly approved paper mills put them in direct competition with Argentine
production at a time when Uruguay’s economy was growing more rapidly.
The production of Uruguay’s first paper mill represented the largest private
capital investment in Uruguay and would help transform the state into a “global hub” of
paper production. “Uruguay’s economy stands to gain a vigorous boost from investment,
which represents more than 10 per cent of gross domestic product and could create as
many as 3000 jobs” (Mander, 2006, para. 14). Argentina expressed concern over the
mills’ production claiming fear of decreased tourism and increased pollution. The state
argued that Uruguay’s paper mill along the river could have a significant environmental
impact on the area leading to economic consequences from possible real estate
devaluation and loss of income from the tourism and fishing industries. By the end of
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2005 through early of 2006 protesters in Argentina blocked border crossings to combat
the mill’s construction (Pavon Piscitello & Andres, 2007, p. 163).
After the Argentine blockade, Uruguay grew concerned about its economy. The
blocked border threatened both tourism and its relationship with Argentina. Uruguayan
tourism minister Hector Lescano said that the roadblocks from Argentine protestors were
responsible for a drastic drop in Argentinian tourists to Uruguay and a loss of between
$70-90 million (Montero & Lacunza, 2007). In total, Uruguay, which relied heavily on
trade with its neighbor, claimed it suffered losses of approximately $400 million during
the Argentinian protesters’ blockade of the border (Pavon Piscitello & Andres, 2007, p.
163). Though Uruguay continued to express concerns over economic damage done by the
blockade, the Argentina did not intervene with then-president Nestor Kirchner initially
supporting the protestors (Valente, 2010).
The conflict between Uruguay and Argentina over the pulp mill’s construction
eventually went to the ICJ with Argentina arguing that Uruguay had violated its 1975
agreement on the use of the shared portion of the Uruguay River. Uruguay responded by
bringing a complaint against Argentina to the Mercosur dispute system arguing that
Argentina had violated regional policies regarding the movement of goods and people
(Pavon Piscitello & Andres, 2007, p. 160). At the same time this dispute escalated, the
conflict between Brazil and Argentina reignited after a period of cooperation between the
two states. In 2006, Argentina took Brazil to WTO regarding unfair Brazilian
protectionist measures against Argentine resin (World Trade Organization, 2007). These
increasing disputes within Mercosur are reflected in the group’s overall cooperation
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levels at the time. Though cooperation levels peaked within the region in 2004 and 2005
they began a downward trend by 2006 that continued through the period observed. The
indicators from quantitative analysis supported this decline within the group as they all
behaved in a way that determined to be detrimental to cooperation levels.
Between 2003 and 2006, regime variation among member-states in Mercosur
reached the lowest levels in the organization’s history coinciding with a peak in regional
cooperation levels. After 2006, the variation increased as cooperation declined. This
variation was due to the addition of Venezuela to the organization’s measurements as it
began the process of gaining full membership that was completed in 2012. In addition to
a shift in regional regimes with the addition of Venezuela, political will for Mercosur
declined beginning around 2005. Member-state’s immediate goals of economic
stabilization within their own territories led to conflicts of interest among the group
inhibiting deeper cooperation efforts (Rezende, 2008, p. 219).
Intra-regional trade within Mercosur peaked in 1998 with the member-states
conducting almost 23% of total trade with each other. The crisis of 1999-2002 decreased
trade dramatically hitting a low of 14.6% in 2002. Though the member-states of
Mercosur began to recover economically after the crisis, intra-regional trade did not
rebound maintaining an average of approximately 15.5% between 2002 and 201541.
Figure 6.4 shows the relatively stagnant levels of intra-regional trade during this period

41

The slight dip in intra-regional trade was due to the addition of Venezuela to the group
aggregate in 2007 whereas Bolivia’s addition in 2010 led to the slight peak in intraregional trade that year. However, in both cases trade leveled out to the previous levels
within two years.
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along with the variation by member-state. After the crisis at the turn of the century, intraregional trade levels do not appear to have an effect on regional cooperation within
Mercosur; they did not rise during the peak of cooperation in 2004-2005 nor did they fall
as cooperation declined afterwards. However, in looking specifically at Uruguay and
Argentina’s intra-regional trade, Uruguay’s levels declined in the years leading up to the
pulp mill dispute. By 2005, Uruguay had lower levels of intra-regional trade than it had at
Mercosur’s formation in 1991 while Argentina’s levels had been gradually increasing as
its economy recovered.
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FDI inflows to Mercosur states reached their highest levels since the 1999
financial crisis in 2006. This coincided with an increase in the variation of inflows among
the members. Figure 6.5 shows the FDI inflows to Mercosur by state from 2000 to 2010
highlighting Uruguay and Argentina. The peak in variation in 2006 was driven primarily
by increasing FDI to Uruguay assisted by the pulp mill construction. While the rest of the
region had relatively volatile levels of FDI during this period, Uruguay gradually
increased its FDI inflows since 1997 most rapidly between 2002 and 2006. On average,
Uruguay had the highest levels of FDI in Mercosur from 2005 to 2014. This trend was
driven by the creation of the disputed pulp mills with the approved mills representing a
major boom in FDI and about a 2% boost to Uruguay’s GDP (Pavon Piscitello & Andres,
2007, p. 162). During this same period, Argentina averaged lower levels of FDI inflows
than either Uruguay or Brazil. After peaking in 2006, variation in FDI inflows within
Mercosur followed a downward trend coinciding with decreased levels of cooperation
though Uruguay continued to receive higher levels than Argentina.
This asymmetry of FDI inflows between Uruguay and Argentina was particularly
contentious due to its primary recipient industry. FDI flowed into Uruguay at record
levels to accommodate the building of the new pulp mills which put Uruguay in direct
competition with Argentina in an industry previously dominated by the latter in the
region. With the two states competing for the same resources including FDI for a shared
industry, distribution of these resources was of particular importance. Additionally, this
loss of relative FDI in a key industry occurred while Argentina was still recovering from
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a severe economic downturn exacerbated by another Mercosur member, Brazil. Thus,
Argentina was left in a particularly dissatisfactory position with the group.

Figure 6.5. FDI inflows for Mercosur by state, 2000-2010
Though Uruguay saw an influx of FDI over this period, particularly compared to
its neighbors, it continued to struggle with a trade deficit. Variation in the current account
balances of Mercosur member-states peaked in 2002 at the end of the Brazil/Argentina
crisis. As expected, this variation dropped dramatically by 2004 at the height of regional
cooperation levels and began to rise again leading up to the Uruguay/Argentina pulp mill
dispute through 2008. Much of this variation within Mercosur was caused by differences
between Argentina and Uruguay. While Argentina maintained or increased its surplus
from 2004 to 2008, Uruguay’s deficit grew. Variation between the two states peaking in
176

2006. The states were aware of this increasing deficit and the benefit Argentina received
in intra-regional trade with Mercosur’s smaller member-states. “Argentine consultants
admit ‘a priori that the mere size difference makes the bilateral relation with Uruguay and
Paraguay, clearly favorable for Argentina’” (“Uruguay President Says,” 2014, para. 9).
While asymmetry in the benefits of regional cooperation through signaling for FDI put
Argentina at a disadvantage, asymmetry in the benefits of increased ties through intraregional trade made Uruguay more vulnerable through running a high trade deficit.
Finally, Mercosur as a whole saw a steady increase in economic openness from
2001 through 2006, coinciding as expected with increased levels of regional cooperation.
After 2006, economic openness within the region remained relatively stagnate with a
slight overall decline. During this period, Uruguay and Argentina had divergent trends.
Uruguay increased global trade as a percent of its GDP significantly between 2002 and
2004, maintaining these higher levels through 2008. In contrast, Argentina’s economic
openness peaked in 2002 but gradually declined afterwards. Though Mercosur increased
its global trade as it recovered from economic crisis after the turn of the century, these
levels decreased slowly at the same time cooperation began to decline within the group.
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Figure 6.6. Economic openness levels for Mercosur by state, 2000-2011
As cooperation levels in Mercosur declined and the debate over the pulp mills
ignited between Argentina and Uruguay, the dispute was taken to both the ICJ and the
Mercosur dispute settlement mechanism for resolution. Argentina took Uruguay to the
ICJ stating that Uruguay was in violation of the previous agreement they had made over
the use of their shared border region. Uruguay simultaneously took its complaint against
Argentina’s blockade to the Mercosur dispute settlement mechanism claiming that the
blockade was in violation of their regional agreement. Initially, the ICJ helped the states
reach a compromise where Uruguay agreed to halt construction. Uruguay complied in
order to resume trade with Argentina as the ICJ continued to hear the case (Pavon
Piscitello & Andres, 2007, p. 166). Both dispute settlement bodies ultimately ruled in
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favor of Uruguay with the ICJ approving the construction of mill (“Uruguay Economy:
Relations,” 2014). In April 2010 “the ICJ ruled that Uruguay had broken some aspects of
the treaty, but that there was no conclusive evidence that the pulp mill – which [had] been
in operation for two years – had polluted the river” (Valente, 2010, para. 12). However,
the ruling did not force Argentina to put an end to the blockades stating that they had a
right to protest (Montero & Lacunza, 2007). Regardless of the ruling, Argentina showed
signs of cooperating with Uruguay when then-President Cristina Fernandez agreed to act
against the protesters and clear the blockade along the border.
Despite the rulings on the pulp mill by both the ICJ and Mercosur in favor of
Uruguay, tensions between the states remained high. Both states compete over shipping
business within the region with a strong reliance on their ports. In October 2013,
Argentina banned the transshipment of its exports through any Uruguayan ports. “The
recent measures have been interpreted as a reprisal for the decision by Uruguayan
president, Jose Mujica, in October to authorize the expansion…of the UPM (Finland)
cellulose pulp mill” (“Uruguay Economy: Relations,” 2014, para. 4). This move by
Argentina hurt the continued development of Uruguay and reignited disputes between the
two Mercosur members. After continuous battles against Argentinian protectionist
measures, recent developments show Uruguay dropping exports to Argentina, Paraguay,
and Brazil as it seeks to distance itself from Mercosur (“Uruguay President Says,” 2014).
Conclusion
Formed in 1991, Mercosur started out as a promising embodiment of the new
wave of regionalism in Latin America. However, after an initial period of success the
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organization’s overall cooperation levels suffered during the financial crisis seen from
1999 to 2002 and have gradually declined since 2005. This decline has coincided with
inter-state disputes between Brazil and Argentina as well as Argentina and Uruguay.
Economic asymmetry among member-states has been at the center of regional disputes
within Mercosur. Despite efforts to ease asymmetry through mechanisms such as
FOCEM, members have repeatedly expressed frustration with regional policies as a result
of unequal gains.
This frustration with economic asymmetry is potentially exacerbated by the
competition over FDI inflows and similar economic profiles among the member-states
within the region. The conflicts between Uruguay and Argentina revolve around
industries in which both states are invested in and show the tensions caused by intraregional competition. Developing regions such as Mercosur tend to suffer from higher
levels of internal competition with cooperation efforts more geared toward attracting
outside investment than margining similar markets. A similarity in market profiles within
a region exacerbates member-states concerns with relative distribution because one
neighbor’s gain is more likely to actually be another’s loss. This relationship is
particularly evident in the disputes between Argentina and Uruguay with their
overlapping economic investment in paper mills and shipping ports at the heart of the
conflict. The inability of Mercosur to solve the ongoing dispute between the two states
despite their utilization of the regional dispute mechanism demonstrates limits to the
organization’s effectiveness though the group remains relatively more successful than
many of its Latin American counterparts (Shifter, 2012, p. 4).
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At the same time Uruguay and Argentina disputed the construction of Uruguay’s
pulp mills, tensions between Brazil and Argentina reignited via another WTO dispute.
Argentina brought Brazil to the WTO in 2006 over protectionist measures placed against
resin imports from Argentina. While the was ultimately dropped by Argentina (World
Trade Organization, 2007), tension between the two states remain and persistent
disagreements between Argentina and Brazil have hindered deeper cooperation within
Mercosur (Soreanu Pecequilo & Alves do Carmo, 2013, p. 62). In addition, the smaller
states within the organization remain concerned with Brazilian dominance in the region
expressing dissatisfaction over regional asymmetries and access to Brazil’s market not
being the spring-board for export-led development that they had hoped for (Ocampo &
Ros, 2011, p. 21). Further cooperation will only be possible if the other members of
Mercosur have some guarantee from Brazil that any steps toward integration will benefit
them nationally as well (Soreanu Pecequilo & Alves do Carmo, 2013, p. 64). The
dissatisfaction of smaller states and concerns over Brazil’s dominance need to be
addressed for the organization to move forward and reverse its recent trend of declining
regional cooperation.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion
Introduction
Regionalism is an important aspect of international relations for Latin America
with every state participating as an active member in a least one regional organization.
Through regional cooperation, these states aim to increase their economic development,
encourage peaceful relations among neighbors, and collaborate on shared issues such as
weak infrastructure and democratic consolidation. In addition, as an emerging region
with increasing influence in the global economy, Latin American states stand to benefit
from presenting a united force by bargaining as a group with powerful global forces such
as the US, the EU, and China. Since the formation of many regional organizations postWWII, regionalism has shifted focus away from the isolationist policies of the 1960s and
1970s to a more economically liberal approach. However, the continued development of
these organizations and the region’s political will for Latin American integration shows a
strong desire among states to work together in order to better adapt to shifts in the global
power structure.
Even with the potential gains Latin American states can achieve through regional
cooperation, the path of the regional organizations they have formed has not been straight
forward. Instead, there is a wide variation in levels of cooperation both when comparing
the different organizations in Latin America to one another and when observing each one
over time. While some organizations successfully negotiate and implement regional
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agreements, others struggle to build relationships between their member-states leading
Latin America as a whole to experience an ebb and flow of regional cooperation levels
over time. This research sought to better understand the factors leading to such variation.
Regional cooperation is expected to produce many gains in absolute terms for the
states involved. However, such gains are not necessarily distributed equally with some
states within a group standing to gain more than others. This research finds evidence to
support the argument that the distribution of economic gains and losses impact political
indicators of cooperation within a regional organization. The more unequally gains from
cooperation such as investment or trade are distributed among members of regional
organizations, the more likely states are to defect from the group as those members
receiving relatively less than their counterparts will fear being the relative “loser” of the
group’s agreements. In addition, member-states gaining far more than their counterparts
may seek “greener pastures” in extra-regional agreements feeling they have little more to
gain from their current organization thus increasing their likelihood of unilateral action
and defection from regional cooperation schemes.
Using both large-N statistical analysis and an in-depth study of two individual
organizations within Latin America, this research looked to see which factors have
helped and hindered regional cooperation efforts in Latin America since WWII. The
quantitative analysis builds off of existing work on international and regional cooperation
and found general trends within Latin America that highlight the significant role of
unequal gains measured as economic asymmetry. The following two case studies on
CAN and Mercosur further illuminated the relationships found in the quantitative section
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through analyzing periods of defection within the groups. The cases also highlighted the
potential role of economic and political crises within member-states. Overall, the research
found economic asymmetry among member-states to be detrimental to total levels of
regional cooperation.
Summary of Findings
This research found a wide variation of regional cooperation levels in Latin
American regional organizations. While there is variation in cooperation levels within
each organization as it grows and changes over time, the variation is greater when
comparing them to one another. This suggests that the initial composition of an
organization is important and that there may be a degree of path dependency within
groups once they are established. Indicators of economic asymmetry along with intraregional trade levels, overall economic openness of the group, regime homogeneity, and
membership size all had a significant impact on political indicators of cooperation within
the groups observed. In particular, a large variation in trade balances and unequal
distribution of FDI increases tensions among member-states increasing the likelihood of
periods of defection.
The initial quantitative analysis built off of existing research with evidence
supporting the significance of intra-regional trade levels and homogeneity of regime
types within a group. However, it found no evidence to suggest US influence or the
presence of a hegemon were significant. The primary focus of the analysis was the role of
economic asymmetry among member-states. As expected, it had an overall negative
relationship with regional cooperation levels. However, not all indicators were
184

significant. Variation in FDI distribution and current account balances were important
factors while variation in GDP growth levels were not suggesting that the indicators that
primarily capture international economic relations rather than domestic well-being are
most critical. While variation in FDI distribution was a strong indicator of lower levels of
cooperation when comparing organizations, it had a smaller but positive impact on
cooperation within organizations over time contrary to expectations. This may be due to
the varying importance of attracting investment for member-states. For example, FDI was
less important for Venezuela during its exit from CAN due to its large export levels. In
addition, short periods of high FDI inflows for one member-state may encourage
cooperation in the short-run as others hope for spillover effects within the region. In
contrast, a continually high level of variation in FDI inflows within a group suggests
ongoing inequality among states in terms of development and economic health, making
cooperation more difficult over time. Finally, despite the potential to increase gains,
larger membership size including the addition of new members was problematic for
overall cooperation levels most likely due to exacerbating problems of collective action.
While the quantitative analysis found general trends between economic
asymmetry and regional cooperation, it utilized organizational aggregate data and
therefore could not assess the particular behavior of individual states. The preceding case
studies provided a more in-depth look at the specific inter-state dynamics within CAN
and Mercosur and better highlighted the relationships identified in the statistical model.
This analysis observed the internal dynamics within these organizations by
disaggregating the data to look at the timeline and state rhetoric specifically around
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periods of defection. The findings of the case studies supported the relationships
identified in the quantitative analysis regarding the impact of economic asymmetry on
regional cooperation efforts.
Through observing periods of defection in both CAN and Mercosur, this research
found further evidence that a high degree of economic asymmetry creates tension among
member-states; in most cases of defection, it is the state losing out relatively to its fellow
members that strays from group agreements. However, this was not always the case.
Venezuela’s exit from CAN was an interesting exception that shows that it is not
necessarily only the relative “loser” of unequal gains that grows unsatisfied with regional
agreements. Venezuela left the organization due to not only a clear difference in foreign
policy approaches from other members but also in search of market expansion
opportunities. States with a disproportionate economic advantage compared to their
fellow members may also defect feeling that deepening ties with smaller states minimizes
what they can gain from the arrangement and makes cooperation efforts less worth the
risk and loss of sovereignty.
In addition to demonstrating the impact of economic asymmetry, the cases of
CAN and Mercosur helped to clarify the varying impact of FDI distribution when
comparing cooperation between organizations versus observing variation within each
one. While variation in FDI among member-states had a positive relationship with
cooperation within organizations, the cases found that it often peaked shortly before a
period of defection. This suggests that FDI variation may still have a negative impact on
cooperation but for some reason has a more delayed effect than other measures such as
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variation in current account balances. Finally, the cases illuminated the role of additional
variables previously omitted from the quantitative analysis. These include economic and
political crises within a state that often coincided with periods of asymmetry as well as
the composition of domestic markets as industry similarity exacerbated the conflict
between Uruguay and Argentina in Mercosur.
Both the quantitative and qualitative analysis in this research found evidence to
support the primary argument that economic asymmetry is detrimental to regional
cooperation levels. Additional factors including regime homogeneity, economic
openness, and intra-regional trade significantly benefit cooperation efforts though to a
lesser degree. The case studies looking at periods of defection within CAN and Mercosur
supported the quantitative findings and provided additional insight into Latin American
regionalism as both organizations have reacted differently to internal struggles. While
CAN suffered membership losses over time, it recovers well each time with more
homogeneity among members after an exit. In contrast, Mercosur retains its members but
also struggles to move forward after periods of defection particularly with the addition of
new member-states. As both of these organizations maintain different trajectories in
terms of regional cooperation, a newer organization encompassing all members,
UNASUR, is attempting to unite these two blocks yet similarly struggles with asymmetry
and lower levels of cooperation.
Future Research Avenues
While the research done here on the relationship between economic asymmetry
and regional cooperation supports a strong connection between the two, more work is
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needed to fully understand the dynamics at play, seek out potential omitted variables, and
test the generalizability of these findings. One avenue for future research includes further
investigation of the current variables through more refined measurement techniques.
Variation in regime type appears to have a negative effect on regional cooperation.
However, the case studies highlighted that shifts in regime type often coincided with a
change in economic ideology. Further research looking at economic ideology specifically
may better clarify the relationship to regional cooperation. In addition, FDI variation may
be better captured if measured as a percentage of total flows into the region or if
controlled by population rather than as a percentage of GDP. By measuring FDI as a
percentage of GDP, member-state’s economic sizes are accounted for. However, the
overall percentage of FDI initially increases in times of crisis as GDP drops thus making
a state look as if it is gaining relative to its neighbors when it is not actually receiving any
additional investment.
Both FDI inflows and economic openness had different interactions with regional
cooperation when comparing organizations versus changes within individual
organizations over time. While variation in FDI inflows was a strong negative predictor
of average cooperation within groups, it positively corresponded with cooperation within
organizations over time. Average levels of economic openness behaved similarly though
the effect was negative between groups and positive within. These findings require
further research in order to clarify the relationships observed. Altering the measurements
for FDI as suggested above as well as adjusting economic openness to exclude intra-
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regional trade would both provide a robustness check as well as potentially explain the
variation observed.
Additionally, re-testing the model using country dyads rather than regional
aggregates as a unit of analysis would provide additional insight into the relationship
between asymmetry and cooperation. As highlighted by the case studies, there is often
one state in particular that is causing most of the asymmetry and defection. Country-dyad
level analysis would isolate each particular relationship within a group as well as increase
the number of cases available for analysis. Another approach would be to capture the
relationship of each state to the remaining states in the organizational aggregate. This
would allow us to highlight any specific outliers in the group as well as isolate which
state(s) are defecting from the group. The observations of both Peru and Venezuela’s
defection from CAN suggest that both “losers” and “winners” of economic asymmetry
have incentive to defect. By isolating individual states from the group aggregate, we can
test the applicability of this finding in a large-N analysis.
Another avenue for future research involves exploring additional potential
variables noted in the cases of CAN and Mercosur as well as expanding the measurement
of cooperation in both the quantitative and qualitative analysis. For example, controlling
for similarity of market composition may better illuminate the dynamics around
economic asymmetry. Perhaps relative gains are less impactful when states are not
competing in the same industries. This might help explain the continued levels of
cooperation within the EU despite notable variation in current account balances among
members. Additionally, future research must address the specific roles of economic and
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political crises within member-states. Do such crises exacerbate the impact of economic
asymmetry or possibly even better explain periods of defection? Finally, with regard to
cooperation, additional qualitative analysis will benefit from comparing periods of
defection with periods of active cooperation between organizations. While defection and
active cooperation are two sides of the same spectrum of cooperation, it is possible that
asymmetry only has negative impact leading to defection whereas additional factors are
at play when regional organizations spur forward.
A final avenue to consider for future research is the analysis of additional cases.
Do the findings from this research hold when applied to regional organizations outside of
Latin America? In particular, how does economic asymmetry affect regional cooperation
levels in other emerging regions such as Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa? Finally,
there is an increasing number of inter-regional agreements as regional organizations
negotiate on a global level. Do concerns over relative gains clearly extend to interregional arrangements among these organizations as well?42 Through further research, I
hope to continue to better understand the specific factors influencing variation in
cooperation within regional organizations in emerging economies around the world.
Contribution and Policy Prescriptions
This research aimed to provide a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics
behind cooperation efforts within emerging regions through comparing Latin American
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When looking at relative gains in inter-regional agreements, supranational institutions
and the overall strength of each organization is likely a crucial. See Carranza (2008, pp.
74-75) for further discussion on inter-regional bargaining power from a neorealist
perspective.
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regional organizations created post-WWII. This nuance is often lost with similar work
comparing organizations to the more advanced development of the EU and therefore
missing the variation present among less developed organizations. In addition, emerging
regions such as Latin America are highly focused on economic development and extraregional signaling through regional cooperation often displaying significantly lower
levels of interdependence relative to Europe or North America. This research contributes
further to our understanding of cooperation in emerging regions through an internal
comparison of the existing organizations in Latin America. This comparison allows us to
observe the variance among these groups without a comparison to the EU or NAFTA that
may dwarf the cooperation levels in emerging regions preventing us from seeing the
critical factors at play. In addition, by moving away from intra-regional trade as a
measure of cooperation but rather a driver of it, this research adds to our understanding of
the impact of economic factors on political indicators of cooperation. Economic
asymmetry appears harmful to overall regional cooperation efforts. However, further
comparative studies within emerging regions are needed to better understand what factors
help and hinder these organizations.
An increased understanding of the drivers of regional cooperation is necessary to
better help states achieve the many potential benefits these organizations can offer in a
globalizing world. The findings of this work support the argument that economic
asymmetry is detrimental to the progress of regional organizations. Therefore, steps must
be taken to minimize the variation in gains enjoyed by member-states in order for regions
to move forward, deepen their ties, and gain from regional cooperation. This is
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particularly important in emerging regions as they seek to increase international
influence; states within these regions need to work together in multilateral institutions
and when negotiating with larger powers to maximize their leverage.
Unfortunately, minimizing economic asymmetry and ensuring relatively equal
gains for member-states is a difficult task especially for less integrated organizations.
Redistribution mechanisms within an organization would lessen any asymmetry with FDI
inflows and help compensate states with severe trade deficits. However, such
mechanisms are unlikely to find much political support as states seek to maintain a high
degree of sovereignty even as they cooperate and stronger states hesitate to minimize
their potential gains. Additionally, more favorable and lenient policies toward smaller
economies within a group can minimize any initial variation in economic gains. Such
measures were adopted by both CAN and Mercosur to assist their smaller members and
were effective initially, particularly within CAN. Unfortunately, these measures are not
always sustainable and can ultimately minimize any integration efforts as states do not
want to relinquish their special status once they improve economically.43
Finally, dispute settlement mechanisms can help prevent periods of defection at
times of high economic asymmetry. While dispute settlements are unlikely to minimize
the actual asymmetrical distribution of gains, they can help settle any conflict that this
inequality may create before states actively defect or turn to extra-regional mediation.
Mercosur developed and actively utilizes its regional dispute settlement mechanism.

43

This was problematic during the Peruvian exit threat in CAN when Peru did not want
to relinquish it exceptions to Andean policies.
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Though it does not appear to be effective in deepening relationships in part because of
perceived power imbalances within the region, it does allow member-states an outlet
during times of conflict and a forum for diplomacy.
This research increases our understanding of the driving factors of regional
cooperation. In particular, it addressed the impact of economic indicators on political
indicators of cooperation in Latin American organizations arguing that economic
asymmetry leads to periods of defection. In an era of globalization, emerging regions
have much to gain through regional cooperation as they seek to simultaneously integrate
with the global economy and protect themselves from international volatility. These gains
must be kept in mind as organizations move forward with any policy attempt to minimize
asymmetries. Through a better understanding of what helps and hinders cooperation
efforts, regional organizations will be better aware of the challenges they face and able to
further explore policies to minimize the impact of potentially detrimental factors.
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Appendices
Appendix A
Components of the Cooperation Index variable:
Level of Representation:
The level of representation (LOR) index was calculated by the Frederick S.
Pardee Center for International Futures (Moyer et al, 2015). The index captures formal
diplomatic relations between two states in a given year looking at the presence of an
embassy and ambassador as well as their level of focus devoted to the singular
relationship. Below is the distribution of the LOR scores for the cases observed.
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Alliance Index:
The alliance index captures the degree of formalized military alliances between
two states. It looks at obligations for non-aggression, neutrality, consultation, defense,
and mutual offense action giving increasing weight to each one respectively. The data
was collected from ATOP and compiled into the alliance index by the Pardee Center for
International Futures.

Trade Index:
The trade index captures the depth of formal free trade agreements between states.
It looks at preferential trade agreements in force, association, regional, and bilateral free
trade agreements, and the formation and accession of custom unions agreements giving
increasing weight to each one respectively. The index is based on data from the World
209

Bank’s Global Preferential Trade Agreements Database and assembled by the Pardee
Center for International Futures.

Dispute Index:
The dispute index observes formalized disputes taken to the WTO as well as
militarized interstate disputes as coded by the Correlates of War project in their
Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) database. The conflicts captured in the MID
database include information on their fatality levels and the highest military action taken
during the dispute. The fatality levels were given a score from 0 to 6 with 0 indicating no
recorded deaths and 6 indicating over 999 deaths. The highest military action was coded
from 1 to 5 with 1 indicating no militarized action and 5 indicating beginning or joining
an interstate war.
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Appendix B
Cooperation index variable distribution.
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Appendix C
Null Regression Results
Mixed-effects ML regression

Number of obs

=

487

Group variable: _all

Number of groups

=

1

Obs per group:

Log likelihood = -68.646152

cooperationDISIN

Coef.

_cons

1.46501

Std. Err.

min =

487

avg =

487.0

max =

487

Wald chi2(0)

=

.

Prob > chi2

=

.

z

P>|z|

[95% Conf. Interval]

.123436

11.87

Estimate

Std. Err.

sd(R.year)

.3128378

.034187

.2525222

.38756

sd(R.org_name)

.4606173

.0825199

.3242253

.6543854

sd(Residual)

.2209253

.0077463

.2062528

.2366416

Random-effects Parameters

0.000

1.22308

1.706941

[95% Conf. Interval]

_all: Identity

_all: Identity

LR test vs. linear model: chi2(2) = 633.64

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Note: LR test is conservative and provided only for reference.

ICC for the Null Model
• .3128378/(.3128378+.4606173+.2209253) = .3146055
• .4606173/(.3128378+.4606173+.2209253) = .4632204
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Appendix D
Correlation chart for all IVs
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Appendix E
Regression Analysis: VIF and ICC for each model.
•

Model 1A
o VIF test for multicollinearity
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

BOTglb_org

1.73

0.578788

GBZ_org

1.57

0.636440

hegemon

1.38

0.723897

growth_org

1.37

0.732054

BOTreg_org

1.31

0.763377

growth_time

1.07

0.934778

BOTglb_time

1.07

0.937788

BOTreg_time

1.04

0.961083

GBZ_time

1.01

0.986432

Mean VIF

1.28

o ICC (intra-class correlation coefficient)
§ .2543835/(.2543835+.1931743+.2011576) = .39213421
§ .1931743/(.2543835+.1931743+.2011576) = .29777974
•

Model 1B
o VIF test
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

FDI_org

2.24

0.445819

growth_org

1.98

0.504548

member_org

1.77

0.565861

GBZ_org

1.73

0.577978

hegemon

1.64

0.609861

member_time

1.32

0.757112

FDI_time

1.12

0.892572

GBZ_time

1.07

0.932746

growth_time

1.04

0.959003

Mean VIF

1.55

. xtmixed cooperationDISIN growth_org FDI_org member_org
o ICC
§ .2689799/(.2689799+.1382544+.2095399) = .43610757
§ .1382544/(.2689799+.1382544+.2095399) = .22415724
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GBZ_org hegemon growth_t

•

Model 2A
o VIF test
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

BOTglb_org

2.50

0.399271

GBZ_org

1.85

0.539721

regtrade_org

1.65

0.605944

BOTreg_org

1.64

0.609354

hegemon

1.50

0.666506

regime_org

1.36

0.737652

regime_time

1.28

0.783914

regtrade_t~e

1.26

0.793396

BOTreg_time

1.14

0.878267

GBZ_time

1.11

0.899570

BOTglb_time

1.03

0.968252

Mean VIF

1.48

o ICC
§
§
•

.1972637/(.1972637+.1722767+.1939596) = .35006868
.1722767/(.1972637+.1722767+.1939596) = .30572618

Model 2B
o VIF test
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

FDI_org

3.51

0.285116

member_org

2.48

0.402920

regtrade_org

2.42

0.413256

growth_org

1.92

0.520930

member_time

1.68

0.596366

GBZ_org

1.56

0.639090

regtrade_t~e

1.35

0.742020

USinf_org

1.34

0.747551

FDI_time

1.15

0.872918

growth_time

1.12

0.894091

GBZ_time

1.08

0.927278

USinf_time

1.07

0.932551

Mean VIF

1.72

o ICC
§
§

.2607075/(.2607075+.1404254+.199867) = .43378959
.1404254/(.2607075+.1404254+.199867) = .23365295
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•

Model 3B
o VIF test
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

GBZavg_org

1.18

0.845520

GBZavg_time

1.16

0.858705

BOTregavg_~g

1.15

0.866513

growthavg_~e

1.14

0.878850

hegemon

1.03

0.971509

BOTregavg_~e

1.03

0.975529

Mean VIF

1.12

. xtmixed cooperationDISIN growthavg_org BOTregavg_org
o ICC
§ .2533755/(.2533755+.2208452+.2177434) = .36616856
§ .2208452/(.2533755+.2208452+.2177434) = .31915702

•

GBZavg_org hegemon growtha

Model 3B
o VIF test
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

member_time

1.13

0.882966

FDIavg_time

1.09

0.914613

FDIavg_org

1.04

0.957618

hegemon

1.02

0.979057

member_org

1.02

0.982483

growthavg_~e

1.01

0.991533

Mean VIF

1.05

. xtmixed cooperationDISIN growthavg_org FDIavg_org member_org
o ICC
§ .2874108/(.2874108+.1738401+.2131373) = .42618005
§ .1738401/(.2874108+.1738401+.2131373) = .25777453

•

Model 3C
o VIF test
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

growthavg_~g

1.34

0.748604

hegemon

1.28

0.781987

BOTglbavg_~g

1.13

0.882158

growthavg_~e

1.04

0.960166

BOTglbavg_~e

1.04

0.960664

Mean VIF

1.17

o ICC
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hegemon growthavg_

§
§
•

Model 4A
o VIF test
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

GBZavg_org

1.75

0.571809

BOTregavg_~g

1.65

0.607557

GBZavg_time

1.62

0.617397

regimeavg_~e

1.41

0.710890

regtrade_t~e

1.26

0.792756

BOTregavg_~e

1.20

0.836030

growthavg_~e

1.18

0.849559

regtrade_org

1.16

0.859719

regimeavg_~g

1.12

0.893061

hegemon

1.11

0.896961

Mean VIF

1.35

o ICC
§
§
•

.2630611/(.2630611+.3193706+.2050402) = .33405776
.3193706/(.2630611+.3193706+.2050402) = .40556444

.2922951/(.2922951+.1916949+.2078783) = .42247217
.1916949/(.2922951+.1916949+.2078783) = .27706848

Model 4B
o VIF test
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

FDIavg_org

1.83

0.547690

hegemon

1.82

0.550849

USinfavg_org

1.79

0.558040

FDIavg_time

1.72

0.582296

member_time

1.62

0.618187

member_org

1.61

0.619583

regimeavg_~e

1.48

0.676446

regtrade_org

1.45

0.687805

regtrade_t~e

1.43

0.701436

regimeavg_~g

1.23

0.813588

USinfavg_t~e

1.21

0.829676

growthavg_~e

1.07

0.934944

Mean VIF

1.52

o ICC
§
§

.3200807/(.3200807+.1470886+.196644) = .48218483
.1470886/(.3200807+.1470886+.196644) = .22158128

219

•

Model 4C
o VIF test
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

member_time

1.60

0.625037

regtrade_t~e

1.35

0.743246

regtrade_org

1.28

0.780700

member_org

1.21

0.827344

hegemon

1.20

0.834072

BOTglbavg_~g

1.20

0.835601

regimeavg_~e

1.18

0.848232

regimeavg_~g

1.15

0.869856

BOTglbavg_~e

1.09

0.916962

growthavg_~e

1.04

0.957522

Mean VIF

1.23

. xtmixed cooperationDISIN growthavg_org BOTglbavg_org member_org
o ICC
§ .2559458/(.2559458+.1625279+.1846498) = .42436715
§ .1625279/(.2559458+.1625279+.1846498) = .26947698

•

regtrade_org re

Model 5A
o VIF test
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

growthavg_~g

2.19

0.456370

regime_org

2.01

0.498206

BOTglb_org

1.92

0.520355

member_org

1.91

0.524202

member_time

1.49

0.671312

regtrade_t~e

1.46

0.685631

regtrade_org

1.43

0.698781

regime_time

1.21

0.827723

growthavg_~e

1.03

0.969514

BOTglb_time

1.02

0.983260

Mean VIF

1.57

. xtmixed cooperationDISIN BOTglb_org growthavg_org member_org
o ICC
§ .2271622/(.2271622+.1354236+.1806619) = .41815584
§ .1354236/(.2271622+.1354236+.1806619) = .24928518

220

regtrade_org regim

•

Model 5B
o VIF test
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

growthavg_~g

2.49

0.400824

FDI_org

1.89

0.530238

regime_org

1.84

0.544518

regtrade_org

1.18

0.845040

regime_time

1.17

0.852709

regtrade_t~e

1.12

0.893564

FDI_time

1.08

0.927369

growthavg_~e

1.01

0.985728

Mean VIF

1.47

o ICC
§
§
•

.2249551/(.2249551+.1621173+.2125208) = .37517954
.1621173/(.2249551+.1621173+.2125208) = .27037882

Model 5C
o VIF test
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

growth_org

2.03

0.492494

member_org

1.95

0.511759

growthavg_~g

1.70

0.589060

GBZavg_org

1.58

0.632441

regtrade_org

1.53

0.653187

member_time

1.49

0.670548

GBZavg_time

1.39

0.721363

regtrade_t~e

1.32

0.757524

growthavg_~e

1.17

0.857188

growth_time

1.08

0.930026

Mean VIF

1.52

o ICC
§
§

.2558363/(.2558363+.1478105+.2103782) = .41665453
.1478105/(.2558363+.1478105+.2103782) = .24072391

221

